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Abstract
This thesis explores the idea that reinvention of their social identities is a possible
means for members of subordinate social groups to demonstrate competencies in
moral agency. As well as being considered morally inferior in the wider community,
members of subordinate social groups may experience diminished moral agency as a
result of external social constraints and the internalisation of negative stereotypes.
Since a person's social identity is implicated in both their oppression and their
potential for resistance, identity is problematised by positing that all persons have a
multiplicity of identities, as proposed by Maria Lugones, including both privileged
and oppressed identities. Social identities are further conceived as both mutable and
possessing fluid boundaries. Being able to reinvent themselves depends upon persons
developing feelings of self-worth and a sense of self-respect, which in turn rely upon
the acquisition of appropriate self-knowledge through situational awareness.
Crossing over the boundaries among their different identities and situating
themselves critically in the margins provides oppressed persons with the social and
discursive space to lay claim to new and reinvented selves. Since self-knowledge and
self-direction are key to developing capacities in moral agency as well as to self-
definition, I suggest that, rather than rely on political force to effect change,
individual group members are able to resist systematic oppression based on their
group memberships by making their social identities, relationships, and practices
intelligible in their moral accounts. Limitations on self-knowledge and the
possibilities of others attending to us, however, mean that these accounts can only be
partial, and that persons with non-standard identities also expose themselves to the
moral risk that their identities, relationships and practices may be unintelligible to
others because they lack a shared interpretive framework. Nevertheless, it is argued
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that the imperfect nature of these moral accounts does not invalidate the potential of
self-reinvention as a tool to enable the development of the competencies necessary
for the exercise of moral agency.
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1Introduction
Oppressed people resist by identifying themselves as
subjects, by defining their reality, shaping their new
identity, naming their history, telling their story.
(bell hooks 1989, 43)
This thesis explores the possibility that persons whose moral competence has
been compromised by oppression may be able to develop the skills necessary for
moral agency, and take responsibility for their choices, by asserting the value of non-
normative identities, relationships and practices in their moral accounts of their
choices and identities. In this project I am mainly concerned with persons who, as a
result of their membership of particular social groups, for example, women, the aged,
racial and ethnic minorities, lesbians, gays and transgendered, and people with
disabilities, frequently either experience diminished moral competency or are
perceived by others to have diminished moral competency, which impedes their
ability to act. I will be arguing that problematising social identities through self-
defined group standpoints (Collins 2002, 208) may allow persons whose social
identities are constrictive in terms of their capacity to exercise moral agency to
challenge the stereotypical identities of mainstream categorisation. Although this
project advocates the disruption of social categories, in practice it is enormously
difficult to use real-life examples of social identities without reference to mainstream
categories of identity. Post-structuralist approaches, particularly the influential
theories of Judith Butler (1990) on gendered identity, suggest a way around this
difficulty by rejecting the idea of identity as a reflection of a person's essential nature
2and arguing instead that it is an effect of a person's actions, and therefore that identity
categories are fluid and provisional, and can be either reinforced or destabilised
through performance. However, rather than pursue this direction I have chosen to
follow the discourse that emphasises the 'real' nature of social identities (Alcoff
2006) because of its currency and meaningfulness in the examination of everyday
struggles with identity. Therefore, I will continue to describe social identities in
terms of these social categories, although I am keenly aware there is a tension
between my necessity to make use of this language and my criticism of social
categorisation as a contributory factor in oppression.1
Persons belonging to social groups whose members are subject to oppression
and social and political powerlessness may experience diminished moral agency as a
result of social constraints on what is considered appropriate behaviour for members
of that social group or due to psychological barriers to expressing themselves in
specific contexts. Members of other social groups, for example, mainstream socially
dominant groups in given contexts, such as men, white people, heterosexuals, and
able-bodied people, may perceive members of subjugated social groups as less
morally competent as a result of negative expectations and assumptions attached to
particular social identities, for example, that women are not assertive enough to make
good leaders.2 These prejudiced perceptions may result in these persons being
considered of lesser moral worth and not of equal standing in the moral community,
and this negative perception by others may inform the person’s own feelings of self-
1 Because I am principally concerned with the implications of social identity for agency some
aspects of moral theory, particularly with regard to how oppressive practices affect specific
dimensions of agency such as that found in theories of practical reasoning, are beyond the scope of
this work. For an overview of practical reasoning and the approaches found in Aristotle, Hume and
Kant the reader is referred to Audi (2006).
2 I will be using the terms 'subjugated', 'subordinate(d)', and 'oppressed' interchangeably to refer to
persons whose social identities as members of particular social group(s) diminish both their social
power and moral standing in the wider community.
3worth. However, even if persons do not internalise the negative perceptions of others
the fact that others view them as morally inferior may diminish their capacity to
exercise moral agency effectively and appropriately. In addition, unreasonable
normative expectations about the kind of behaviours associated with members of
subordinate groups may operate to curtail the kind of actions available to members of
these groups, for instance, the idea that gays and lesbians cannot raise well balanced
children may affect gays and lesbians acting on their aspirations to be parents.
Persons whose moral worth is often questioned by others may lack the kind of social
conditions necessary in which to demonstrate full moral agency or take responsibility
for their actions. I argue that there is resistance potential for members of subjugated
groups in taking responsibility through the moral accounts of their practices,
relationships and identities if the person giving the account has attained a critical
perspective in relation to the choices they make and the identities they espouse.
Identity is posited as multiple, mutable, and with fluid boundaries (Lugones
1990b, 503), so that persons possess any number and combination of oppressed and
privileged social identities as a result of their membership(s) of different social
groups. These multiple identities do not fragment the unity of the self since the
authenticity and integrity of a multiple self is understood as being attained through
ongoing activity, particularly through exercising autonomy skills (Meyers 2000,
172), rather than through the integration of the different aspects of the self.3 Since the
self is conceived of as both embodied and inter-relational, the exercise of autonomy
skills depends upon our relationships with others as these either facilitate or diminish
the development of self-worth and moral competency that are necessary for the
3 See Chapter Three for more discussion of the integrated self and Chapters Four and Five for what
it means to show integrity in terms of a person’s dependable responsiveness to others and in the
moral accounts they give.
4exercise of moral agency. Understanding moral agency through the lens of the plural,
relational self makes possible the notion of resistance as the reinvention of social
identities by the critical positioning of the self in regard to these identities, as well as
the potential (un)intelligibility of these reimagined identities by others.
The idea that moral agency requires persons to be self-aware and have
knowledge of their authentic desires, values, beliefs, and emotional states, is
supported by Diana Tietjens Meyers's (1989) description of the skills necessary for
autonomous choice: self-discovery, self-direction, and self-definition. The
acquisition of relevant self-knowledge and effective moral reflection for a person's
self-definition is dependent on being valued and acknowledged by others.
Consequently, persons have to develop feelings of self-worth and self-respect in
order to see themselves, and to be seen by others, as capable of making worthy moral
choices and able to provide credible explanations for those choices. However, this
may be difficult in inequitable societies in which some persons are devalued on the
basis of their social identities; therefore, practices that facilitate the development of
self-worth and self-respect may also be productive of moral agency for persons
whose moral worth has been devalued by others.
By extension, it can be seen that the way persons make sense of moral
problems and express their choices is by constructing a narrative of explanation, that
is, a story of the values a person has relied upon in making their choices, and that the
communication, interpretation and evaluation skills which are necessary for narrative
competency presuppose those of autonomous competency (Atkins 2008, 136–37).
Limits on self-knowledge, for example, the partial nature of what we can know about
ourselves given that we are constructed relationally, operate in concert with the
constraints of oppressive social practices and institutions to prevent persons who are
5members of certain social groups from fully achieving this goal. This occurs as we
have seen above, where group memberships attract constraints on action, such as
constraints on affectionate displays by gays and lesbians in public places, or where
social expectations about group members impact their ability to develop the
competencies necessary to exercise full moral agency or take responsibility for their
choices, as when women develop emotional receptivity at the expense of self-
direction (Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000, 18).
In inequitable social contexts the categorisation of persons into social groups
and the social identities assigned persons may also contribute to oppression by
making it difficult for certain groups to exercise full moral agency where mainstream
assumptions about the homogeneity and stereotypical behaviour of group members
arises from understanding social identities as fixed and immutable. Consequently,
one response to dominant methods of categorisation is to argue for the relevance of
multiple (or 'intersectional') identities—the idea that we are always members of
multiple social groups, some of which may be privileged and some oppressed—
which require persons to be self-reflective and to situate themselves critically with
regard to their social identities. This response is central to the way I take up my
concern with moral competency because, as I shall argue, claiming plural situated
identities is one way for members of subordinate groups to avoid the difficulties
attendant on taking up or reclaiming demeaning mainstream stereotypes, although
the latter is another possible resistance strategy in some contexts.
Claiming plural situated identities is also important given that the social and
discursive spaces we inhabit, or are permitted to inhabit, are factors in oppression
and consequently in resistance. Persons who are marginalised by inequitable social
practices and hegemonic discourses—mainstream narratives, also called master
6narratives, which affirm and entrench the status quo and exclude the experiences of
subordinate groups—may consider that resistance equates to either the establishment
of a separate 'home' space or movement towards the centre of social and political life.
However, I argue that where persons have multiple social identities, some privileged
and some oppressed, they have to be able to move into the boundary zones between
different social groups and into the margins of social discourses in order to achieve
the critical positioning necessary to unsettle established social categories. Knowledge
systems provide a framing device for understanding information about the world and
therefore function to maintain a world view; challenging the dominant explanatory
framework by crossing over social and discursive boundaries makes alternative,
situated epistemologies possible.
Although the resistance potential of making oneself intelligible through moral
accounts has been suggested by a number of theorists,4 I believe I am alone in
suggesting the liberatory potential of self-definition through the critical positioning
achieved by inhabiting multiple perspectives of self-understanding. Developing
awareness of their situated multiple identities allows persons to achieve the critical
perspective necessary to interrogate assumptions and expectations about social
identities arising from group memberships and to question the privileging of some
identities achieved by subjugating others. In systems of oppression, both the
construction of a person's social identity by dominant forces and the internalisation
of negative attitudes toward a social identity may function to distort a person's sense
of self. Consequently, it may be difficult for persons subjected to domination to
construct a narrative of identity that is true to their authentic selves, that is, an
account of themselves that reflects the person's authentic desires and hence is
4 See, for example, Babbitt (2001) and Nelson (2001a; 2001b).
7morally credible (Meyers 2000, 158), rather than one conforming with desires that
have been generated by their internalisation of external forces, such as normative
expectations associated with the social identity they have been ascribed. Undertaking
the kind of self-discovery and self-definition required to reveal the authentic self in
these constrained situations requires persons to position themselves in the margins,
in-between their different social identities, between self and self, and between self
and other, since it is in these threshold places that self-transformation is possible
(Anzaldua 2002, 1). It is my contention that moral accounts from the margins of
social spaces function to question the notion of difference as a means of
marginalising and disempowering the oppressed, and therefore that these moral
accounts present a challenge to the way identities are categorised under systems of
social domination. Because situated narratives may not be fully understood using the
dominant knowledge scheme, those seeking to understand may also have to adopt a
new or an alternative interpretive framework, and hence to question the
epistemological certainties of domination.
Oppressive practices and social institutions based on group memberships lead
both to the diminution of moral agency arising from expectations about the moral
capacity of persons with certain social identities, and to incomprehensibility about
their actions and choices as a result of a lack of epistemic credibility in mainstream
discourses. Consequently, a person's ability to create a narrative of their self re-
conceptualisation or self-definition, as well as revealing their capacity to function as
a moral agent, also becomes a means of challenging negative expectations about
members of their group by making their practices, identities and relationships
intelligible to others. Such an activity brings with it a moral risk, that the person's
moral life will be misunderstood (Calhoun 1999a). However, I am in agreement with
8Susan Babbitt's (2001, 82) contention that sometimes it may be necessary for persons
to take the risk of being unintelligible to others in order act in ways that are
commensurate with seeing themselves as a certain sort of person, someone with
moral worth, even if such a valuation is contrary to how they are seen by others.
In this thesis I defend the view that before persons are able to exercise moral
agency they first have to acquire skills in moral competency. Moral competency
consists of developing a diverse skill set that enables persons to undertake the kinds
of practices necessary for demonstrating moral agency (Walker 2007, 10). Moral
agency itself is not simply the capacity to act but instead is considered to be a
person’s ability to act in accordance with their own deliberated choices that arise
from and fulfil their own authentic desires. Whether their desires are authentically
arrived at depends upon a person’s ability to value themselves and to see themselves
as worthwhile individuals who are entitled to be treated as equal members of the
moral community, and this may be influenced by how they are seen by others.
Additionally, some persons may be unable to differentiate their own authentic desires
from the normative expectations associated with members of their social group by
others. For example, a woman may have difficulty in identifying whether her desire
to have a child is authentically hers or not. Consequently, for persons belonging to
some social groups significant internal and external barriers exist that may diminish
their ability to exercise full moral agency.
My claim, then, is that a person’s ability to develop the skills in moral
competency, necessary for full moral agency, is influenced by the social identities
they are assigned or assume, since these identities are socially constructed and come
with normative expectations and assumptions which serve to constrain the exercise
of moral agency for members of some social groups. This constraint on moral agency
9occurs because a person’s ability to develop competencies in moral agency is, to
some extent, contingent upon whether they see themselves as morally worthy and
develop feelings of self-respect, and this, in turn, depends to some extent upon how
others perceive them. Therefore, it is my contention that resistance to oppressive
social constraints for persons whose group identities are devalued by others involves
persons recognising the existence of multiple perspectives arising from their multiple
group memberships, and critically examining these situated perspectives in order to
re-evaluate and redefine these identities. Further, I argue that such a project may
involve persons valuing their own identities and insisting on the meaningfulness of
their relationships and practices, regardless of how these are perceived by others, in
particular members of privileged groups.
Structuring the thesis proved difficult because the chapters are interconnected
thematically, and it has been challenging to develop the argument in a linear fashion
while keeping track of its complex interrelated concerns. In order to maintain some
order, generally speaking Chapters One to Three are concerned with the effects of
social identities on the development of moral agency, while Chapters Four to Six
examine how identity impacts upon persons exercising moral agency.
In order to trace the key arguments of this thesis—that resistance depends
upon developing self-worth and the capacities necessary for moral agency by
claiming pluralist situated identities and making these intelligible to others through
the moral accounts persons give—and to elucidate these themes, I begin in Chapter
One by considering some ideas about the social forces of domination. I propose a
definition of oppression that supports my proposal for possible means of resistance.
Teresa de Lauretis (1990) has suggested that the different ways in which power is
viewed leads to conceptions of resistance; my own understanding of the possibilities
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for resistance depends upon an understanding of power as relational, rather than a
force that is held in the hands of specific individuals and institutions and which acts
upon one from outside. This approach relies on Michel Foucault's (1981, 94)
description of power as a force which circulates through the social field and that is
revealed when it is exercised; and further, that resistance is intrinsic to the exercise of
power (McLaren 2004, 217–18), making the relationships between persons and
between persons and social institutions the focus of resistance. My understanding of
oppression in a civil or social context also owes a debt to earlier conceptions of
power, particularly socio-psychological understandings such as those found in the
work of Axel Honneth and Charles Taylor (Fraser 1996, 14) that suggest that
oppressive forces undermine persons' sense of self-worth; and, I would further claim,
that distort what persons can know about themselves and the world. Combining these
understandings of power and resistance with the idea that persons are oppressed in
relation to social identities which arise from their assignment to subordinate social
groups, I arrive at a view of oppression as social constraints directed at members of
these social groups which hinder their capacity to develop the competencies
necessary for exercising full moral agency. In this chapter I also briefly consider the
way social group formation contributes to oppression by the homogenising and
stereotyping of members of out-groups leading to the objectification of persons
belonging to these subjugated cohorts.
I consider the aspects of social identities arising from group memberships
which contribute to oppression in more detail in Chapter Two. In particular, I focus
on the way the operations of social powers, including identity power, help to
normalise unjust social practices in the creation of some social identities, especially
in inequitable societies. I continue the discussion of social identities by considering
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Maria Lugones's (1994, 460) contention that dominant processes of categorisation
actively contribute to oppression, and her inference that resistance to these processes
may require renewed thinking by all involved, both advantaged and disadvantaged,
about the kind of social categories to which persons are assigned. The chapter
concludes by considering Lugones's proposal of claiming multiple identities as a
means of resisting for those whose opportunities and agency are diminished by the
identities they are assigned by the dominant social order. Before doing this, however,
I pick up the epistemic aspect of social oppression again when I consider how the
situated knowledges of the subjugated may assist in their resistance and how
privilege-cognizance—that is, awareness that in inequitable societies some social
identities accrue advantages regardless of any individual merit—may help create the
potential for resistance by revealing to those with privileged identities how their
privilege is contingent upon practices of exclusion and discrimination.
Having raised the possibility of a person's self-definition being a means for
them to resist oppressive categorisations in Chapter Two, I consider in Chapter Three
some aspects of the self that are necessary for exercising this autonomous behaviour,
using as my basis Marya Schechtman's (1996) notion of narrative self-constitution. I
begin examining the relational nature of moral agency by considering what aspects
of the self are essential for full moral agency, emphasising the development of skills
in autonomy competencies (Meyers 2004, xvii) which itself requires feelings of self-
worth and self-respect that can only be obtained by being valued as a person by other
members of the moral community. I adopt Meyers’s argument that the notion of the
unified, integrated and authentic self is not at odds with the idea of multiple identities
if an integrated self is thought of as one in which the distinctive set of qualities
making up a personality unite the disparate elements of the self (1989, 70), and
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authenticity is understood as the exercise of autonomy skills and integration as the
intelligibility of a person’s autonomous self-definition and self-discovery (2000,
172). Before this I suggest that the project of self-definition may require persons to
unsettle their ideas about fixed boundaries of the self and of social identities and that
such an idea requires a concept of social space, or space within power relationships,
in which it is possible to conceptualise ideas of self and identity outside the dominant
interpretive framework. Consequently, the second part of the chapter concentrates on
how social spaces operate to constrain persons, through either social practices or
expectations, and how this constraint is related to their embodiment. I also look in
detail at actual social spaces and the power relationships involved, particularly how
the notion of 'home' or 'homeplace' as a place of safety and empowerment is at odds
with many persons' actual experiences, observing that conceptual understandings of
public and private space are closely related to ideas about autonomy and agency. As
a result of this investigation, I reject the idea that persons are able to act as full moral
agents when they are in a 'safe' space, arguing that notions of safety and home entail
an idea of the self that is too static. Instead, I return to the notion of boundary
crossing between social identities.
In Chapter Four I move on from the discussion of how moral agency may be
constrained in situations of oppression to consider how it may be exercised given the
constraints outlined in the first half of the thesis. I focus on the aspect of taking
responsibility for personal choices and identities, given that practices of
responsibility are central to how we practice morality (Walker 2007, 16–17),
although acknowledging the problematic nature of responsibility-taking for persons
whose agency has been diminished by oppression. I consider two different but
complementary approaches to taking responsibility: making oneself intelligible to
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others through the explanations given for one's choices (Hoagland 1988), and
committing to a project, values or relationship by actively standing behind practices,
identities and relationships (Card 1996). Both approaches require persons to be self-
reflective and to develop appropriate self-knowledge and self-understanding, and
they therefore rely upon them demonstrating skills in autonomy and narrative
competency in order to give coherent moral accounts of themselves. Being able to
give a moral account of one's choices and actions is a basic element of responsibility-
taking, since moral self-accounting may be demanded of us or we may demand it of
others for their actions and choices. In addition, we understand moral problems by
way of the moral accounts given by those involved. However, unless those attending
to these moral accounts situate themselves so as to listen with a non-judgemental
attitude, then there is room for those giving the accounts to be misunderstood or be
unintelligible, particularly if they stand behind non-normative practices, identities
and relationships.
Given that one of the risks of giving moral accounts is being misunderstood, I
begin Chapter Five by considering the conditions required for a moral account to be
intelligible to others. The key factor in determining whether a person's moral account
is intelligible is whether they share a moral framework with others about what
constitutes living a good life within which the person's behaviour is meaningful to
those others. Where persons stand behind non-normative behaviours, identities and
relationships they may lack this shared interpretive framework, with the result that
their choices and ensuing explanations are unintelligible to others. I suggest that
whether there is social uptake, in the sense that a person's choices or behaviours are
meaningful, and hence intelligible, to others, depends upon whether that person,
because of their group affiliations, has the good moral luck to be a member of a
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social group which has some credibility. In the second half of the chapter I consider
the argument that when a person's claims are unintelligible to others then the person
is taking a moral risk, that is, the risk that they may not see themselves as possessing
self-worth, or have the expectations appropriate to persons possessing self-worth,
because the meanings they stand behind are not socially validated (Babbitt 2001, 4).
Persons risk their actions or choices being misunderstood when they either stand
behind non-normative identities, relationships and practices or when they belong to a
social group whose members are denied certain kinds of moral agency, in other
words, when they are perceived by others as not being full members of the moral
community. Although being misunderstood or unintelligible to others can be
interpreted as evidence of moral failure (Calhoun 1999a), I argue that acting in ways
commensurate with one's feelings of self-worth, and contrary to the negative
valuations of others, may gain acknowledgement of one's value from those others,
even if one's choices and actions themselves are unintelligible.
In the final chapter I bring together the idea that persons can resist the
negative perceptions and expectations which are present in dominant categorisations
of their social identities by valuing themselves and insisting on the meaningfulness
of their practices, identities and relationships. I argue that self-worth can be built by
re-envisaging social identities, but I caution that such an undertaking requires
challenging the dominant interpretive framework and consequently may result in a
person's actions and choices being misunderstood by others. Re-creating one's sense
of self involves developing the skills in autonomy and narrative competency which I
described in Chapter Three; however, it also presupposes that persons inhabit social
and discursive spaces that enhance the development of these essential moral
competencies. Also such re-imaginings of the self are necessarily partial since there
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are significant external and internal limitations on a project of self-invention
(Mackenzie 2008), particularly where oppressive forces distort the kinds of social
identities available. Despite these limits, however, I suggest that when persons are
valued as equal members of the moral community their practices, identities and
relationships are considered meaningful even when these are not fully intelligible to
others.
I offer the thesis that taking responsibility for one's choices by claiming plural
situated identities and making these identities and one's relationships and practices
intelligible to others through the moral accounts one gives as a tentative first step
towards resisting the demoralising effect of oppressive social forces. Such moral
accounts are necessarily partial given that self-knowledge and self-understanding are
incomplete; moreover, such accounts risk unintelligibility if persons stand behind
non-normative identities and behaviours, impairing their potential social uptake.
Consequently, such accounts are limited in their transformative power. The main
impact of such accounts would seem to be in their ability to empower the person
giving the account by giving them a means to assert their moral worth and to
demonstrate moral competency. However, as some of the examples given will show,
the social costs of standing behind non-normative identities and behaviours may
outweigh potential benefits. Further work needs to be done to establish how
transformative moral accounts can be, perhaps through an investigation of such
accounts and their social impacts.
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1. Oppression and relationships of power
For every oppressed group there is a group that is
privileged in relation to that group.
(Iris Marion Young 1988, 276)
Introduction
In this chapter I develop a conceptual understanding of oppression in which
membership of different social groups becomes the justification for privileging some
social identities at the expense of others, where social identities are conceived as
multiple, fluid and inter-relational, so that degrees of both oppressed and privileged
social identities may co-exist in the same individual.5 Historically, the conceptual
shift from political to social analyses has allowed socio-psychological aspects of
oppression to emerge as significant barriers to resistance. Chief among these for my
purposes are social expectations about moral capacity which lead to the
diminishment of effective moral agency, particularly in persons who are members of
less privileged groups. Several feminist theorists, for example Marilyn Frye (1983,
10–11) and Ann Cudd (2006, 23), support a view of oppression expressed by Iris
Young as "the inhibition of a group through a vast network of everyday practices,
attitudes, assumptions, behaviours, and institutional rules" (1988, 275), resulting in
systematic harms unjustly perpetrated on group members. The distortion and
5 A number of theorists either reject the notion that social group memberships influence identity to
the degree suggested here, or argue that the effect of social group memberships on identity is so
profound that no unified identity can emerge. See Meyers (2000, 158–59, 162–63) for a detailed
discussion and rebuttal of these two positions. I would also argue that identities arising from group
membership(s) do not exclude the possibility of a unified self, and, although social group
memberships are significant in terms of the formation of identity, these are not the only factors
involved. For example, see Fricker (2007, 14–17) for the role of identity power in social identity
formation.
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ossification of power relationships between members of different social groups is
central to the construction of a resistance strategy, since any attempt at resistance
needs to acknowledge the web of interconnected and interdependent relationships
any one individual has, and how, given the co-existence of privileged and oppressed
social identities, these relationships may both disempower and empower them to
effect change. The complexity of social power relationships in conjunction with the
multiple nature of social identities means that any strategy for resistance must be
equivocal about the possibility of success; however, the intricate interplay itself
suggests the possibility of resistance, albeit with these reservations.
History and development of concepts of oppression and resistance
I will briefly consider some historical approaches to oppression theory in
Western thought, drawing on work done by feminist theorists, in particular Cudd
(2006) and Nancy Fraser (1996), before considering the role of social groups in
relation to oppression in more detail. As Cudd shows, the concept of oppression has
undergone a number of significant changes since gaining momentum with the advent
of liberalism and the notion that human beings should be treated equally.6 It was
conceived in quite different ways by different theorists until, in the modern period, it
began to refer to arbitrary or unjust laws causing economic or physical deprivation
(Cudd 2006, 7).7 In the nineteenth century the concept was broadened by social
movements, such as first wave feminism, so that rather than referring only to
political subjugation of a people by a ruler, oppression could also encompass the
6 See Cudd (2006) for a detailed outline of how the concept has changed over time.
7 As mentioned by Cudd (2006, 5–6), Hobbes, Rousseau and Locke offer quite distinct
understandings of what it means to be oppressed. Cudd sums these up as the understanding of
oppression as synonymous with domination and tyranny and suggesting "rule by an arbitrary or
opposing will, and resulting in the abrogation of liberal political rights, economic deprivations,
and physical brutality" (2006, 7).
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notion that one social group may be oppressed by another. Additional conceptual
shifts occurred during the nineteenth century resulting in more nuanced
understandings, including the idea that expectations based on social conventions and
prejudices could themselves be injurious to specific social groups. By focussing on
the mutual need for recognition between master and slave, Hegel's work on slavery
suggested another, psychological, account of oppression (Cudd 2006, 11). A further
shift occurred with Marx's analysis of oppression as fundamentally the economic
exploitation of labour by capital (Cudd 2006, 12–15).
Fraser (1996) makes the useful—although perhaps overly simplistic—
distinction between theories which categorise oppression as economic deprivation
and those that focus on cultural deprivation.8 According to Fraser, theories of
oppression can be divided into two main streams according to the responses
demanded by them: materialist conceptions which focus on economic deprivation,
such as Marxism, and cultural or symbolic understandings, which I describe as socio-
psychological, such as that found in Honneth and Taylor which build on Hegelian
ideas, in which exclusionary and marginalising social practices diminish the moral
worth of the oppressed.9 In the first case the situation of those who are oppressed can
be relieved by economic redistribution so that, for example, they have access to jobs
and schools, higher wages and professions previously denied them. In the second
case the goal is for the oppressed to gain social acceptance, which may be achieved
by gaining recognition from those with more power so that their voices are heard and
8 In her critique of Fraser's division Young queries whether the category of powerlessness can be
ascribed to maldistribution, given that it is described "both in terms of the division of labor and in
terms of norms of respect" (1998, 54). Young further suggests the imposition of two categories is
arbitrary since Fraser fails to justify the reduction to two categories over the five suggested by
Young (1988). I discuss Young's pluralist approach later in this chapter.
9 Fraser (2005) has since suggested a third division based on the exclusion of women from the
political framework, which has representation as the response demanded.
19
their identities, relationships and practices given credence. In both cases the world is
seen as being divided into a number of sub-groups under two over-arching main
groups: the privileged and the oppressed. In later chapters I will be arguing for an
understanding of social identities as both multiple and changeable, which would
suggest it is overly simplistic to divide the world in this way. However, the language
of oppression and privilege has a long history in feminist theory and provides a
useful framework for a discussion of social injustice which targets a group or
category of people.10
Cudd (2006, 21) critiques early theoretical approaches for failing to provide a
starting point for dealing with oppression. In doing so she indicates a further way
such theories can be divided, and another way of thinking about resistance. On the
one hand, Cudd argues, are those theorists such as Marx and Hegel, who suggest a
collective, functionalist approach is required for change, a future social form in
which such injustices are removed. The difficulty with such an approach for a person
finding themselves oppressed is how to act on an individual level. Conversely, Cudd
argues that Rousseau and Mill posit individualist theories that fail to include the
systemic nature of social injustices against an individual who is a member of a social
group, and that such an omission makes it unclear what is preventing individuals
from resisting by an act of will. Neither of these approaches is adequate, in Cudd's
opinion, because what is needed is a theory of oppression which acknowledges that
social oppression is perpetrated and maintained by social institutions but also "posits
mechanisms through which social phenomena work at the individual level" (2006,
21), and hence allows for individuals to respond.
10 Lugones (1994) suggests that the dualistic division of the social identities of the oppressed by the
privileged is integral to domination, denying as it does the necessarily multiplicitous nature of
social identities. I will consider this argument and its implications in more detail in Chapters Two
and Three.
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Fraser (1996, 13) makes a further distinction between two kinds of remedies,
affirmative and transformative, available to correct injustices of recognition or
distribution.11Affirmative remedies, such as the welfare state, aim at correcting
inequitable outcomes with regard to injustices of distribution without addressing the
underlying political structure, whereas transformative remedies, such as socialism,
attempt to address the framework which allows the injustice to occur. Where
injustices of recognition occur, affirmative remedies, such as multiculturalism, aim at
the cultural re-valuation of a social group whereas transformative remedies seek to
deconstruct the opposition between privileged and oppressed by reconceptualising
the subject. Fraser (1996, 28), in noting that some of these pairings are incompatible
because they aspire to opposing goals—for example, the redistribution of materials
to some groups via the welfare state is in tension with the deconstruction of social
identities—hints at the difficulties inherent in constructing a coherent approach to
resistance which is responsive to both the problem of recognition and the problem of
redistribution.
Other feminist approaches to oppression
Cudd (2006, 19) identifies a number of strands in recent feminist theorising
on oppression: those that owe their methodology and conceptual bases to Hegel,
Marx and Mill, that is, to failures of recognition, economic equality and legal
equality, as well as psychoanalytical analyses of oppression. Not limited to feminist
theory are approaches which focus on racial or ethnic oppression, the oppression of
the Jews as a result of the Holocaust, heterosexist oppression of gay, lesbian and
11 Kelly Oliver (2001, 50–51) argues that the distinction made by Fraser is not as marked as she
would claim since, although Fraser argues for a transformative approach which is not a simplistic
binary/oppositional approach of the affirmative approach, her analysis is a continuation of that
tradition.
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transsexual minorities, the oppression of the disabled, and the oppression of both the
elderly and children. Among feminist approaches to oppression, Jean Harvey's
(1999) suggests that the underlying relationships are fundamental to oppressive
situations, and it is the distorted nature of these relationships between members of
different groups that results in harm to some group members. This is an important
observation: it is not the imbalance in power between members of different groups
per se that makes for oppression, since many unequal power relationships are for the
most part healthy (parent-child, teacher-student, employer-employee, for example).
Rather, it is "power-laden but distorted relationships" (Harvey 1999, 39), which are
founded on accepted social practices, that result in harm to some individuals. For
example, if a parent makes decisions for a teenage child without consultation, even if
these decisions are in the child's interests and accord with their desires, the
"continual nonconsultation constitutes a significant distortion of what the
relationship should be" (Harvey 1999, 21). As a result, resistance commonly involves
the revelation of the underlying power relationships which have ossified to support
forces of domination (Young 1988, 275).
The contingent and unstable nature of social identities and their primacy in
feminist analyses of oppression has resulted in a focus on moral agency, since
agency, at least as it is understood here, is considered as being "concerned with the
social conditions for and requirements of action, as well as with the internal and
external barriers to action" (Deveaux 2000, 15). Given the feminist presupposition of
the compromised nature of autonomy and agency in the context of oppression,
resistance theories often emphasise how individuals may be able to demonstrate
moral and agential capabilities through affirmation or reclamation of social identities
in spite of diminished effective moral agency. For example, Claudia Card (1996) has
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argued for the importance of 'standing behind' identities, relationships and practices
as a lesbian as a means of taking responsibility for one's choices and the
endorsability of one's values, and I will return to this idea in Chapter Four. Similarly,
many third-world and feminists of colour emphasise the significance of re-evaluating
social identities, particularly those constructed by dominant social institutions.
Lugones (1994, 473), for example, has suggested that reducing plural identities to a
singular unity is a form of psychological oppression, insofar as it impels these
individuals to see themselves as fragmented selves, and resistance, therefore,
requires rethinking social categories as well as reconstruction of the identities
themselves. Given the complex nature of social identity construction—which I will
explore in the next section—and the difficulties involved in self-definition arising
from our dependency on others for knowledge of ourselves, which I will also revisit
in later chapters, the project of reconstructing identity, implicating as it does the need
for mutual intelligibility, becomes problematic.
Whether overtly or covertly most accounts of oppression refer to the different
ways oppression is experienced, and it might be more accurate to talk of cases of
cultural oppression, physical oppression, economic oppression or psychological
oppression, rather than of a general experience of oppression. Young (1988)
describes these varying manifestations—exploitation, marginalisation,
powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence—as the "five faces of oppression".
Although it is possible for an individual to experience all five if they are subject to
extreme forms of oppression, such as slavery, and some forms are more likely to be
experienced in some situations than others—cultural imperialism arising from
colonisation, for example—more commonly individuals experience a combination of
several of these 'faces'. Consequently, Young (1988, 276) argues that because
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oppression is experienced in different combinations of different factors by different
groups it is not possible to arrive at one account of oppression which covers all
cases; it is, however, possible to use a combination of the five aspects to describe the
circumstances of the oppression of any one group. Young's pluralist approach is
notable because it makes an attempt to include in the theory the complexity of
multiple oppressions arising from multiple group memberships, a point central to my
approach to oppression.12
Another way of thinking about the experience of oppression is that it is
manifested differently in different spheres. In the social realm oppression is typically
experienced via practices of discrimination, marginalisation and/or exclusion from
public life; psychologically, the internalisation of oppression can be perceived as loss
of self-respect, or belief that one lacks the capacity for autonomy (Bartky 1990, 29–
30); and, in discourse, oppression may be evident as the silencing, exclusion or
distortion (Morgan 1987) of some moral voices.
Finally, oppression can be approached by considering who benefits from its
continuation, expressed best in Sandra Bartky's insight that "the kinds of alienation"
generated by oppression "serve to maintain a vast system of privilege—privilege of
race, of sex, and of class" (1990, 32).
12 Unlike Young, however, I am not concerned with an account of oppression that describes every
possible kind of oppression in every possible circumstance. In particular, although I may allude to
them, I am less concerned with those instances of oppression that stem from colonisation—for
example, the subjugation or physical or cultural elimination of indigenous groups, physical or
economic enslavement—or state-sanctioned programs for eradication of whole groups, for
example, through ethnic cleansing, such as pogroms against the Jews and Romany. Two reasons
constrain my choice of examples of oppression: firstly, I have to draw the line somewhere or be
overwhelmed by the number of cases of oppression; and secondly, and most importantly, the
instances mentioned here often involve formal justification of the program of oppression, such as
laws which describe members of a group as non-citizens, and hence resistance must be undertaken
to change legal standing as well as to change the way in which the moral worth of the individuals
is viewed. My principal concern in this thesis, however, is the way individuals are viewed as
members of the moral community, and the experiences I am most concerned with are those that
diminish the moral capacity and agency of individuals through exclusion and/or marginalisation
rather than physical harm caused by overt violence or exploitation.
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In summary, an adequate conceptual understanding of social oppression must
point in the direction of a resolution to the injustices identified (Cudd 2006, 20–21),
while at the same time being complex enough as to require neither an overly
individualistic nor collectivist response. In addition, given the complexity of the
construction of social identities, any account of social oppression should avoid a
simplistic binary approach. It should provide individuals with the possibility of
resistance while not burdening them with the responsibility for changing social
institutions; and, instead of simply deconstructing oppositions between subject
groups it should anticipate the conceptual change needed for transformation to
occur.13 The account I am going to proffer here is that oppression is the unjust or
unfair treatment of individuals on the basis of their membership of social group(s),
which results in feelings and experiences of diminished moral worth and potentially
in the reduction of moral capacity and agency. In other words, I am concerned with
oppression that is the result of unfairly privileging one group over another, such that
the internalisation of oppression as a result of unjust treatment may impact on moral
capacity and agency. Consequently, the focus of my thesis is on the socio-
psychological aspects of oppression as my main concern is how the oppressed can
gain recognition of their moral worth given the way their moral capacity is
compromised as a result of how their social identities are viewed.
Group membership is important to my understanding of oppression insofar as
social identities contribute to oppression because individuals are identified as
belonging to particular social groups whose members have identities that often
attract negative descriptors. As Frye has put it: "If an individual is oppressed, it is in
13 Although I do not consider deconstructive approaches to oppression here, I have found useful
Oliver's (2001, 51) suggestion that, rather than limit themselves to the oppositional logic of binary
analysis, responses to oppression should provide an alternative conceptual framework to be truly
transformative.
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virtue of being a member of a group or category of people that is systematically
reduced, molded, immobilised. Thus, to recognise a person as oppressed, one has to
see that individual as belonging to a group of a certain sort" (1983, 8). Consequently,
the nature of social groups, particularly how they are constructed, is key to my
understanding of oppression, and I will consider this briefly in the rest of this chapter
before moving on to explore the nature of social identities and oppression in detail in
Chapter Two.
Social group membership
Although there is disagreement about the nature and formation of social
groups, or even that they exist (Cudd 2006, 34), the concept of group membership is
such a useful way of understanding human interactions that I believe it would be a
mistake to discard it prematurely merely because it is contested.14 I am aware there is
a tension between my use of the term and the implications of unity and coherence
that may not obtain for some groups, but it will be assumed for the purposes of my
thesis that social groups exist, and that they are significant in terms of social
structure and interpersonal interactions.15 However, because social groups may result
from established social practices and norms they may not be visible, even to
individual members of the group. Additionally, the multiplicity of group
memberships for individuals with multiple social identities may obscure recognition
14 Cudd (2006, 34–35) divides theorists into those who accept the existence of social groups and
those who deny that the term has any usefulness. She further broadly divides those who accept that
social groups exist into intentionalists, whose main focus is the social club, modern state or
conversational pair, and structuralists, who describe social groups as the result of implicit and
explicit social forces such as rules, norms, and practices.
15 Here I am in agreement with Alcoff, who argues that "group identities can be misnamed,
misrecognized, or misrepresented, but they are real entities, and thus are not inherently or
inevitably incorrect descriptions. They are not illusions, or reducible to the machinations of power,
or stable and fixed with closed borders and clear criteria of inclusion" (2006, 121; italics in
original).
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of the oppressive nature of some group memberships, for example, the gendered
oppression of white women who are privileged by race identity.16 However, it is
important to remember that at any point any single person usually belongs to several
groups, "their identities fuse axes of harm with axes of advantage", so that individual
subjects may be privileged and/or oppressed multiple times, and/or both privileged
and oppressed on the basis of group membership, dismantling "the stark opposition
between dominant and subordinate positions" (Meyers 2000, 160).
In order to examine how group membership contributes to oppression I will
utilise the ideas of a number of theorists, in particular those of Young (1988) and
Cudd (2006), on how social groups arise and how key features of social groups are
relevant to an understanding of oppression.17 Firstly, Cudd claims that social group
formation is externalist; that is, group formation is not related to the inner workings
of individuals, or what they feel about themselves, but instead to objective facts
about the world (Cudd 2006, 36). In other words, social groups are the result of
political and social realities not psychological states. Although I agree with Cudd that
social group formation is externalist and the resulting social identities must be
endorsed by others, I also argue in the following chapters that an externalist view is
neither wholly deterministic nor does it preclude the possibility of self-definition. For
example, a member of the gendered group 'woman' is able to some extent to pick and
choose which of the characteristics associated with being a woman she will take up
and which she will reject. Which aspects of an identity are sufficient for the person to
16 Tom Robinson's accuser, Mayella Ewell, in To Kill a Mockingbird falls into this group; Harper Lee
(2006) reveals this duality by showing that Mayella has power over Tom because of her race,
while her gender simultaneously makes her a victim of her father.
17 Cudd’s discussion on social groups makes use of empirical research and approaches in social
psychology which are outside the scope of this thesis. For relevant studies in this area the reader is
referred to Tajfel (1981), Oakes et al (1994), and Branscombe (1998); and for recent scholarship
on theories of the self in social psychology to Baumeister (1999), Sedikides and Spencer (2007),
and Leary and Tangney (2012).
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claim or be assigned a social identity varies depending on both the time and place
and the identity itself, for example, a person can be a 'woman' without being born
one but must be born an Indigenous Australian.18 It should also be noted that not
every social identity is the result of social group formation. Cudd argues further that
an internalist view of social group formation is not sufficient because it does not
account for those who may not self-identify with the group to which they find
themselves involuntarily assigned. I will consider voluntary versus non-voluntary
group membership in more detail later in this chapter.
If we are who we think we are because others believe us to be so then identity
depends on how others define us, and such definitions are in terms of social groups
which have associated with them specific attributes, stereotypes and norms which
then affect one's sense of identity. Young suggests that although one finds oneself a
member of a group it does not follow that one cannot change one's group
membership, and that "such changes in group affinity are experienced as a
transformation in one's identity" (1988, 274).19 Our sense of having a particular
identity is dependent upon the affirmation of others. For example, believing oneself
to be gay is not the same as coming out to others at a Mardi Gras which involves
making claims about oneself which are then authorised by others. One can believe
any number of things about oneself and one's identity but these do not normally
contribute to a social identity unless they are given credence by others.20Although
18 I have used the terminology 'Australian Aboriginal person' or 'Indigenous Australian' throughout in
deference to the perception that the term 'Aborigine' has negative connotations connected to white
colonisation which perpetuate racism and discrimination against this group. However, the reader
should be aware that these two expressions are general terms used to refer to a heterogeneous
grouping of many different tribes of mainland Indigenous Australians.
19 The reverse can also hold: changes in one's relationships can change one's identity and hence one's
group memberships.
20 I am thinking here of situations where someone may believe they belong to a group in good faith
but discover later they do not; for example, they may believe they belong to a particular culture but
discover as an adult they were adopted from a culture with different values. One can also believe
the opposite: that one belongs to a group from which one is rejected, such as girl believing she is a
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there is some leeway for difference within a group, and how an individual acts may
influence the way all members of the social group are viewed, in general social
identities are social because they are culturally derived rather than solely constructed
by an individual.21
The existence and constitution of social groups reflect changes to the way
social identities are constructed across space and time. The notion of what constitutes
a racially distinct group, for example, varies both historically and geographically. In
the United States (US) Latin American immigrants are labelled by race or ethnicity
depending on both their country of origin and which city or state they reside in,
labelling which often reflects ideas of class as well as race. For example, Mexicans
in California are labelled by race, whereas Argentinians in the US may escape any
racial connotations at all (Alcoff 2006, 241). Not only are patterns of group
differentiation fluid but the internal differentiation of groups reflects the wider
society (Young 1988, 274) so that, for example, language, religion, nationality and
culture mediate understandings of skin colour and race (Alcoff 2006, 245).22 While
discrimination on the basis of race, sex or class may be overtly expressed through
official depictions of group membership, for example, race definitions in South
Africa during the period of Apartheid, mostly these understandings are implicit and,
rather than being enshrined in formal legislation, are reflected at the level of social
practices.
boy. It is also possible to believe irrational things about one's identity, such as believing oneself to
be Napoleon or that the government is spying on one because of knowledge one possesses;
evidence to the contrary or denial by others will not necessarily disabuse the person of their beliefs
about their identity. All of these different kinds of belief may influence one's sense of self but they
do not normally affect one's social identity aside from extreme cases, such as where one's
irrational beliefs about oneself are diagnosed as mental illness.
21 As I discuss in more detail in Chapter Two, members of in-groups are permitted differences in
behaviour and practice, whereas members of out-groups tend to be defined homogeneously.
22 In the Dominican Republic 'black' refers only to Haitians, and dark-skinned Dominicans self-
identify as Indian or mestizo; however, when they move to the US they find they are considered
black by American race standards (Alcoff 2006, 269).
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Group construction may involve identification through physical markers on
the body, but sometimes the organisation of social identities in socially negotiated
spaces is fundamental to the origins and nature of the social group. Patricia Hill
Collins (2002) suggests social groups are created via two main mechanisms: either
exclusionary or inclusive social practices. Commonly, social groups are formed via
exclusionary social and political practices that result in segregated places of
employment, education, housing and public facilities. The physical separation
between one group and another emphasises both the absence of commonality and the
oppositional relationship that exists between them, particularly where a hierarchical
power relationship is involved. Notions of purity and separation, whether they occur
in geographical space, occupation or housing, or in school curricula, appear to be
central to how unjust power relations are maintained (Collins 2002, 214). Indeed the
attempt to separate out cleanly the different identities is the way oppressive societies
structure social categories (Lugones 1994), something I will investigate in more
detail in Chapter Two. Typically, race and class groups are formed in this way,23 so
that poor neighbourhoods and ethnic ghettos are not simply artefacts of group
formation but function as key elements in the construction of the group.24 The
construction of social groups via exclusionary practices is in contrast to the creation
of gendered groups which depend upon inclusive strategies; women typically live in
23 Both Collins and Young qualify the notion of class as a social group. Young (1988, 274)
distinguishes two ways of looking at class, either as the definite example of social group or as an
abstract structural concept that ignores subjectivity and identity, and concludes that class can be
both of these. Collins (2002, 215) agrees that class is not a thing but instead describes an
oppositional relationship among social groups unequal in power, in fact the paradigmatic example
of a mutually constructed privileged–disadvantaged relationship between social groups. Since the
social groups produced are the result of a power relationship they are both constant and
changeable historically and geographically.
24 In extreme cases the separation of groups includes physical barriers to create separate spaces—for
example, the Israeli West Bank barrier, the Berlin Wall and the Warsaw Ghetto—in which
difference is demarcated by walls and maintained by force. Anyone who occupies that space is
identified ideologically as belonging to a separate group regardless of race, class, or ethnic, or
religious affiliation, so that the husbands and wives of Jews who remained with their spouses
during the Nazi era gave their Jewish spouses pseudo-Aryan credentials. See Klemperer (1998).
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close proximity to men and are encouraged to develop "a commonality of interest
with men" (Collins, 2002, 211). Given that women may not see themselves as having
separate concerns, beliefs and interests to men of their class and/or race these
differences in the mechanics of group construction may explain why for some
women gender identity is less salient than class or race.
The salience of social identities
The examples given above suggest another aspect of group membership
which is important, particularly in relation to hierarchical societies, and that is
whether one's membership of a group can be described as voluntary or not (Cudd
2006, 36). If membership of a social group is freely chosen then it is less likely to be
implicated in oppressive social identities than if the individual is assigned to the
group, particularly as a result of visual characteristics such as skin colour or gender. I
say 'less likely' because situations exist where freely chosen affiliations can also
result in oppressive social identities, and it may be misleading to divide social group
memberships into those that are voluntary and those that are assigned. It is
sometimes the case that persons choose to voluntarily move into a group which
would normally be an assigned, non-voluntary group, such as when someone decides
to have sexual reassignment surgery. Marilyn Friedman's understanding of the
differences between social groups may be helpful here since she divides group
affiliations into 'communities of choice', or those we enter voluntarily, and
'communities of place', or those communities which are "found, not entered,
discovered, not created" (1990, 152).25 This distinction would allow for persons
25 I prefer the term 'found communities' to describe these, since I believe it suggests the non-
voluntary nature of these affiliations better than communities of place which seems less specific.
In addition, in later chapters I consider the importance of spaces, both social and discursive, in the
exercise of moral agency.
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undergoing sexual reassignment surgery to choose to be members of a group by
entering a community of choice which for other group members may be a found
community.
However, for the purposes of this discussion I accept Cudd's distinction that
there are social groups which are entirely freely chosen and those whose
memberships are at least partially determined by external forces, in part because the
voluntary/non-voluntary group distinction drawn by Cudd is another way of saying
that some social identities may be less important in terms of the story of resistance.26
Similarly, sometimes there will be a hierarchy of features of identity and sometimes
they will be equally salient (La Caze 2004, 268), and, depending on the situation one
finds oneself in, one's sex, race, or class identity may not be equally compelling
factors in regard to oppression and resistance (Moi 1999, 201).27 However, where
discrimination exists, the aspect of one's identity that is foregrounded is often not the
aspect one would deem germane in the particular situation. For example, a woman
scientist may feel that her gender is not relevant in being considered for a promotion,
but the possibility that she may have children in the future may be considered
relevant by the persons considering her for the position, when a man's potential
fatherhood would not. Those who decide whether race or sex or class identity is
pertinent at a particular time or in a particular place are usually members of social
groups that benefit from the subjugation of another group, not the members of the
subjugated group themselves. Therefore, being able to decide for oneself when one
26 Young describes non-voluntary group membership as having "the character of what Heidegger
calls 'thrownness', one finds oneself as a member of a group" (1988, 274).
27 Toril Moi suggests that for Simone de Beauvoir "to say that the sexed body is the inevitable
background for all our acts, is at once to claim that it is always a potential source of meaning, and
to deny that it always holds the key to the meaning of a woman's acts" (1999, 201). In some
situations sex will be less important than class or race but in other situations it will not be; this
neither suggests nor denies a hierarchy of oppressions.
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wants to highlight one's sex or class or race identity may be important in terms of
resistance, since, just as one may be compulsorily assigned a social identity, one may
also be prevented from claiming an identity at a particular moment or in a particular
situation.28
Visibility and stereotyping
Oppressive social identities bring with them the apparently antonymous
reality of being simultaneously highly visible and highly invisible. For example,
women experience being both highly visible in terms of their sexuality whilst
simultaneously being overlooked and ignored in other situations, as middle-aged
women trying to obtain service in shops frequently discover.29 This is not to say that
the visibility of social identities per se is the problem since in some cases one may
desire to be seen as owning a particular identity. However, some social identities are
constructed to be highly visible and oppressive, as the assimilated Jews of western
Europe discovered during the years of Nazi control.30 The most pervasive way in
which people categorise others is to divide the world into those who belong, or the
in-group, and all others, or the out-group. Those in the in-group are seen as
individuals with positive attributes while those not belonging are typically seen as
28 Moi puts it this way: "In certain situations I wish my female body to be considered as the
insignificant background of my claims or acts ... My wish does not represent an attempt to escape
my particularity ... It represents, rather, a wish to deny that the fact of being a woman is of any
particular relevance to my understanding of trigonometry" (1999, 204).
29 My partner discovered a (highly visible) way to obtain attention as a middle-aged woman. After
she stopped removing her facial hair she discovered she was not only attended to but was
frequently remembered—as the only female client with a beard! By confounding the stereotype of
how women should present themselves in public she seems to have discovered a way around the
invisibility of reaching middle-age. Of course, subverting or destabilising social identities does not
always result in positive outcomes, and I return to moral risk taking and the potential for
unintelligibility in Chapter Five.
30 Western European Jews commonly thought of themselves as members of their respective nations
rather than as distinguished by their religion. The Nazi persecution of them as Jews sometimes
changed this sense of self-identity. In Primo Levi's words, transcribed in Poli and Calcagno's 1992
biography, the racial laws and the Lager made him a Jew. "Since then, I am Jewish. They sewed
the star of David on to me, and not only on to my clothes" (quoted in Anissimov 1998, 258).
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having a homogeneity of negative characteristics (Cudd 2006, 70). The visibility of
members of subjugated groups results from their identification as members of out-
groups; difference and exclusion from the mainstream renders the social identities of
the oppressed more visible. What makes these social identities problematic is not so
much that they are visible but that this visibility is accompanied by stereotypical
ascriptions designed to generate hostility and negative expectations in others.
Stereotypes are generalisations about members of a particular social group,
which usually stem from ascribed, mainly visual indicators, and extend to further
inferences about group attributes and behaviour (Cudd 2006, 69), for example, all
Jews are acquisitive, or all Asians are good at mathematics. Stereotyping relies on
broad conceptualisations of individual behaviour frequently based on external visual
markers—such as black skin colour—which are believed to indicate sameness of
characteristics and abilities among all the members of that group. Stereotypes tend to
be embedded within mainstream discourses, affirming, for example, that women are
natural care-givers or that gay men are naturally flamboyant.31 Expectations arising
from stereotyping tend to override experiential evidence of the world, so that even if
we know from our own experience that particular groups contain non-stereotypical
members we may continue to see the stereotype instead of the individual, something
members of these groups are often aware of and responsive to.32 In these situations
31 Television programmes and films are especially prone to this kind of shorthand to suggest
character, taking advantage of the viewer's predisposition to see a whole range of traits and
behaviours in particular groups.
32 For example, Brent Staples's 1986 essay, "Just Walk On By" (quoted in Bailey 2007a, 150),
describes how white female pedestrians respond fearfully to a black man walking near them,
changing their body language and hunching protectively over their purses as if in anticipation of
an attack, solely on account of his skin colour. And Audre Lorde (1982, 5) recounts an encounter
with a frightened white woman who flags down her car but when the woman sees the driver is
black she chooses to remain with the danger outside rather than enter a physical space with a
coloured woman. The white woman in Lorde's story is a significant example of the damage
stereotypes can do; she is more frightened of the risk presented by difference than she is of a real
threat to her safety.
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individuals cannot reveal the multiplicity or complexity of their identities to others
because they are perceived only in stereotypical ways as a member of a group which
is feared and/or hated by members of other groups.
It might be argued that the inferences associated with stereotyping are a
cognitive shorthand which make it easier for human beings to respond quickly to
others and their environment. However, this does not explain why positive
characteristics are normally assigned to members of in-groups and negative
characteristics to members of out-groups, since stereotyping does not distribute
negative and positive qualities evenly among all groups as it would otherwise be
expected to do, unless the explanation is simply that members of in-groups self-
define. Psychological research suggests it is more likely that stereotyping operates as
a kind of socio-psychological rationalisation by the dominant for injustices inflicted
on minorities, since studies show stereotypes not only operate as a way of grouping
others but also to bolster "the valuation of one's self-identity" (Cudd 2006, 73).
Although there are doubtless negative stereotypes about those whose group
membership is voluntary, such as the 'red neck' stereotyping of members of the
Shooters Party in New South Wales and Victoria,33 members of these groups can
always deflect these attitudes because they are able to dissociate from the group
either by disclaiming membership or by leaving the group. Because voluntary groups
have members who have willingly chosen to affiliate themselves for the purposes of
some commonly shared belief, attitude, and/or action and have expressed their
willingness to join together (Cudd 2006, 39), then the act of disaffiliating is a
relatively simple matter.34 In contrast, although members of some found communities
33 For example, the headline "Shooters Party—fanatical red necks pushing for open season in
National Parks" ("Shooters Party" 2009), or the description of members of another political party
as "trying to out-redneck the rednecks in the Shooters Party" (quoted in Brown 2014).
34 Some voluntary group memberships are less easy to disaffiliate from: some religious sects, and
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may be able to 'pass' as members of other groups, for example, some Australian
Aboriginal persons may be able to pass as white, the vast majority have visible
markers that identify them as members of a particular sex or race. Consequently,
these individuals may find it difficult to respond to unfair or inaccurate
generalisations intended to disempower—all Muslims are terrorists or all women are
weak, for example—since they cannot simply deny membership or cease to be
members of the group, even when they feel no particular association with that group.
Additionally, social identities, particularly those which manifest in markers
on the body, such as racial or gendered identities, are fundamental to our sense of
self (Alcoff 2006, 6), and therefore to our capacity to function as moral agents.
Found communities have an important role to play here, at least in the constitution of
a person's initial 'given' identity, since, by harbouring "ambiguities, ambivalences,
contradictions and oppressions" (Friedman 1990, 153), they may impact negatively
on the constitution of a person's identity. Stereotyping is potentially harmful to
developing an authentic sense of self because the negative imagery involved can be
internalised if it is not rejected; even when aspects of a social identity are rejected
doing so may compromise both a person's sense of self and their capacity to function
as an effective moral agent. The process of choosing which aspects of an identity are
appropriate to a person's sense of self involves capacities for autonomous moral
reflection which may be implicitly denied someone possessing that identity, making
the possibility of self-definition important for both resistance and moral agency.
However, given the constraints imposed upon self-definition by the mutual
construction—that is, the construction between self and society—of social identities,
which I will explore in more detail in Chapter Two, it may be useful here to consider
outlaw groups, such as bikie gangs, come to mind.
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some aspects of the role played by social forces.
Constraints and power
Because of the institutional nature of oppression we have to be concerned
with practices of power, where power is best understood in the relational sense
suggested by Foucault (1981, 94), whose existence is revealed when it is exercised.
Group memberships, whether voluntary or not, bring social penalties and incentives
for their members. These penalties and rewards form constraints on individual
behaviour, where constraints are best understood as limits upon actions rather than as
barriers to action (Cudd 2006, 42).35 This suggests an alternative way of
understanding a social group as "a collection of persons who share (or would share
under similar circumstances) a set of social constraints on action" (Cudd 2006, 44;
italics in original). Some constraints arise not from social factors but instead stem
from the biological (having to eat and drink), physical (not being able to live at great
pressures, such as in ocean depths), or the psychological limitations of being human.
Although some social constraints may be rewarding, constraints upon members of
oppressed groups tend to contribute to curtailing choices and freedoms, even if there
is some benefit accruing from group membership. For example, in Western societies
women are often rewarded with financial security by dressing and behaving in ways
deemed appropriate although these may be physically constrictive or uneconomic to
maintain. Some social constraints may arise through what appear to be unintentional
means, such as paying women lower wages and making it difficult for women to
obtain loans, with the outcome that they continue to be economically dependent upon
35 Cudd describes social constraints in non-normative terms as "facts that one does or ought to
rationally consider in deciding how to act ... or facts that shape beliefs and attitudes about other
persons" (2006, 41).
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men.36 However, I would argue that the majority of social constraints are linked to
underlying normative values and have as their rationale expectations about what is
deemed appropriate behaviour for members of different social groups. I will consider
the role of social expectations in more detail in Chapter Five. For those burdened
with oppressive identities, the earliest awareness of belonging to an oppressed group
is accompanied by restrictions on behaviour, frequently in the form of social
prohibitions, for example when it is no longer cute for a little girl to dress in her
brother's trousers.
Constraints such as these are not the problem, as without some social
constraints there would be no curb on people doing as they wish and society would
be too chaotic. The difficulty arises when some social groups are disadvantaged by
unjust constraints related to their involuntary membership of a social group.
Intentional social constraints which arise from normative assumptions, including
stereotypes, about the way members of different groups should behave, by setting
limits on the actions of some groups, maintain ossified power relationships. Not only
do such limitations prevent members of some groups from living fulfilling lives or
demonstrating their full capacity as moral agents, in many instances the constraints
placed upon members of these social groups operate to the advantage of members of
privileged social groups. It is in the maintenance of inequitable power relationships
between members of different groups that social constraints on action function as
36 The argument made after women began to move into the workforce in numbers following World
War II was that men not women were the main breadwinners for their families and needed higher
wages, whereas women were taking home a second wage. This was never the case for African
American families in the US which frequently had women as the main wage earner and who had
also been present in the workforce in large numbers (Scarborough 1989, 1457–61). Implicit in the
argument is the conception of a family as one that is white and heterosexual, and like the writings
of many white second wave feminists, such as Betty Friedan, this argument largely ignores non-
white and poor white women as well as women without men (hooks 2000, 1–3). See Collins
(2002, 218) for more on the way in which the conception of 'family' as a nuclear unit, by assuming
a sexual division of labour, assumes the separation of family and work.
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adjutants to the discrimination, marginalisation and exclusion of the subjugated.
Conclusion
Oppression involves the constraint and disadvantage of individuals on the
basis of social group memberships, and this socio-psychological constraint leads, as
we shall see in more detail in Chapter Three, to the diminishment of effective moral
agency in group members. Social oppression is both systemic and structural,
operating through social practices sanctioned by entrenched institutions, and
therefore involves the co-option of individuals in their own subjugation. The
centrality of group membership to my conception of oppression means that the
nature of social identities arising from group membership, and how individuals are
assigned or acquire membership, is core to my understanding of oppression. Social
groups are complex phenomena which can be delineated in a number of different
ways but conceptually they are nevertheless a useful tool for understanding how
some individuals are excluded or marginalised from mainstream experience and
discourse. Because group memberships form the foundation of oppression as it is
understood here, questioning the nature of the social identities assigned to group
members may be fundamental to resisting oppression. In subsequent chapters I will
consider in more detail the way social identities impact upon a person's ability to
develop the competencies necessary for moral agency. I will begin in Chapter Two
by discussing some aspects of social identity formation, how these may contribute to
oppression, and why the possibility of self-definition, which is sensitive to the
constraining internal and external forces described here, may offer a means of
resisting.
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2. The political salience of social identities
How are you going to deal responsibly with the
unalterable facts of who and what you are, of having or
not having privilege and power?
(Barbara Smith 1984, 77)
Introduction
Central to my argument in this chapter is the understanding that social
identities constructed in hierarchical societies, although distorted by inequitable
power relationships, are not solely the product of exclusionary and unjust social
systems, and therefore can potentially be resisted and transformed. Social identities
in inequitable societies reflect and reinforce the degree to which someone is
privileged and/or oppressed, depending upon their group memberships. Of
importance to my argument is the way negative and/or oppressive identities are
constructed in societies whose social hierarchies contain inequalities in standing,
which result in unjust or unfair outcomes for some members as a result of their social
identities. In order to examine how it is possible to redefine negative social identities,
I will be considering some aspects of group formation mentioned in Chapter One, in
particular the use of stereotyping of others in order to create a seemingly
homogeneous out-group. I will contend that when social categorisation itself
becomes a form of social control it becomes an act of resistance to reject identities
constructed through processes of domination and assert the legitimacy of self-
definition as a means of establishing social identities. The perception that members
of some social groups possess identical characteristics and traits, and hence desires
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and needs, is threatened when the oppressed insist upon a multiplicity of identities,
both privileged and oppressed, arising from multiple group memberships. I will
argue that it may be possible for the oppressed to resist by developing a critical
perspective as a result of having multiple social identities, making it possible for
them to creatively re-imagine themselves and their lives otherwise. I will also
suggest that the epistemic advantage conferred by the 'outsider within' status of the
oppressed, in conjunction with the perspectives gained from multiple identities,
provides a useful conceptual tool to see through the dominant framework of pure
social identities and across the boundaries separating privileged from disadvantaged.
I argue that self-definition becomes the means by which the oppressed make who
they are intelligible to others via the (re)creation of new social identities. Before
considering how self-definition might benefit the oppressed I will first look at some
aspects of social identities and categorisation which contribute to the demoralisation
of members of subjugated social groups.
Social identities and power relations
Having explored how social groups form in the previous chapter, here I will
consider how identities arising from group memberships, in particular those affiliated
with involuntary group memberships, contribute to privilege and oppression. I
previously suggested that those group memberships we are assigned on the basis of
visible identities such as sex, race or ethnicity, are most likely to be associated with
privilege or disadvantage for members of those groups. Changes in our interpersonal
relationships can also result in involuntary changes to group membership, which
have an impact on our privileged or disadvantaged status. Complicating the lived
experience of privilege and disadvantage, individuals generally possess more than
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one identity as a result of involuntary membership of social groups and this results in
complex power interactions that make it difficult to pinpoint specific bias or
discrimination. The term 'intersectionality' was coined to describe the experience of
oppression by persons with multiple group memberships, in particular how the
various oppressions arising from different group memberships interact with one
another to produce multiple, significant impacts on persons with multiple social
identities.37 Whatever their origin, the social identities arising from group
memberships that are beyond individual control can be damaging to members of both
privileged and oppressed groups, as understanding of one's self/identity is closely
linked to those visible gendered or racial identities which are filtered through
stereotyping and the perceived homogeneity of group members.38
What are social identities and how do they form? Social identities are those
identities that are constituted in relation to others. Being identified in a particular
relation to others, whether to another individual or to a particular group, is always a
social experience that occurs externally to the individual. We only need think of
those instances when we are accorded a social identity, not necessarily as a member
of a group, to see it is something which operates upon us and not something we will
into existence or that is the result of internal causes.39Although social identities are a
37 Although Crenshaw (1989) coined the term intersectionality, the concept of multiple interacting
oppressions has been discussed previously under other terminology, including 'interlocking
oppression' (Collins 1986, revised 1991; 1990), and 'multiple jeopardy' (King 1988). Recognition
by black women in the US of the complexity of their social identities goes back at least to
Sojourner Truth's famous “Ain't I a Woman?” speech of 1851 (quoted in Haraway 1992, 90–91); it
is also the first recorded instance of self-definition by a black woman. More recent examples of
theorising the complexity of black women's identity include the works of bell hooks, the
Combahee River Collective (1979), Smith and Smith (1983), and Lorde (1984).
38 There are some involuntary group memberships which arise from relationships we enter into
willingly; however, although we could be said to have freely chosen the relationship, we do not
choose the associations of being labelled with a particular social identity as a result of our
involuntary group membership, for example, converting to Islam or Judaism as a result of an inter-
faith marriage results in certain ascriptions.
39 One day my partner's mother introduced me to medical professionals as her daughter-in-law
although I was not, legally speaking, in this relationship to her. This act of social definition not
only changed the way others viewed our relationship it also changed how I regarded myself and
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joint construct, and hence impact on and are affected by our sense of self, they do not
necessarily reflect our inner sense of who we are; rather, they are predominantly how
we are identified and acknowledged by others. Miranda Fricker proposes a concept I
find useful in discussing the mechanics of social identity formation, and I want to
develop this here to show how this might facilitate or impede the uptake of identities
claimed by subjugated groups. Fricker (2007, 14–17) suggests that social identities
form under the influence of a force she calls "identity power", an operation of power
dependent upon a shared imaginative conception of social identity. In other words,
there is widely shared conceptual agreement about what it means to be young or old,
male or female, in the collective social imagination. Numerous beliefs, qualities, and
values are attached to specific social identities. For example, in one culture 'elderly'
may have associations of wisdom and reverence, whereas for others it may be
accompanied by suggestions of dependency and burdensomeness. These collective
conceptual understandings are important both because they form the basis of social
interactions and because they create expectations about how others will behave. As
the example above shows, the beliefs, qualities and values associated with social
identities are not necessarily negative ones. However, where these associations are
negative, persons who are assigned these social identities also attract numerous
disadvantages, such as testimonial injustices which I will discuss later.
Moreover, this operation of power functions in tandem with other kinds of
social power (Fricker 2007, 15), so that normative social practices stemming from
social institutions contribute to the way in which identity power is exercised.
Because the meanings attached to these identities are determined by relationships of
my sense of responsibility in relation to her. As Walker (2007, 113) suggests, and as I discuss in
Chapter Four, social relationships are created and shaped in ways which produce vulnerabilities in
some individuals to specific others, and these relational vulnerabilities are entrenched in social
identities and the social practices attached to them.
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power and privilege, the effects of identity power can be tracked by the manner in
which social identities are described. By deciphering these meanings we can, in turn,
track power relationships within hierarchical societies. In inequitable societies, the
assumptions and expectations attached to particular social identities through identity
power may operate in concert with unjust social institutions to negatively influence
the way some persons experience themselves as subjects and agents by adversely
affecting the development of competencies necessary for the exercise of moral
agency, so that in these situations identity power may be seen as a corollary of the
forces of domination.
Visibility and intelligibility of the multiple self40
Much of the difficulty members of oppressed groups have with social
identities arises out of the way these identities are constructed as uniform and
stereotypical. Although membership of a social group differentiates its members
from those of other social groups, it does not necessarily connote this kind of
homogeneity of group members. The notion that 'others' are stereotypically similar to
one another seems to be a function of the way groups are formed, and the negative
imagery associated with members of some groups in the form of damaging and
disabling stereotypes is apparently the result of in-group/out-group differentiation
(Cudd 2006, 70), as I discussed in Chapter One. Stereotypes are not only
incapacitating in terms of self-realisation but may also cause epistemic injustice, or
the dismissal of a person's experiences and testimony on the basis of their social
identity, which may occur when stereotypes inform our "credibility judgements"
40 I have adapted the term 'multiple self' from Lugones, who describes persons that have multiple
intersecting identities as either multiplicitous or plural. "I am giving up the claim that the subject is
unified. Instead I am understanding each person as many" (Lugones 1990b, 503).
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(Fricker 2007, 31).
As previously mentioned, the high visibility of some social identities,
particularly those identities linked to subjugated groups, is a consequence of the way
social groups are formed and the stereotyping of group members of out-groups.
However, the "logic of oppression" (Lugones 2003, 77) constructs the oppressed as
simultaneously both visible and invisible.  Visibility reinforces dominant
stereotypical conceptions and contributes to the objectification of the oppressed and,
at the same time, as members of out-groups, the oppressed are frequently overlooked
and ignored (Collins 1991, 45). The same individual who is highly visible in
conformity to a stereotype will be both unseen and unheard in many contexts.
Invisibility may bring with it some benefits, since it may be more bearable to be
ignored than to be vilified or treated with violence. However, for the most part there
are considerable disadvantages to any social group whose members are continually
overlooked, just as there are dangers attached to being treated as an object not a
subject. It could be argued that the most significant of these disadvantages is that
groups whose members are objectified and ignored lack any real political influence.
By tracking whose voices are heard, we can identify whose views and ways of
knowing are considered important and whose are silenced.
Social visibility, then, is not necessarily a problem; in fact, to some extent, as
the arguments for recognition of the oppressed suggest, making one's identity visible
to others is the goal of those resisting oppression.41As mentioned in Chapter One,
one of the ways in which the subjugated respond to oppression is through obtaining
recognition from the dominant as a means of resisting the way oppression renders
41 For example, Misha Strauss says "recognition matters to identity because it confers the 'semantic
authority' necessary to the construction of one's self-understanding" (2003, 45). I discuss the
concept of semantic authority later in this chapter.
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them invisible. Lugones (1990b, 504) describes visibility as a kind of "faithful
intelligibility" and hence a precondition for the oppressed taking responsibility.
Invisibility, as it is understood by Lugones, occurs when someone remembers who
they are in another reality but cannot convey this knowledge in the reality they are
currently in, thus rendering the meanings of their actions and the actions themselves
invisible to others. For example, Lugones suggests a Latin American retains the
memory of the person she is when she is among other Latinos when she works as a
maid in an Anglo-American household, but she cannot convey the person from the
Latino reality to others in the Anglo reality. This suggests it is not identity that shifts
between different worlds so much as access to certain aspects of one's identity that
are still present and available but that cannot be seen by others, perhaps due to
stereotyping or 'arrogant perception', which is understood by Lugones (1987, 4) as a
failure of identification and love.42 Lugones (1990b, 505) proposes that oppression
attempts to erase other selves, as well as silencing them and, therefore, to remember
oneself from other worlds is a liberatory and resistant task. But, in my view,
liberation, like faithful intelligibility, depends not only upon remembering but also
upon making the hidden self, the oppressed self, visible.
If faithful intelligibility is as Lugones understands it and requires a person to
be visible, then the invisibility of particular social identities represents a problem for
intelligibility. In Chapter Four I will consider the minimal conditions for
intelligibility and conclude that appropriate self-knowledge is necessary in order to
make oneself comprehensible to others. However, given that it is sometimes the case
42 Frye developed the notion of arrogant perception, which she describes as seeing with eyes "which
organize everything seen with reference to themselves and their own interests" (1983, 67). For
example, the arrogant perceiver believes that they are the animating force of attitudes towards
themselves, rather than allowing that others possess desires and motivations which are their own
and arise for reasons independent of the arrogant perceiver.
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that "identity power at once constructs and distorts" (Fricker 2007, 55) who someone
is, then self-knowledge may be elusive and illusory. For members of some social
groups being intelligible is complicated by mainstream understandings of group
identities that rely more on stereotyping and perceived knowledge of the other rather
than real understanding. Having multiple identities further complicates a person's
ability to make themselves intelligible to others, not merely because it contradicts the
way domination categorises the oppressed or because others may be reluctant to
embrace the notion of the multiple self, but because it is difficult for a person to be
aware of, and acknowledge, the many different aspects which make up the multiple
self, much less convey this understanding to others.
The problem with social categories
In this section I consider some critiques of the notion of social categories.43 It
is useful to state at the outset that, contrary to these arguments, abandoning these
categories is problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, whatever the merits of
criticism of social categories, it is difficult to know what to use in place of them.44
Not only that but persons belonging to disadvantaged social groups also use
homogenising terminology to describe group memberships to connect with one
another, develop political awareness, and form alliances. In addition, the highly
visible nature of some social identities, such as race and gender, by itself presents a
sound reason for not abandoning the concept on the grounds that social categories do
43 See Alcoff (2006, Part I Chapters 1–4), for a detailed examination and analysis of the various
criticisms of the notion of social identities.
44 Naomi Zack (2005, 8) suggests the notion of sharing the same 'essence', where the essence is
defined in a particular way to encompass a number of features of belonging to a particular identity.
However, the essence is "not substantive" and is not found in an individual or in the group. For
instance, "category FMP" is the category encompassing persons who share the relational essence
of being gendered women.
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not necessarily reflect actual social groups. To forego the use of social categories
such as race will not prevent discrimination (Collins 2002, 220), although it may
obscure the reasons for the discrimination.45 Social categories such as race and sex
are highly visible, real categories defined by real social positions (Haslanger 2005,
10–11), and to dismiss them as merely discursive is to overlook actual power
relationships.46 I would also argue that these descriptions are not just convenient
linguistic tags but represent real, albeit heterogeneous, social assemblages, which in
inequitable societies reflect actual hierarchical social relationships in danger of being
obscured if we abandon the terminology of social categorisation.
Sally Haslanger (2005, 15–16) has suggested a further way of thinking about
categories is to consider whether a particular category of a concept or a practice
should exist, and if so how it should be defined. To do this we might first need to
consider what the point of the practice or concept is. Consider, for example, the
historical instability of racial categories. For instance, Michael Omi and Howard
Winant (quoted in Frankenberg 1993, 11) point out in 1986's Racial Formation in the
United States, that the different conceptual understandings of 'non-white', 'Oriental'
and 'Asian' in the US over time represent changes to the role played by Asian
Americans in relation to the dominant white majority. Such changes to historical
conceptions of social categories occur as a result of changes in social practices over
45 One of the reasons given for disavowing social categories is to avoid the charge of essentialism, of
developing universalising concepts that iron out differences within social groups, leading to
exclusions and further oppression. White middle-class feminists have been charged with excluding
the experiences of women of colour, working-class women, lesbians, and women with disabilities,
to name a few, in conceptualising the group 'women'. Part of the problem here lies with the fact
that universalising concepts are the domain of the privileged, in this case men, and in asserting
their equality it makes sense that the oppressed (women) would mistakenly use the same methods
to define themselves. Recently the problem of essentialism, or what I prefer to call the problem of
exclusion, has been re-evaluated as a problem with the notion of social categories themselves,
which I will discuss in more detail in the next section.
46 Haslanger (2005) discusses the social categories race and 'gender'. I have used the terminology
'sex' rather than gender in my discussion of her ideas to be consistent and because the change does
not affect her premises.
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time necessitating a revaluation of the category, including renaming and re-
establishing the boundaries of the category.47As well as changes to social practices
affecting changes to social categories, social practices gain legitimacy and become
normalised because of the way social categories are constructed, and therefore
practices are a reflection of social categorisation. For example, the division of people
into two sexes authorises a multitude of simple and complex social practices, from
which public toilet to use to whom one may marry. To add to the complexity,
concepts and the social practices they describe are "deeply intertwined" (Haslanger
2005, 13), so that the concepts that enable us to describe and structure social
practices in turn influence how we see those practices, while the evolving practices
themselves affect our concepts.
There are political and theoretical benefits, Haslanger (2005, 15) suggests, to
asking how particular concepts structure social practices, in particular, whether such
concepts confer false legitimacy on some practices. Questions about which social
practices are authorised, and why, are revealing of relationships of power within a
society. The meanings attached to particular concepts and practices, whose meanings
dominate and why, and whether alternative meanings exist, reflect distributions of
authority and power.
Not only are the meanings associated with the social categories denoting race
and sex indicative of oppressive relationships, the manner in which social categories
are conceptualised is itself a reflection of relationships of domination and control.48
Considering how social categories are conceptualised may, therefore, reveal these
47 For example: Card (1996, 11–12) gives examples of the changing names given to African
Americans and lesbians over time; and in Chapter One I mentioned the example of dark-skinned
Dominicans whose race changes if they move from the Dominican Republic to the US (Alcoff
2006, 269).
48 Haslanger (2005) uses the term 'social kinds'—distinct from 'natural kinds'—to refer to race and
gender categories.
49
underlying power relationships. Historically, social categories of race, class and
ethnicity have been constructed on the basis of exclusions (Pratt 1984) or
segregations (Collins 2002; Lugones 1994), which have reflected social practices of
separate housing, education and employment depending on one's race and class. For
example, persons of colour of both sexes in the US were limited to particular
professions or jobs in the workplace (Scarborough 1989). As Collins (2002, 211)
points out, gender oppression differs from other oppressions by being organised via
inclusionary strategies, since women live in close proximity to men. However,
Collins also argues that, by reproducing the naturalised hierarchy that "informs the
self-definitions of race–class groups, the idea of family permeates both types of
group organisation" (2002, 220) and functions as a means of legitimising these
differing methods of control. In other words, the different exclusionary and
inclusionary social practices that maintain race, class, and gender oppression are
justified through reference to the same hierarchical organising principle.
One consequence of exclusionary forms of group organisation in particular is
that social groups are conceived as homogeneous collections of individuals, which
impacts on how others respond to them. For example, in countries with a history of
colonisation the indigenous people are frequently grouped together. Consequently,
government decisions tend not to address different communities' needs but to assume
homogeneity across all indigenous groups in terms of needs, interests and traditions,
which can lead to further inequalities of treatment. Resistance requires that members
of oppressed groups make claims to social identities that others may identify with,
whilst at the same time remaining aware of the dangers of creating an essentialising
category, which excludes some of those who would normally identify with that
group. In addition, the oppressed have to beware of inadvertently acting in the same
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way as the dominant, since they may create a sense of political unity by emphasising
the homogeneity of other groups. For example, Chandra Talpade Mohanty (1991, 54)
argues that the use of the category 'women' in Western feminist theory has led to the
homogeneous category 'third-world women', whereas in fact there is a great diversity
among women in non-Western countries, even among those who share cultural
traditions.
A number of feminist theorists are concerned with this problem of
exclusions, or the simplification of complex multiple social identities, which results
when individuals are categorised as A or ~A, where, to use Frye's (2005, 47)
example, if A is vanilla then ~A contains everything that does not fit into the
category vanilla. This method of social categorisation makes it appear as if ~A
represents a homogeneous grouping, even when it does not. For example, where A is
the category vanilla, then ~A, in addition to including the flavours strawberry,
banana and peppermint, also contains "triangles, the square root of two, the orbit of
Haley's comet, and all the shoes in the world" (Frye 2005, 47). Frye considers the
problem arises because social categories are erroneously conceived as sets where
membership is determined by having the necessary and sufficient conditions for
belonging to that social group. Sets function as a means of sorting red grapes from
green grapes, elephants from whales: they work by taking multiplicity and reducing
it to separate unities. Since there are no necessary and sufficient conditions for
membership of social categories or, Frye (2005, 49) argues, natural or living kinds,
sorting individuals into group memberships in this way is questionable, and leads to
theoretical difficulties. According to this analysis, the problem of essentialism in
feminist thought, of the notion 'women' being conceived in a way which is not
exclusionary, arises because of how we think of social categories rather than how we
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think of women. Rather than doing away with social categories altogether, Frye
argues, we should be looking for alternative ways of theorising social categories,
ways that do not reduce social groups to the simplicity of sets. Frye (2005, 51)
suggests, as alternatives, Wittgenstein's notion of family resemblance, or the idea of
social webs, conceptual frameworks that allow for the retention of complexity and
plurality in social categories such as women.
From the preceding discussion it will be seen how difficult it is for anyone to
self-define, particularly for a member of an oppressed group, given the complex
interaction between social categories and social practices, and the way in which the
concepts which inform and describe these change over time. In the next section I will
discuss another problem associated with categorisation, the argument advanced by
Lugones that in inequitable societies social categorisation is itself a form of control.
Lugones identifies the main reason for this as the conceptualisation of identity as
unified and 'pure' or homogeneous, so that persons with multiple identities are forced
to see themselves as singular or appear fragmented; hence, the risk of fragmentation
enforces homogeneity of the group by erasing plurality. Imagining individuals with
multiple identities as necessarily fragmented results from conceiving identity as
unified and pure, and Lugones argues that the fragmentation that results serves the
dominant and contributes to oppression.49
49 Compare Zack (2005), who argues that the concept of intersectional (multiple) identities itself
leads to more fragmentation: for example, instead of using the group 'women', the notion of
intersectionality results in several groups structured in terms of different intersections, for
example, race+class=woman. I would argue that the problem of intersectionality leading to
fragmentation of identity arises because Zack unconsciously constructs identities as additive
whereas Lugones's description of multiple identities suggests it is impossible to separate out the
different facets of identity—to use her analogy of curdle-separation from mayonnaise, an unstable
mixture of egg and oil which when it separates does so impurely, resulting in yolky oil and oily
yolk (1994, 459). For Lugones, the attempt to separate out, cleanly, the different identities is part
of the process of oppression; it is the way oppressive societies structure social categories. See Ann
Garry (2011) for a recent discussion of whether the notion of intersectionality fragments 'women'
as a group identity.
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Although Lugones was not the first to question the notion that there are
"discrete, coherent and absolutely separate identities" (Martin and Mohanty 1986,
192) or to suggest that the dominant benefit from this categorisation of social kinds,
her work is significant for the suggestion that social categorisation, by reducing
multiplicity to unity, is itself a form of domination.50 By conceiving social identities
as unified and pure, dominant forces ensure that members of social groups whose
identity is multiple have difficulty seeing themselves as multiple rather than
fragmented. If individuals are conceived of as possessing singular, fixed social
identities, then any individual who demonstrates 'impurities' in identity is necessarily
fragmented since identity by conventional definition is pure and unified. By reducing
the plurality of others to a singular unity, the dominant force the oppressed to see
themselves as flawed, fragmented beings. If what is multiple is conceived of as
singular then any part that does not fit the pure, unified picture of identity results in
fragmented identities and damaged psyches (Alcoff 2006, ix). By splitting people
into neat, purportedly homogeneous groups, the logic of oppression forces
individuals who experience themselves as having multiple identities to see
themselves as singular or to experience themselves as fragmented; in either case they
cannot see their own experience of who they are. Categorisation functions as a means
for the powerful to force the concept of homogeneity onto others for the purposes of
exerting control over them (Lugones 1994, 460).51
The categorisation of social identities as unified and pure, which results in
50 For example, Young says, "individual persons, as constituted partly by their group affinities and
relations, cannot be unified, themselves are heterogeneous and not necessarily coherent" (1990,
48).
51 Although my focus here is on the concept of purity with regard to categorisation, there is of course
a political aspect to defining identities as pure, especially in situations where it is used to support
the segregation of races or classes in geographic, educational, cultural, and employment spaces.
See, for example, Collins (2002, 214).
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social group members being perceived homogeneously, leads to what Lugones
(1994, 474) describes as the "transparency" of some group members. The idea of
transparency is understood by Lugones as the perception that the needs, interests, and
ways of some individuals within the group are identical to the needs, interests, and
ways of all the members of the group. For example, white women are transparent as
'women' and black men are transparent as 'black'. In public life the inclusion of
individuals from marginalised groups frequently takes for granted that the group
members are a homogeneous body and the views of one are a reflection of all,
thereby stifling or silencing some voices. Although membership of a social group
differentiates its members from those of other social groups it does not entail
homogeneity of group members; in fact, as mentioned in Chapter One, it is the
differentiation into in-groups and out-groups that generates the heterogeneous in-
group and homogeneous out-group distinction. Conceptualising the constitution of
some social groups as homogeneous results in the erasure of anyone who is not
transparently a member of that group, for example, black women are erased from the
group 'women' and from the group 'black'.52 Conceptualisation of some social groups
as unified and homogeneous leads to a presumption that the needs, interests and
ways of all members of those groups are identical, erasing the experience and
acknowledgement of anyone whose needs and interests are not identical to those of
transparent group members.
Another outcome of conceptualising multiple identities as fragmented is the
imposition of a view of multiple identity as dual personality: in the example Lugones
gives, the multiple identity that is Chicano is seen as a dual personality, the Mexican
52 hooks says, "no other group in America has so had their identity socialized out of existence as
have black women. We are rarely recognized as a group separate and distinct from black men, or
as a present part of the larger group 'women' in this culture" (1981, 7).
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American.53And because the Mexican part of Chicano culture is conceived
stereotypically by the Anglo as heroic and mythic it is conceived not as a living
culture but as "both static and dying" (Lugones 1994, 471). Hence there is considered
to be no barrier to assimilation into Anglo–American culture. The portrayal of the
authentic indigenous person as "pure, unsullied, [and] fixed in time and place"
(Alcoff 2006, 271) paints indigenous culture as preserved statically in a pre-
colonised state, in contrast with the dynamic, evolving nature of white culture. It
could also be argued that all minority indigenous cultures experience their
indigenous identity filtered through the prism of the dominant culture. For example,
Indigenous Australians living traditionally struggle to claim an identity in the light of
the myth of the authentic 'Aborigine' as a peripatetic hunter and gatherer living off
the land telling stories from the Dreamtime.54As an undergraduate in 1996, I
remember hearing in a lecture by Dr. Jim Kohen that local Australian Aboriginal
groups were opposed to the eradication of feral cattle in the Northern Territory
because in the 200 years elapsing since white settlement the cattle had become an
important part of both their diet and culture. However, those in government were
reluctant to accept that this practice constituted Aboriginal culture because it was not
consistent with pre-white Aboriginal social practices, even though there is ample
evidence of contemporary Indigenous Australian adapting and modernising
traditional practices.55 The challenge for the dominant white culture is to see
Aboriginal culture as contemporary and evolving and Indigenous Australian identity
53 Alcoff calls these mixed or ambiguous identities and suggests they can result in "cognitive
dissonance and fragmented selves" (2006, ix) if the multiple nature of the identities is denied.
Meyers (2000, 159) argues further that failure to own plural identities undermines both
authenticity and autonomy, and I will examine her argument in Chapter Three.
54 There is another myth of the 'Aborigine' as part of a dying race, drunk and diseased, living in
squalor literally and figuratively on the edges of Anglo civilization.
55 See Kohen (1995, Chapter 9) for more detail.
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in its many forms as authentic, a challenge that requires becoming privilege-
cognizant with the advantages and disadvantages accruing to the victors and victims
of colonialism and racism.
In this section I have argued that practising social categorisation by
postulating pure, unified identities and denying multiple identities, can contribute to
oppression. One of my suggestions for overcoming this is for members of subjugated
groups to self-define, and by doing so dismantle the framework of categorisation that
separates privileged identities from oppressed identities. However, this is a
problematic strategy, and in the next section I will discuss some other problems with
knowledge claims made by the oppressed which might prevent self-definition from
occurring, in particular whether claims to epistemic privilege by the oppressed can
overcome the disadvantage imposed by the privileging of dominant knowledges at
the expense of credibility for claims made by oppressed.
Social identity and knowledge claims
Later in this chapter I will consider the idea that one way the oppressed can
overcome the subjugating effects of being defined and categorised by others is to use
the epistemic advantage gained from multiple perspectives to see through the
dominant framework, which allows only pure and unified social identities, and to
transform the way their social identities are conceptualised. However, before they
can do this, a major problem for those assigned to subjugated social identities is how
to have their identities and lives taken seriously in the credibility economy.
Testimonial injustices, or injustices that occur when the speaker is not given
credence by others, are more significant when they are the result of what Fricker
(2007, 27) designates "identity prejudice", or prejudice linked to someone's social
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identity. These "systematic testimonial injustices", in Fricker's terminology, occur not
as a result of the content of what someone says, but because biases exist against
particular social identities and group memberships, which affect the way group
members are heard, or if they are heard at all. In Fricker's opinion, an additional
injustice is done to someone when their experiences are dismissed because they
possess a particular social identity.
One way in which women's knowledge claims are devalued is in terms of
their emotional lives/responses, where women are characterised emotionally in such
a way as to trivialise their experiences. Sue Campbell (1994, 50) suggests, by way of
example, that when someone is angry at an injustice and their anger does not receive
uptake—since, for social uptake to occur, their actions have to be in accordance with
expectations attached to particular social identities—the lack of a commensurate
response causes bitterness. The feeling of bitterness is publicly formed, according to
Campbell (1994, 51), as a collaboration between the refusal of others to listen or to
act and the consequent refusal of the injured party to forgive and forget. By refusing
to hear the injured person in the first place, the latter's feelings can then be dismissed
as mere bitterness and the original injustice ignored. In refusing to listen to and
acknowledge legitimate feelings (especially feelings of anger) in response to an
injustice, others can avoid any sense of responsibility for what has ensued. I will
consider the problem of unintelligibility as a result of failure of social uptake in more
detail in Chapter Five.
An equally problematic response is when the privileged make claims to an
equivalence of experience to that of the oppressed, especially given that one of the
claims made by and on behalf of the oppressed is that they are privy to knowledge
not available to the privileged. For example, when in 2010 Maori–Indigenous
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Australian rugby player Timana Tahu resigned from his team in response to racist
taunts directed against him and other black players, actor Russell Crowe, a white
New Zealander, who was clearly in sympathy with Tahu, responded that he could
understand Tahu's position because he, himself, had been subject to racist slurs
("Aussie Actor" 2010). It is not clear from the article whether Crowe was claiming
the same knowledge of racism that a black man has or if he was equating ethnic slurs
against himself—on account of his New Zealand origins or Scottish ancestry—with
the white racism directed at Maoris and Indigenous Australians. It is clear that
neither of these claims stands up to scrutiny since the ethnic discrimination
experienced by white groups in Australia in the last 50 years is in no way equivalent
to the systemic racism directed at Maori New Zealanders or Indigenous Australians,
and it could be argued that Crowe's claim is an instance of the privileged co-opting
the experiences of the oppressed. Even where such claims are rejected or not given
credence, they risk diverting the discourse away from the claims made by the
oppressed, effectively silencing them in the public forum, and making the story told
one about the privileged.56 I will return to this point in later chapters.
It could also be argued that Crowe's claim is an instance of what Elizabeth
Spelman (1988, 12) called "boomerang perception", seeing oneself in the other rather
than seeing the other,57 so that Crowe may have equated Tahu's experience (of racial
taunting) with his own without considering whether or not they represent the same
56 For example, in a discussion on Steven Spielberg's film Lincoln, Aaron Bady (2012) suggests that
by focusing on a minor footnote to the emancipation of black slaves the implication becomes that
Lincoln is responsible for freeing them, thereby diminishing not only the long fight by white
abolitionists but also the efforts of the slaves themselves.
57 The other is "just like us", in Spelman's words, "I look at you and come right back to myself"
(1988, 12). This differs from Frantz Fanon's (1967) 'white gaze', where the world is seen only from
the perspective of white people so that what is important or relevant becomes what is important or
relevant to white people, and behaviour is contextualised on the basis of race membership
resulting in inequitable judgements and outcomes for blacks and whites.
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kind of experience.58 In this instance Tahu's own experience may disappear against
the claims to knowledge made by a white man, much as the claims to knowledge
made by indigenous groups may be made to seem less authoritative than claims
made by a white anthropologist on their behalf.
The privileging of dominant perspectives leads to what has been termed
'epistemologies of ignorance',59 which can emerge either by refusing to allow the
oppressed to know, the active erasure of 'subjugated knowledges',60 or by producing
"epistemic blank spots that make privileged knowers oblivious to systemic
injustices" (Bailey 2007b, 77).61 In other words, the erasure, co-option or derogation
of some knowledges both points to and is itself an instance of unfair or unjust social
practices. It would seem to follow that privileging these perspectives, foregrounding
the perspectives voiced by the oppressed, is itself a form of resistance. As the
example of Timana Tahu shows, the way the oppressed can resist is normally through
a politics of identity, by making knowledge claims from a particular perspective, in
this case laying claim to a black identity in addition to being a rugby player.
To counteract the trivialisation of knowledge claims by those with subjugated
identities in mainstream discourses, it has been suggested that the "situated and
embodied knowledges'' (Haraway 1988, 583) of members of oppressed groups
should be epistemically privileged; however, because identity is considered multiple
rather than singular, such standpoints are necessarily partial.62 The claim made here,
58 Crowe's claim to knowledge is unusual insofar as he claims to understand white racism as if he
was a black man; it is not unusual, however, in claiming to know what the experience of blackness
is like. Robert Bernasconi (2007) gives examples of two white philosophers (Sartre and Arendt)
who lay claim to knowledge of the black experience in their writing.
59 Book title by Shannon Sullivan and Nancy Tuana (2007).
60 Donna Haraway's terminology (1988). This is similar but not identical to Foucault's (1980, 81–83)
notion of subjugated knowledges.
61 Gaile Polhaus (2012, 715) suggests another kind of privileged ignorance—"willful hermeneutical
ignorance"—occurs when "dominantly situated knowers refuse to acknowledge epistemic tools"
developed by those situated marginally.
62 Although the language used varies, the principle involved is the same: that there are advantages to
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though, is not that epistemically-privileged knowledges represent all there is to
know, or that there is one viewpoint and that is the viewpoint of black women, or
Indigenous Australians, or lesbians.63 Neither do proponents of this view claim that
the content of what is revealed has been hitherto unknown. Rather, "the interpretative
framework is what gives life to the distinction between content and point of view"
(Tirrell 1999, 239). Here, what is suggested is that each of these viewpoints, like that
of Timana Tahu, represents knowledge normally hidden or ignored in mainstream
discourses, and therefore, revealing these knowledges is one means of rectifying
these epistemic omissions.64 Susan Wendell, discussing the perspectives of those
with disabilities, expresses this hope in the following way:
I want to say that having a disability usually gives a person experiences of a
world different from that of people without disabilities, and that being a
woman with a disability usually gives a person different experiences from
those of people who are not female and disabled, and that these different
experiences create the possibility of different perspectives which have
epistemic advantages with respect to certain issues (1996, 73).
Wendell locates knowledge of the social world securely in the identity of the subject:
looking at the world from a particular, concrete standpoint versus the objective 'view from
everywhere'. Harding (2006, 250–54) suggests that the origins of standpoint theory can be traced
to Karl Marx, which in feminist scholarship has developed into two projects: the encouragement of
situated knowledge and the identification of epistemic privilege. See Kristina Rolin (2009) for an
analysis of Harding's methodological approach to standpoint theory.
63 Or that there is a single viewpoint which can be described as the black woman's view or Australian
Aboriginal person's view or lesbian's view. See also, Collins (1990) and Harding (1991) for
theorists who make claims to epistemic privilege reliant on notions of position, situation and/or
location.
64 The argument for pluralism can look like an argument for relativism—different meanings and
understandings of the truth are associated with different groups of people. Harding suggests that
the notion of relativism only emerged in mainstream discourses as challenges were made to
universalising concepts and relativism, and therefore reflects a problem that exists “only from the
perspective of dominating groups” (1989, 27; italics in original). Harding (1991, 113) argues
relativism and absolutism are complementary rather than contradictory positions. Similarly,
Haraway argues that such a standpoint is not relativistic because relativism is the counterpoint of a
totalising viewpoint whereas the alternative is "partial, locatable, critical knowledges" (1988, 584).
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a woman with disabilities, she claims, experiences the world differently from
someone who is not female and disabled, just as the black rugby player experiences
the world differently from someone who is not black (or a rugby player, since
different degrees of racism seem present in different sports).
The contextual nature of such knowledges means that it is the oppressed
themselves who are more likely to have critical insights into their own oppression
than those around them. These "insights and emotional responses" then become "a
legacy with which they confront any new issue or situation" (Narayan 1989, 264). To
take the example of the black rugby player again, Tahu's own experience of white
racism, gained through repeated exposure to racism in the wider community, allowed
him to identify the language directed towards him and other black players as racist. It
is possible that non-black players were oblivious to the racist nature of the remarks
because they did not possess a context of emotional and physical response to racism.
Uma Narayan suggests that even those who are sympathetic may "fail to perceive
subtle instances" (1989, 264) of oppressive behaviour; additionally, my claim is that
they may fail to perceive oppression because it has been normalised by dominant
discourses. The white players may understand the racist remarks not as racism but as
part of a culture which belittles players on the basis of personal characteristics when
they make mistakes during the game. The fact that the personal characteristic by
which the black players are disparaged is part of a wider identity prejudice makes
these comments not merely incidentally offensive but symptomatic of systemic
racism. The white players' inability to recognise such blatant racism is a reflection of
their own privileged identities (white, highly paid, elite sportsmen).
The knowledge the oppressed possess does not simply relate to the ability to
recognise oppression. As Wendell says, the knowledge gained by the oppressed gives
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them insights into certain issues others do not have access to. The way the oppressed
experience the world gives insights into human behaviour not immediately available
to others who, by reason of not sharing the same experience and identity, do not have
access to the same knowledge. Laying claim to an oppressive identity provides an
epistemic advantage in considering the choices other people make, in particular the
actions of those who share the same identity. For example, the oppressed may not
turn to the police if they are in trouble, perhaps because their experience of the police
has been negative. Fricker gives the example of a black man in the UK whose
testimony to police about an incident is not properly investigated because of identity
prejudice (Saunders 2009). Another person of colour would recognise the difficulty
of being heard properly by those in authority in a racist country, as well as having
knowledge of them based on a shared social identity, recognition not necessarily
available to persons who do not experience racism on a daily basis. I am not claiming
here that only the oppressed can understand the reasons the oppressed act as they do,
as I would agree with Narayan (1989, 264) that to assume as much is absurd since
we patently can learn a lot about one another without having to inhabit each other's
experiences.65 However, I would argue that in certain circumstances, such as a court
of law where the outcome may be a lengthy prison sentence, or even the death
penalty in some US states, it may be an additional injustice to try a person without
ensuring that their experiences as subjects of oppression are fully understood by
those judging them.
A special instance of the epistemic privileging of members of oppressed
groups' claims to knowledge is made on behalf of what has been termed the outsider
65 Compare Lugones (1987, 4), who argues that we need to inhabit the other's perspective, through
what she calls "'world'-travelling", in order to understand them. I will discuss world-travelling later
in this chapter.
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within. As mentioned in Chapter One, the spatial as well as the discursive
marginalisation of some groups from mainstream life and discourse may include the
physical sequestration of group members in ghettos. However, many of those who
live in the margins are privy to what occurs in privileged households, businesses, and
educational and judicial institutions, even if what occurs in these places excludes
them or includes them only in marginal roles. Collins (1991) has suggested that
outsider within status frequently renders such an individual invisible to those whose
privilege is observed, giving the former an unprecedented advantage for bringing
their knowledge as a marginalised subject to the privileged experience which they
observe as a partial participant. For example, black female servants in the segregated
Southern US states were privy to the domestic life of middle-class whites and
therefore aware that middle-class white women were not considered as equals or
treated as such by white men (Collins 1991, 43). This is not the same position
anthropologists have in relation to their subjects:  the outsider within is not choosing
this perspective in order to gain an epistemic benefit; rather, it is the inadvertent
corollary of being marginalised. Having what Narayan (1989, 265–6) calls "double
vision" may give the marginalised an epistemic advantage, but this should not make
theorists valorise the state of being oppressed; we should consider, instead, how the
critical insight given by multiple perspectives can be made available to others.
The outsider within is believed to have an epistemic advantage because they
are able to operate within two different contexts and with two sets of practices, and it
is presumed this gives critical insights "because each framework provides a critical
perspective on the other" (Narayan 1989, 266). Outsider within status may therefore
be best thought of as a tool, a conceptual approach which allows the person to see
beyond the totalising framework of domination. In order to be in this position (one of
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multiple perspectives) the outsider within has to assimilate an experience which is at
odds with their own lived experience. Although members of oppressed groups have
to know the privileged in non-reciprocal ways in order to survive, the argument for
epistemic advantage is not simply that one has to know more than the privileged to
survive. Nonetheless, being oppressed actually confers an epistemic advantage, that
one’s knowing is privileged in a way that the oppressor’s knowing is not. What gives
the advantage in terms of knowing is the person's social identity as an outsider which
may render them invisible in the social reality of the privileged. One of the best
known examples is Frye's claim that because lesbians do not exist in heterosexual
reality this gives them a particular epistemic advantage by being "in a position to see
things that cannot be seen from within the system" (1983, 173).66 Remembering who
and what we are in one social reality when we are in another is important to how we
see things, in Lugones's (1990b, 504) analysis of multiple perspectives, since if we
can remember who we are from one reality to another we can act based on intentions
we had in the other reality. The difficulty that arises here is that actions may be
misunderstood because our intentions stem from who we are in another reality. This
argument is very close to the contention that our actions potentially risk moral failure
if we cannot make ourselves intelligible to others. I will return to this problem and
explore it in more detail in Chapter Five as it poses a direct challenge to a central
theme in my thesis, that it might be possible for persons to demonstrate moral agency
by making their choices, relationships and identities intelligible to others.
A number of problems have been identified with inhabiting multiple
perspectives and I will look at these through the work of Narayan, whose exegesis of
the difficulties of dual perspectives finds echoes in the work of other theorists as
66 Specifically, Frye observes that lesbians see women, and seeing what is invisible to
heteronormative patriarchy takes lesbians outside of this explanatory framework.
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diverse as Linda Martin Alcoff, Gloria Anzaldua, and Lugones. For example, all four
theorists make the argument that inhabiting multiple perspectives can leave the
individual feeling an outsider in each culture. In Hispaneando y Lesbiando Lugones
(1990a) writes about feeling an outsider in lesbian community because of her Latina
identity and an outsider in Latino culture because of her lesbian identity. Narayan
(1989, 267) further identifies as a potential negative an absence of fluency, so that
one is no longer perfectly adept in any culture, giving by way of example her own
knowledge of the words for everyday items in Indian languages but only the English
words for technical subjects, such as economics and biology. In addition, having
knowledge of multiple cultures might make it difficult for the agent to satisfy their
desires. For example, an Indian woman may want to wear Western clothing (either
because it is comfortable, or as a sign of independence from restrictions on her as a
woman in her own culture) but feel obliged to wear traditional costume to show
solidarity with her own culture (Narayan 1989, 267). I would suggest that the
criticism that she cannot choose to do both—to embrace the freedom of the west and
validate her own Indian culture—overlooks what is important about this situation:
that possessing knowledge of both cultures gives the woman a critical perspective
necessitating a (political) choice about her dress. Although the woman cannot choose
to do both this does not counteract the value gained by inhabiting multiple
perspectives, since it was these multiple perspectives that gave her both choices in
the first place.
Narayan (1989, 266) is correct, though, in stating that possessing outsider
within status does not in itself generate a critical perspective. One has only to think
of the idea of 'passing'—for example, a coloured person passing as white, or a gay
person passing as straight—to see that outsider within status can lead to a number of
65
practices which are morally questionable.67 Narayan mentions two of the many ways
in which people may respond to inhabiting multiple viewpoints. The first of these is
when persons keep their multiple perspectives as separate as possible, without
allowing their consciousness of another perspective to cross social spheres. Here,
Narayan gives the example of the way many women live in the west, acting out
traditional women's roles in a domestic context and men's roles in public life. The
dichotomising of the two perspectives leads to contradictions and inconsistencies
which may be troubling, but in Narayan's view such an approach also allows women
to get the most out of life, having both a successful career and a successful family
life. The second possible response to possessing multiple perspectives is to deny the
practices of one's own culture and to embrace the practices associated with dominant
groups instead. The practice of passing probably fits in somewhere here since being
able to pass as a member of a dominant group means one can deny one's affiliation
with, for instance, the gay community and act in a way which identifies one as a
member of the heterosexual majority. Although these responses may appear benign
or even positive, in that they may assist someone to have a better job or live in a
better neighbourhood, each of these alternatives exacts a price which I suggest is
greater than that paid by the person seeking to engage critically with multiple
perspectives. Practices such as passing may cause psychological damage as a result
of self-censorship and denial of those aspects of oneself which may result in one's
rejection by others. For instance, Alcoff says of passing that it "causes one to dislike
those aspects of self that reveal otherness" (2006, 267). In my view feeling that one
no longer has a home, or feeling alienated from one's original culture, both of which
may arise from viewing dual or multiple perspectives critically, is less damaging
67 Alcoff (2006, 266–67) gives an eloquent example from her own experience as a mixed-race Latina
passing as white.
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psychologically than feeling alienated from oneself as a result of disengaging from
multiple selves or from passing as someone one is not.68
While the oppressed have little choice but to understand the social practices
of the dominant because these are the practices by which everyone is expected to live
there is no corresponding incentive compelling the dominant to understand the
practices of the oppressed, and this dichotomy presents a problem for these claims if
they are understood simply as contesting dominant knowledge systems. It could be
argued, as Bat–Ami Bar On (1993, 95–96) does in response to Collins's (1990, 204)
argument that knowledge claims made by black women can contest white male
epistemologies, that any insights generated by possessing dual perspectives have no
social power to affect dominant discourses.69 In Bar On's (1993, 96) opinion the
persons most likely to be convinced by knowledge claims made by the marginalised
are other similarly situated persons, so that such claims merely serve as a means of
empowering the marginalised themselves. While I agree with Bar On that challenges
to dominant epistemologies will not necessarily be successful, I disagree that the
goal of knowledge claims made by the marginalised is either to empower the
oppressed or to challenge dominant epistemologies. Given that knowledge claims by
the privileged are epistemically privileged over claims by the oppressed, and that
subjugated knowledges can be suppressed by dominant knowledge validation
processes (Collins 1990, 203–4), it is not enough for the oppressed to make a claim
to some experience for it to achieve credibility and authority from society at large.
68 I will consider this in more detail in Chapter Three, including the notion that the desire to feel 'at
home in the world' is contrary to having a critical perspective necessary for resistance.
69 Bar On refers to Collins talking about black women scholars making claims in academia. Collins
(1990, 204) argues that such claims can "contest those advanced by the white male community",
however Bar On refutes this on the grounds that the white male community does not have to
accept the knowledge validation process on which black women's claims are based. In other
words, the dominant can reject the framework within which knowledge claims made by the
oppressed have validity, making the claims themselves invalid.
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Indeed, Collins argues that knowledge claims made by the oppressed may be rejected
on epistemological grounds because "for any body of knowledge, new knowledge
claims must be consistent with an existing body of knowledge that the group
controlling the interpretive context accepts as true" (1990, 204). This suggests that
subjugated knowledges are best considered in ways other than oppositional to
dominant epistemologies.
Bar On also argues that knowledge claims made by the oppressed are flawed
for claiming to be untainted by oppression. According to Bar On, two kinds of
practices are seen as authentic in claims to partial knowledge: practices which are
considered integral to the group (such as the care-giving practices associated with
women) which may be implicated in the oppression of the group, and practices of
resistance.70 Bar On (1993, 93) claims that practices of resistance are conceptualised
in two ways, firstly, as practices pre-dating oppressive culture (for example, pre-
colonisation, pre-patriarchial), and secondly, as practices responsive to, and
subversive of, oppression. These two approaches to conceptualising resistance can be
combined. For example, Bar On (1993, 93–94) argues that in "La concienca de la
mestiza/Towards a New Consciousness", Anzaldua (2007) draws upon Chicano and
American Indian culture and myth as well as challenging the oppressions found in
Anglo and Chicano culture. I would dispute Bar On's (1993, 94) claim that practices
of resistance are theorised as authentic only if they are untainted by oppression or
indicative of a certain group. For example, hooks describes being an outsider within
70 Bar On is writing in the early 1990s and refers to ideas in care theory from the mid to late 1980s,
in particular notions of women's practices of nurturing and caring, particularly mothering, found in
the work of Sara Ruddick and Virginia Held in Eva Kittay and Meyers (1987); the debate has since
moved on. Bar On argues that although Ruddick and Held are sensitive to ambiguities in practices
of mothering and caring they go on to develop theories that suggest these practices are
uncomplicated. Bar On's point is that women’s practices of nurturing and caring for others
identified by proponents of an ethics of care in the 1980s are linked to the gender roles assigned
women within oppressive systems, and since they are acted upon by oppressive forces they cannot
be theorised without complexity.
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as having a public acceptance of the separation between margin and centre and a
private consciousness of being "a necessary, vital part of that whole" (2000, xvi).
While I do agree with Bar On that practices of oppression are implicated in practices
of resistance, I would argue that this does not make the meanings attached to the
social practices and institutions of domination unassailable. As Foucault has shown,
power and resistance are always co-implicated and one cannot exist without the other
(McLaren 2004, 217–18). As a result, the possibility of resistance survives even
where states of domination exist and resistance is limited because power relations
have become ossified.71 If the subject is both produced by power and opposed to the
way it is produced by power, since one of the effects of power is resistance to
productive power (Butler 2004, 189), it is impossible for theorists such as Anzaldua,
Lugones or hooks, for example, to creatively imagine notions of resistance and
empowerment without reference to the oppressive systems that construct both
themselves and their practices of resistance. I would argue, however, that the
meanings attached to these practices, while tainted by oppression, are not wholly
determined by oppression.
In contrast to Bar On, I would contend that the importance of subjugated
knowledges is that they are situated and embodied, and therefore necessarily partial.
Such knowledges should be privileged because, as reflections of marginalised lives,
they are implicated with, and indicators of, oppression. However, they are not simply
oppositional to mainstream knowledges, because partial plural knowledge claims in
71 For Foucault, because "power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are
free", "where the determining factors saturate the whole", such as with slavery, "there is no
relationship of power"; rather, "it is a question of a physical relationship of constraint" (1983,
221). However, Foucault said in "The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom",
that even where "power relations are fixed in such a way that they are perpetually asymmetrical
and allow an extremely limited margin of freedom" there is some possibility for resistance,
suggesting by way of example that women in conventional marital relationships in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries could "deceive their husbands, pilfer money from them, refuse them sex"
(quoted in McLaren 2004, 221).
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themselves, by their very existence, dispute the totalising claims of dominant
epistemologies, and this implicates them in both practices of oppression and of
resistance. Claims to knowledge by the oppressed do not annihilate dominant
knowledges; they challenge the notion of totalising knowledges, the claim that this is
all there is. When the marginalised make knowledge claims, they argue for the
existence of other, partial perspectives which are ignored by the comprehensive
claims to knowledge made by mainstream epistemologies. The challenge is not to the
knowledges themselves but to the dominant notion of 'truth' versus truths.72
In summary, the situated standpoints inhabited by the oppressed have a
twofold importance for resistance practices: firstly, the situated and partial claims to
knowledge made by the oppressed challenge the monolithic epistemologies of
domination; and secondly, the multiple perspectives inhabited by the oppressed also
give them a critical perspective on knowledge claims. It is the critical positioning
attained rather than the content of the knowledge claims themselves that is important
for resistance, since positioning oneself in this way potentially allows persons to see
alternative ways of understanding not wholly constricted by the explanatory
frameworks imposed by dominant epistemologies.
Repudiating privilege
Theorists of oppression point out the limits to what the oppressed can do or
change about the way their social identities are perceived without corresponding
change from the privileged.73 In response, a number of theorists have suggested ways
the privileged can be traitors to their privilege or disown their privilege.74 This
72 I will return to the notion of competing truths in Chapter Six.
73 Compare Campbell (1999), who cautions that dominant identities lack the same imperatives to
change that exist for the marginalised.
74 Although the arguments in feminist theory about essentialism and lack of awareness of difference
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challenge has been taken up principally by white theorists in response to race-
privilege, although the theory could apply to any privileged group.75 One of the
earliest is Sandra Harding's account of traitorous or perverse identities. Harding
(1991, 103) argues that the contradictory aspects of an identity such as 'woman
scientist', for example, give an epistemic advantage because of being at the centre
and the margin simultaneously—in other words, being the outsider within. For
Harding, having a traitorous or perverse identity involves showing disloyalty to class
or race privilege.
Lynne Tirrell (1993) argues that although we commonly think of authority
and privilege as identical, having authority is about having power, while being
privileged is a matter of having a special benefit or exemption. This being the case,
she argues that it is possible to have power and yet disaffiliate from privilege since,
while privilege may be presumed by dominant groups, it is  ultimately affirmed by
others. But is it that simple to be a class or race traitor? Is it even possible to
disaffiliate from class or race privilege, given that I suggested in the previous chapter
that it is not possible to disaffiliate from group memberships which are based on
visible characteristics? Alcoff (2000, 273) is less convinced by the theory of race
treason because she believes race-privilege is largely left intact and there is a
tendency on the part of those supposedly engaged in disaffiliating from race privilege
to disavow any ongoing responsibility for race violence or discrimination. It is not
clear how it is possible to simultaneously take responsibility and deny responsibility
for the consequences of privilege.
could fall into this category of privilege-awareness or privilege-cognizance, for the most part these
are now taken for granted, at least in the theory, and the theorists here are concerned with changes
that might be possible if the dominant were to disown privilege. For the most part, too, such
theorising centres on race-privilege and how white people can respond ethically to the reality of
racism.
75 For example, Frankenberg (1993); Narayan and Harding (2000); Sullivan and Tuana (2007).
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Alison Bailey suggests the notion of traitorous identities for those whites
acting with awareness of race privilege, behaviour she describes as "privilege-
cognizant" (2007a, 147) white scripts.76 Bailey believes that privilege-evasive
behaviour and speech acts enforce and support racism, and that being conscious of
one's advantages as a result of racism, that is, privilege-cognizant, becomes a way for
whites to take responsibility for the negative consequences of racism to people of
colour. Clearly, this awareness of privilege could be applied to other social groups
which are treated unequally and suffer sociopsychological discrimination. Privilege-
cognizance would involve recognising when one's race or sex or age or ability or
religion or sexuality privileges one in some way, and, I would argue, specifically
when this privileging disadvantages someone else or some other group.
Privilege-cognizance is the recognition of exclusions, of the (discrimination,
violence, treatment towards others) that have resulted in one being in the privileged
position one is in, for example, Minnie Bruce Pratt's (1984) recognition of the role
slavery played in the privileging of her white southern family. Pratt's
autobiographical narrative unpicks the histories of oppression and resistance that
shape her sense of self and belonging in three key times and places in her life: her
childhood in Alabama, her marriage and lesbian coming out, and her later years as a
white woman in a black neighbourhood in Washington, DC. By critically examining
the details of her childhood, Pratt reveals instances of oppression that were
overlooked or ignored, such as the slave house in the centre of the square in her
home town. In order to see difference, Pratt has to challenge the notion that what she
knows is all there is to know.77 She says: "I feel the need to look differently because
76 Ruth Frankenberg (1993) developed the distinction between race-cognizant and race-evasive white
scripts.
77 Adale Sholock argues that, as well as providing an obstacle to effective change, the epistemic
uncertainty that attends "systematic ignorance" (2012, 701) in the privileged can "offer
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I've learned that what is presented to me as an accurate view of the world is
frequently a lie ... I'm learning that what I think that I know is an accurate view of the
world is frequently a lie ... So I gain truth when I expand my constricted eye, an eye
that has only let in what I have been taught to see" (1984, 17; italics in original).
Charles Mills has suggested that, for white people who subscribe to what he calls the
'Racial Contract', this kind of epistemic ignorance is part of learning to see the world
wrongly, a kind of 'inverted epistemology' that results in "white misunderstanding,
misrepresentation, evasion, and self-deception on matters related to race" (1997, 18–
19; italics in original).78
I will argue in the next chapter that the self is produced by and productive of
place. If this is so, then social selves or public identities reflect public
acknowledgement of spatial occupation, lives lived, to put it another way. In the US,
southern white, middle-class subjectivity is, in part, produced by the invisibility of
black labour and lack of acknowledgement that white privilege is built on the lives
and the spaces black slaves occupied, such as the buildings where slaves were sold.
Just as Pratt comes to see that the exclusion of black slaves made her own family's
privilege appear natural, privilege-cognizance amounts to acknowledging this sleight
of hand, the disappearance of those whose oppression makes one's privilege possible.
Recognising these omissions from one's own history requires a new way of knowing
the world, a way of seeing which is seeing what or who is not there, who has been
painted out of the picture, to make it possible for those present to claim a society that
opportunity for greater connection" (2012, 709) between privileged and oppressed, and that
epistemic uncertainty should be considered an additional strategy rather than a dilemma for the
privileged.
78 Mills (1997, 18–19) says that in order to maintain a worldview of white superiority, whites are
required to "live in an invented delusional world, a racial fantasyland, a 'consensual
hallucination'", where stereotypical views of other races (for example, "Tontos, Man Fridays and
Sambos") are considered to be representative of real racial groups.
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is just and fair and egalitarian. It is in the interplay between privilege-cognizance and
the cultivation of traitorous identities, acting upon one's understanding of the
exclusions of others, that one is able to take responsibility for histories of violence
and discrimination that have made one's privilege possible.
Being able to make claims about oneself and society therefore requires
knowledge about the world that the privileged normally hide, in order to avoid
acknowledging that the advantages taken for granted as a right come at a cost to
others. Privilege-cognizance, then, is a kind of moral accounting where the moral
and socio-economic costs of oppressive social practices are given a value by those
who benefit most. As the ones who bear the brunt of the burden, the oppressed are
already aware of the unacknowledged costs of unfair and unjust social practices.
Bailey (2007a, 154–55) uses Lugones's (1987, 18) concept of world-
travelling to explain what happens when persons are privilege-evasive, as well as
illustrating how traitorous identities would work. World-travelling suggests that we
cannot understand others without travelling 'playfully' to their worlds, where
playfully implies an attitude of loving perception, allowing one to see the other in all
their complexity and difference, making it possible to understand them and their
choices. According to Lugones (1987, 3) the subordinate have to become world
travellers in order to survive—they have to be outsiders within some other cultural
context because they are marginalised from the mainstream, and, in the case of
members of some subordinate groups, quite literally cannot dwell there all the time.79
As a result of their marginalised status, the oppressed experience their sense of self
differently in different contexts, and "the shift from being one person to being a
79 hooks expresses this in the following way in her Preface to Feminist Theory: "Across those tracks
was a world we could work in as maids, as janitors, as prostitutes ... We could enter that world but
we could not live there" (2000, xvi.)
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different person" (1987, 11) is Lugones's definition of world-travelling. In Bailey's
analysis, privilege-evasive scripts present a way for the privileged to avoid becoming
world travellers, whereas world travel is "an indispensable strategy" (2007a, 154) for
those wanting to cultivate a traitorous identity.
However, Campbell argues that those with dominant identities, that is "those
identities most affirmed by current social structures" (1999, 216n1), do not have the
same imperatives as the oppressed to be world travellers in this way. Campbell
suggests that this is the case because of the nature of expectations which she argues
are "central structures in the constitution of selves and are a way of understanding
and ordering the world" because they "structure attention and memory, are
interwoven with emotion, and give rise to norms" (1999, 225). Although the
oppressed may need to resist the internalisation of norms causing them to challenge
expectations of their behaviour, the dominant experience expectations of their own
behaviour as settled in the form of apparently natural social practices and rules.
Having expectations which are easily met reinforces entrenched attitudes and
behaviours; such expectations, which gain normative force through being met
(Campbell 1999, 223), "become psychic habits that are unselfconscious and thus
protected from self-scrutiny" (1999, 216); therefore, the dominant do not have the
same impetus to transform themselves or their behaviour. Campbell also suggests
that "although our expectations can become apparent to us when they are not met,
disruption may lead neither to their critical engagement nor to their reformulation,
but rather to emotional responses that are antithetical to change" (1999, 229). In
other words, challenging settled expectations may result in anxiety and an inability to
know how to respond rather than in personal transformation.
Given that each person has a multiplicity of identities as a result of social
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group assignments, clearly some, if not all, persons also possess privileged social
identities, and there is little incentive for members of these groups for critical self-
examination, thus setting a limit on potential change. In their commentary on Pratt's
reflections, Biddy Martin and Mohanty (1986, 196) suggest that privileged identities
are constructed by suppressing knowledge of the injustices which make privilege
possible. This repression of oppression and struggles of resistance extends to the
repression of difference within the self. By assuming a concept of an unchanging
stable self the privileged resist acknowledging that difference exists, and by
conceiving social identities as self-evident, homogeneous, fixed and unchangeable
(Martin and Mohanty 1986, 193), the historical context of social injustices is hidden
or denied. Members of privileged groups therefore benefit from ignoring the
relationality of their autonomy and moral agency which I will discuss in the next
chapter, and because their social expectations are met they have less reason than the
oppressed to question the concept of the self as a coherent, unified structure
(Campbell 1999, 231).80
In order to discover the true political nature of her upbringing and privilege
Pratt has to re-examine her childhood and reveal where the exclusion of specific
histories of oppression and resistance, and the repression of difference, both outward
and inward, made privilege possible (Martin and Mohanty 1986, 196), and to
unsettle the notion of a fixed, coherent, completely independent sense of self.
Questioning assumptions about one's privileged position in the world and about
oneself as separate from and independent of others, rather than necessarily relational,
80 Campbell (1999, 231) argues that although Pratt challenges the notion of a "coherent and
historically continuous" identity, she does not support the alternative notion of the multiple self;
rather, she looks for a kind of community where community is not about shared "behaviors,
feelings, and values" but rather "material and historical locations" where relationships of
domination and exclusion are acted out. I will return to the idea of space and its significance for
practices of resistance in Chapter Three.
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requires re-examining notions of the self and who one is. Accepting the complicity of
oneself and one's group in the oppression of others requires firstly acknowledging
one's interdependence with others. Pratt's narrative indicates how difficult it is to
unravel the complex connections between self and other, safety and harm, and
privilege and oppression; for instance persons can feel at home (safe) while being
harmed in situations of domestic violence. This kind of knowledge is not easy to
come by for either privileged or oppressed; it requires courage and commitment to
unscramble settled notions such as that only by ignoring injustices to one group can
another feel safe and at home in the world. I will return to these ideas in Chapter
Three.
Assuming the dominant do choose to move from the centre to the margin in
the way that Pratt did, to travel to the worlds of the oppressed, it is unclear exactly
what difference this would make. Travelling to the world of the oppressed requires
more than seeing the other with a loving rather than an arrogant eye, although it is a
start to see the other in all their complexity.81 Moreover, there are inherent limits to
what we can know about the other, and avoiding arrogant perception while travelling
to other worlds requires acceptance of these limits as well as acceptance of the
epistemological limitations attached to being a member of a dominant group.
The idea of privilege-cognizance as a strategy for change raises many
questions, including how awareness of injustices translates into political change.
Although it is outside the scope of this project to attempt to address these here, it is
worth remembering that privilege-cognizance represents a mostly untried strategy
that depends upon practitioners actively seeking out information that may make them
feel uncomfortable. Additionally, Campbell (1999, 219–20) suggests that although
81 See Frye (1983, 74–76) for more detail on what it means to look with loving perception. I will
return to this notion in Chapter Four.
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knowledge is essential for identity transformation, by itself it does not give sufficient
reason for dominant identities to transform themselves. I would argue, given Pratt's
example, that what might make transformation possible is the multiplicity of
identities, both privileged and oppressed, which inform a person's expectations and
experiences. For instance, Pratt's privilege-cognizance with regard to her white race
arises in conjunction with her understanding of her comparative powerlessness as a
woman. If the privileged actively seek out histories of violence and repression of
other groups, as Pratt has done, or travel to another's world, as Lugones suggests, to
provide themselves with 'the view from there', then these acts may ultimately be
instrumental in motivating social change; however, the prospects for success are
tentative at best.
Rethinking social categories
Because the construction of social categories frequently contributes to
oppression, as the preceding sections have demonstrated, then it may be difficult at
first to see how re-envisioning social identities can also be a means of empowering
the oppressed and enabling resistance. However, as I have shown, there is
complexity to the way in which social identities are constructed, and this allows the
oppressed the space to re-conceptualise the way in which social identities are seen. In
contrast to the dominant, for whom social identities operate as a means of excluding
and marginalising others, members of oppressed groups are able to create a sense of
inclusiveness by allowing not only for differences among group members but also
for diverse interpretations about who belongs within a social group. This does not
mean that there is an infinite number of types who fit into a group; rather, it suggests
a willingness on the part of group members to consider as belonging those with
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different attributes but who identify with the group. Feminism has a long history of
theorising the importance of difference and inclusion as a counter to the politics of
dominance and exclusion. One way of allowing for the inclusion of difference within
social groups is to promote the concept of identity as multiple in instances where
domination conceptualises singular homogenised identities. To dispel the assumption
that multiplicity (multiple identities) implies fragmentation of the self, social
identities need to be re-conceptualised as necessarily plural and complex. Although
both dominants and subordinates can be described in terms of membership of
different social groups, as mentioned above, members of in-groups conceptualise
themselves as individuals with differing characteristics whereas members of out-
groups are perceived as having similar features. The presumption of homogeneity by
the dominant deprives the oppressed not only of their individuality but also of their
plurality.
As we have seen earlier in this chapter, Lugones (1994, 468) argues that not
only does understanding social kinds as discrete and unitary represent a form of
domination but for the oppressed to conceive of the self as impure, as mestizaje, can
be a form of resistance.82 If the dominant insist on the purity of the self, and the
consequential understanding of those with multiple identities as fragmented, then to
conceptualise identity as necessarily multiple becomes a form of resistance for the
oppressed. It also represents a form of self-definition available to the oppressed, the
conception of social identity as plural and consequently of oppressions as multiple
and interlocking or intermeshed.
Lugones (1989) talks about a self who is one person in one world and another
82 For Lugones the term mestizaje, which means a mixed race person, refers to "an example of and a
metaphor for both impurity and resistance. I hold on to the metaphor and adopt mestizaje as a
central name for impure resistance to interlocked, intermeshed oppressions" (1994, 459).
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person in another world. This individual is someone who, like Alcoff, may be
accepted as having a different identity in a different context. As mentioned earlier,
Alcoff (2006, viii–ix, 266–67) describes in Visible Identities how she was able to
pass as white in the broader community because of her light skin, but how as a result
of her Latina heritage she was also accepted by the Hispanic community, enabling
her to be an insider in both white and Hispanic communities. Similarly, Lugones
(1990a) talks of being a part of both the Hispanic community and the lesbian
community. Notice that in both these cases the two identities ascribed or assumed are
in tension with one another and, for Alcoff at least, one identity confers privilege
while the other results in oppression. This may appear inconsistent with my previous
example of the black woman, someone whose two identities are not mutually
exclusive and both of which entail oppression. But what I am concerned to point out
at this stage is that many types of multiple identities exist and the ascription of
multiple identities does not automatically result in either privilege or subjugation.
Historically, however, the confluence of the social categories male, white, and
middle-class has equated to political and economic privilege.
To claim that identities and hence oppressions are singular and separate from
one another is to overlook the complex way in which discriminatory forces intersect
or intermesh, such as the way race is implicated in poverty.83 Intersectionality, or
intersectional oppression, refers to the way in which "subordinating practices operate
synergistically" (Meyers 2000, 154), so that—as in  Kimberle Crenshaw's (1989,
149) vivid analogy of multiple vehicles arriving simultaneously at a crossroads from
83 In addition, this is not the way that persons with multiple identities experience their sense of self.
Beverly Smith, in conversation with Barbara Smith, says that although it may be useful to separate
out the different strands of oppression, "in reality, the way women live their lives, those
separations just don't work. Women don't live their lives like, 'Well this part is race, and this is
class, and this part has to do with women's identities'" (Smith and Smith 1983, 116).
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different directions and striking a person—it is impossible to tell which oppression is
responsible for the resulting harm. In societies which attempt to redress the injustices
to members of out-groups, the presumption of homogeneity within marginalised
groups can lead to further injustices. By assuming that identity is singular and
discrete, legislators have framed anti-discrimination legislation presuming
discrimination on account of a single facet of social identity, which then makes it
impossible for claimants to argue in court that they suffer from multiple
discriminations. For example, Crenshaw (1989) and Cathy Scarborough (1989)
independently analysed a number of legal cases in the United States involving
discrimination against black women and discovered inconsistencies in the
judgements, which only made sense if the courts were presuming discrimination was
always singular and discrete. For black women this presumption meant the
legislation did not recognise discrimination on the basis of both race and sex
concurrently.84 Instead, in order to make a successful claim the women had to show
that any race discrimination experienced also affected black men or that sex
discrimination also affected white women. Conversely, the women were unable to
argue that they were representative of women or blacks since the court differentiated
their experiences as black women from those of white women and black men on the
grounds of sex or race. Black women therefore found themselves in the anomalous
position of not being able to claim discrimination as black women and not being able
to claim discrimination as women, or as blacks, since they were not considered
representative of their own gender or their own race. The reason for this is that
implicit in the legislation is the assumption that the definition of woman is
synonymous with the situation of a white woman and the definition of black is
84 The courts treated attempts to claim both discriminations as attempts to claim double the remedy,
hence not what the anti-discrimination legislation intended.
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synonymous with the situation of a black man. To use Lugones's terminology, the
transparent group members of the groups 'men' and 'women' are black men and white
women; therefore black women are rendered invisible within the legal system, which
is implicitly looking for racist discrimination against black men or sexist
discrimination against white women. When a black woman attempts to gain redress
for discrimination, the legal system is unable to appropriately consider and address
discrimination against her as a black woman.
In analysing the legislation and the anomalous case of black women,
Scarborough (1989) and Crenshaw (1989) found that the legislation reflects an
understanding of oppression and discrimination that presumes that, but for one
feature of identity, the individual would have equal social access and opportunities to
that of a normative subject, in other words, a white, middle-class male. Anti-
discrimination legislation is constituted upon the premise that 'but for' a particular
kind of discrimination an individual would be able to get that job or be granted a pay
rise. Therefore, anti-discrimination legislation looks at removing the barrier of race
or sex or sexuality, or whatever the aspect of one's identity that is deemed to be
preventing an individual from succeeding. This problem arises in the legislation
because discriminations are treated not only as singular and additive (King 1988;
Scarborough 1989; Lugones 1994), or with what Lugones, calling on Spelman's
vivid description, calls "pop-bead logic" (1994, 474),85 but also because there is a
presumption of an equivalence between the different oppressions. To consider
oppression in this way is to overlook the fact that sex, race and class discrimination
operate as three separate systems of social control, which are nevertheless interactive
85 Spelman says, "one's gender identity is not related to one's racial and class identity as the parts of
pop-bead necklaces are related, separable and insertable in other 'strands' with different racial and
class 'parts'" (1988, 15).
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(King 1988, 47). Deborah King (1988, 51) also suggests that the reduction of the
complexity of black female identity to an addition problem reflects structural terms
developed by Europeans and white males privileging their sex and race; in other
words, it is an additional means of coercing black women by determining the
language in which they can define themselves. By determining the way the
oppressed are able to legitimise themselves, the categorisation of social identities is
another component of domination.
One difficulty which may arise in applying the concept of intersectionality to
moral problems concerns the salience of identities, which I discussed in Chapter
One. Intersectionality suggests that, for those affected by multiple oppressions, trying
to determine which discrimination is at fault is analogous to attempting to discover
which vehicle is to blame if someone is hit simultaneously by two or more vehicles
coming from different directions. However, if there is a hierarchy of features of
identity and they are not equally salient in every circumstance, then the additive
approach may reflect the reality of the lived experience better than an intersectional
approach, particularly with regard to legal injustices rather than moral harms.86
Intersectionality assigns no difference in weighting to the various features of identity
that constitute a multiple identity, because it is concerned with the synergy of these
factors; yet some of these factors may be less significant than others. For example,
class and race discrimination may be much more important factors contributing to
the economic and social inequities suffered by black women than sex discrimination
(King 1988). However, this does not mean that intersectionality is not also relevant
86 That identities are privileged or oppressed in differing degrees may not be obvious until we
provide a specific context for the privileging or oppression. Being young, female, white and
childless may equate to being young, male, white and childless at a department store service
counter but as an employee of a busy legal firm the man may get the important promotion because
of a perception that the woman intends at some unspecified point in the future to take time out to
have children.
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since it may be that both these factors apply: one aspect of identity may be more
salient in the discrimination and yet other factors may influence being treated
differently. For example, a landlord who discriminates systematically against women
on welfare may appear to be discriminating against black women if the majority of
applicants denied are black because the majority of welfare recipients are black;
being black in this situation is not as salient as receiving welfare but the complex
interplay between poverty and race may result in what is covert racism, and the
women's race may be as significant, although an unacknowledged factor, in
disadvantaging them.
The concept of intersectionality used as a methodological approach to legal
and social problems is "animated ... by a distinctive way into reality that captures not
just the static outcomes of the problem it brings into view but its dynamics and lines
of force as well", and it is this "synergistic interaction of the variables which it
exposes" (MacKinnon 2013, 1023–24) which makes it truly transformative. Like
outsider within status, intersectionality provides a conceptual approach which allows
the person to examine critically "the dominant framework of discrimination"
(Crenshaw 1989, 152).87
Re-defining social identities
I am arguing that the act of self-definition, of creating and claiming a social
identity or identities, constitutes an act of resistance for the oppressed. However, as
these identities need to be widely recognised by others they need to be public not
private identities, in order to be considered resistant identities. Since the dominant
conception of group identities of outsiders is often predominantly negative, there is
87 For an overview of intersectionality as a methodology, and its critiques, see Vivian May (2013).
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an issue for the oppressed in laying claim to their own positive identities. If negative
connotations of a social identity exist in the wider community these will not be
erased by the resistant act of re-claiming the identity; rather, identity power means
the two ways of interpreting the identity will continue to exist in tension with one
another. As a result, some identities may appear internally contradictory to members
of the wider community and be rejected. Identities that are in conflict with normative
understandings of how members of that social group should behave may also be
rejected. For example, prescriptive expectations of gender are so engrained that for a
woman to dress in 'man's' clothing and refuse to remove excess body hair, may result
in the expectation that this individual is claiming a male rather than a female identity,
even if this is not the case. The refusal by the wider community to embrace non-
normative understandings of social identities can affect the self-image of the
individual. This makes it more difficult for the person to insist on their understanding
of their identity, since it is difficult to claim an identity if the community is unwilling
to affirm a positive value for that identity.88
The most serious problem with the idea of persons making themselves
intelligible through self-definition is that because social identities require uptake by
others it is questionable whether the oppressed can gain affirmation from others apart
from members of their own social group. It has been suggested that for the oppressed
to make claims which have semantic authority the meanings attached to those claims
must be able to be encompassed by the wider community, that is, they must be quasi-
normative. This would seem an almost insurmountable barrier to overcome;
however, the oppressed do press successfully for changes to how they are perceived,
one example being the more positive public image of persons with non-hetero
88 To claim a social identity whose positive meaning(s) may not be validated by society involves
taking a moral risk. I will consider this problem in more detail in Chapter Five.
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sexualities in contemporary times. I would suggest changed perceptions are possible,
because there exists a certain fluidity in the norms of any society since social
institutions and practices change over time and the expectations attached to them also
change; consequently, there can be some uptake of meanings that are unfamiliar or
novel. However, social uptake of new identities is necessarily partial, because the
meanings attached to the identities by the oppressed do not fully accord with
normative values and expectations. I suggest that this partial uptake is all that is
required for alternative meanings of social identities and practices to be introduced
into mainstream discourses.
As I mentioned earlier in this chapter, one imperative for the oppressed is to
be world travellers, to inhabit both their own marginalised culture(s) and the culture
of the dominant, in order to survive.89 Lugones (1987, 4) argues that seeing the other
in all their complexity, rather than as products of our arrogant perception, requires us
to travel to their world. For example, Lugones (1987, 4–6) describes seeing her own
mother as a servant and a victim as a result of seeing her arrogantly. Because she saw
her mother as a servant, she equated being female in patriarchal Argentina with
servitude and rejected this for herself. World-travelling provides a means of
identifying with the other and allows us to see the other in all their complexity, where
difference is recognised not erased. Only by travelling to her mother's world does
Lugones (1987, 18) reject arrogant perception and come to realise that her mother is
not solely constructed by patriarchy, and this understanding then affects how
Lugones sees herself. Because we see "what it is to be them and what it is to be
89 Lugones (1987, 9) defines a world as a place inhabited by people or which may have been
inhabited at some time in the past or may be inhabited by imaginary people; it is not, however, a
utopia, an imaginary place. I will come back to the notions of imagination and world travel in
Chapter Six.
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ourselves in their eyes" (1987, 17; italics in original), world-travelling becomes a
way of discovering what we cannot otherwise know about ourselves and an
important step to self-knowledge, which in Chapter Three I suggest is a precursor to
making ourselves understood by others.
Lugones says we are "fully dependent on each other for the possibility of
being understood and without this understanding we are not intelligible, we do not
make sense, we are not solid, visible, integrated; we are lacking" (1987, 8). The idea
that we are fully dependent upon one another for the possibility of being understood,
without which we are not intelligible, and that such an understanding is only reached
by travelling to one another's worlds raises a problem that, given the possibly settled
expectations of the dominant, there is little serious incentive for them to travel to
worlds occupied by the oppressed. In my view, however, to see the problem as one of
the dominant understanding the oppressed is to buy into the logic of oppression in
which identity is conceived as unified and static. If, instead, all persons are
conceived as having multiple identities, some of which may be privileged and some
oppressed, and how these identities are perceived and understood depends upon the
person's situation at any one time, then it follows that an individual's identity may be
perceived and understood in multiple ways, depending upon the time and place. I
will return to this point in the next chapter.
The notion I raise here, that members of subordinate groups can resist
dominant understandings of the social identities—with all their concomitant negative
associations—assigned to them, requires that identity power is not the implacable
force it may have appeared from my discussion at the beginning of this chapter. For
this to be the case it must be possible to exercise identity power in a way which
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questions the construction of members of some groups as fragmented, or lacking, or
as stereotypes. And this is precisely what Collins (1991, 43–44) argues when she
says that through a process of self-definition, black women may be able to challenge
the power dynamics that underlie the process of social definition. According to
Collins, acting in defiance of their oppression by self-defining may involve black
women in claiming those aspects of their social identity that are "stereotyped,
ridiculed, and maligned", for example, "assertiveness and other 'unfeminine'
qualities" (1991, 44) which are part of the Sapphire stereotype.90 Pratibha Parmar,
describes this as "creating identities ... not 'in relation to', 'in opposition to', 'as
reversal of', or 'as a corrective to' ... but in and for ourselves", arguing that "such a
narrative thwarts the binary hierarchy of centre and margin: the margin refuses its
place as 'Other'" (1990, 101). Developing positive self-images through a process of
reclamation and reinvention requires skills, such as critical self-reflection, which are
integral to moral agency, as I will discuss in the next chapter. When black women
assert a social identity which is not recognised by dominant forces they question the
credibility of established meanings for social identities. Self-definition may also
challenge the forces underlying social categorisation as a means of control; for
example, persons asserting a multiplicity of social identities to refute dominant
characterisations of their identities as unified and discrete question the way in which
social categories are constructed. Therefore, self-definition by members of
subordinate groups may present a challenge to the power dynamics underlying social
categorisation as a means of control. If social categorisation in the context of control
is a form of domination, then challenging the external definition of oneself by
asserting one's own identity and demanding recognition of multiple identities
90 Sapphire is a stereotype ridiculing assertive black women.
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provides a means of resisting oppressive forces.
Collins (1991) stresses the importance of self-valuation and definition for
black women as a means of resisting the dehumanising effects of being objectified by
external negative definitions and the internalised psychological oppression that
accompanies objectification. The view of self-definition she posits presumes the
oppressed already possess self-worth and the ability to self-define. There is no
suggestion that black women need to reach some higher level of consciousness, to
become empowered first, or to be politically conscious; rather the sense I gain is
that—at least for black women—the power to self-define is not completely
attenuated by external de-valuation and definition. Collins suggests that most African
American women do not self-define as "mammies, matriarchs, welfare mothers,
mules, or sexually denigrated women" because the "ideology of domination in which
controlling images are embedded is much less cohesive or uniform than imagined"
(1990, 93). Therefore, black women already possess the tools to self-define. By
crediting black women with this ability Collins suggests the oppressed possess a kind
of power, the creative energy necessary for self-definition,91 and this reflects self-
valuation.92 I would suggest this is not necessarily the case for members of other
subjugated groups and may not always be the case for black women. I will examine
the role played by self-worth and self-respect in developing the skills necessary for
the critical reflection that enables self-definition in more detail in the next chapter.
Collins argues that when black women refuse the status assigned by
91 Collins says: "Regardless of the actual content of Black women's self-definitions, the act of
insisting on Black female self-definition validates Black women's power as human subjects"
(1991, 43–44).
92 In speaking of her mother, hooks says Rosa Bell "did not allow the white supremacist culture of
domination to completely shape and control her psyche" (1991, 46); and under the heading "What
We Believe", The Combahee Women's Collective begin by mentioning their "shared belief that
black women are inherently valuable" (1979, 364–65).
89
domination, by "challenging the political knowledge-validation process that results
in externally defined, stereotypical images" (1991, 42), self-definition calls into
question "the entire rationale for such domination" (1991, 45).93 I would suggest that
rather than countering the knowledge base, the refusal to be completely defined by
external forces poses a challenge to the fundamental interpretive framework. An
example of how self-definition or re-definition might weaken a dominant paradigm
is given by Frye (1983, 152–54) in her examination of the meanings attached to
being lesbian. Frye demonstrates that lesbians are excluded from "phallocratic
reality" (1983, 154) because the idea of lesbianism has no meaning in the dominant
phallocratic conceptual scheme, and therefore the existence of lesbians represents a
challenge to the dominant (heterosexual) reality. Lesbian existence represents a
challenge to the dominant phallocratic conceptual scheme because the concept,
lesbianism, is meaningless within the phallocratic scheme. In other words, we need a
new interpretive framework, one which does not assume heterosexuality, in order to
make sense of the idea of lesbianism.
Similarly, the character of Sethe in Toni Morrison's Beloved (2006),
exemplified by her making claims to having feelings for her children and by taking
responsibility for her children, represents a challenge to the dominant conceptual
scheme, because at that time and place slaves and the children of slaves are
considered to be property and, as objects, cannot possess the emotions belonging to
persons.94 Sethe's personhood is not instantiated in her being as it is for a non-slave,
93 Collins argues that "if Black women—the quintessential 'other' in white, patriarchal society—
refuse to accept their assigned status, then the entire rationale for such domination is challenged"
(1991, 45).
94 Beloved (Morrison 2006) is the story of a black slave, Sethe, in the US south, who escapes from
the plantation Sweet Home with her children. When she is found by her old master Sethe tries to
kill her children to prevent them being taken back into slavery. Although she is only successful in
killing her daughter, the eponymous character, Sethe is rejected by other ex-slaves because of her
actions. The key elements from the novel that appear in this discussion are the relationships
between Sethe and her children and another ex-slave, Paul D.
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and her claims to knowledge—which attest to her equality as a moral agent—
therefore exist in tension with the conceptual schema of slavery. We need a different
interpretive framework, one in which slavery and its values are considered wrong, to
interpret Sethe's behaviour as we would that of another person.
Tirrell (1993, 10) adopts Frye's (1983, 165) notion that domination does not
totally define the oppressed, that there is some part of the oppressed which is
undefined and unseen; and this analysis corresponds with Foucault's (1983, 221)
understanding of power as something which is exercised only over free persons so
that there is always some potential for resistance. The part of the person that is not
defined by domination enables members of subjugated groups to resist the negative
images and stereotyping of dominant discourses and interpret their own lives.
However, as I suggested earlier, in order to be intelligible to others this self-
definition has to be taken up by the community, and Tirrell argues that for this to
occur the oppressed must be authorised to speak. If black women authorise one
another to speak, who authorises the black rugby player to speak out against racism?
Tirrell argues that for the speaker to have semantic authority—which she defines as
"having a say (about something) that others recognise and respect" (1993, 16)—the
community must be prepared to take up the meaning. She suggests this only occurs
where the norms of that community encompass that meaning. The implication here is
that without normative change occurring first there can be no social uptake of non-
normative values, an issue which I will consider in more detail in Chapter Five.
I will suggest in later chapters that, even if the powerful are privileged in
being guaranteed a space in which to speak, public spaces exist where it is also
possible for the voices of the oppressed to be heard, and hence that being authorised
91
is not a sufficient condition.95 However, if we accept that authorisation of speech is
required then the issue of where the oppressed get their semantic authority presents a
difficulty for theories of resistance.96 For instance, the concept of semantic authority
would seem to demand that I demonstrate why white rugby players would listen to
Tahu, heterosexuals would attend to lesbians, or slave owners respond to Sethe as if
she was a person not property. It could be argued that the partially privileged are
authorised to speak by means of other social identities, so that Tahu is authorised as
an elite sportsman and some lesbians are authorised because they are white and
middle-class. Sethe would appear to have no privileged social identity enabling her
to be heard, and yet some slaves told their stories and were heard, suggesting that the
authority to be heard is not wholly conjoined with social privilege. Earlier I
mentioned Tirrell's argument that authority and privilege do not necessarily go hand
in hand. Authority is a form of power, in this case the power to appear credible to
others. It could be argued that by claiming personhood Sethe challenges not only the
practices but also the power relationships of slavery in which she is an object not a
person. Perhaps it is also the case that the oppressed are sometimes heard because the
privileged do not always feel vulnerable to claims of equality by others and may
authorise the oppressed to speak—for example, the white Australians who voted yes
in the 1967 Australian Referendum for recognition of Indigenous Australians may
not have felt that their own privilege was threatened by changing the status of
95 A good example of this today is the existence of online activist communities, such as
SumOfUs.org, Getup.org.au and Avaaz.org.
96 Not everybody accepts this line of argument. Kathleen Jones (1988) argues against the concept of
semantic authority on the grounds that since women have been excluded by the process of
authorisation in the past, therefore the concept itself is exclusionary. Bar On (1993, 96) argues that
the oppressed should not aspire to epistemic authority since they do not have the power to exclude
or silence the dominant and therefore they can only authorise one another to speak and persuade
others, who are empowered by their like-mindedness, to their viewpoint. As mentioned earlier in
this chapter, Tirrell says the problem of the oppressed needing semantic authority is the result of
the conflation of the concepts of authority and privilege, which should be treated separately, thus,
obviating the problem.
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Indigenous Australians.97
Rather than normative values changing completely over time, perhaps what is
happening is that communities can encompass meanings which are not normative but
such uptake of novel meanings is necessarily partial and gradual. For example, white
rugby players might allow that what Tahu experienced seemed to him to be racist
abuse while simultaneously denying that the rugby league is racist, thus giving
partial credence to his claims but denying their own complicity and privilege. Partial
uptake of meanings does not necessarily involve public acknowledgement of the way
privilege is obtained at the expense of others, but merely for particular injustices to
be seen as unfair and unacceptable, as no longer normative. For example, in Australia
there has never been public acknowledgement of the way white people have
benefited from discrimination against Indigenous Australians. However, in the 1990s
there were mass demonstrations of whites expressing solidarity with Indigenous
Australians, just as the institutionalisation of white racism in Australia (in the form of
legalised discrimination against Indigenous Australians and the White Australia
policy to retain racial purity) did not prevent a vast majority of white Australians
from voting yes in the 1967 Referendum.98
Such mass mobilisations towards inclusiveness point towards another
possibility. Tirrell (1993, 24) argues that to be heard the oppressed have to change
from being members of found communities to being members of communities of
97 The 1967 Referendum, officially the Constitution Alteration (Aboriginals) 1967, was for
amendments to the Australian constitution regarding the status of Indigenous Australians to allow
the Federal Government to make special laws on their behalf, but, coming at a time of increased
activism for Indigenous land rights and recognition, it also had a symbolic value.
98 It could be argued that the 1967 referendum did not remove substantive barriers to equality,
including some discriminatory states legislation. However, as Michael Dodson (1993), then
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner at the Australian Human Rights
Commission, noted, "without the capacity for inclusion, albeit in a limited form, invidious and
direct discrimination against Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people was entrenched at a
constitutional level."
93
choice—the differences between which I discussed briefly in Chapter One—because
the latter provide "models of alternative social relationships as well as standpoints
for critical reflection of self and community" (Friedman 1990, 158). However, in my
view this is not required and not what actually occurs, since such a formula for
change suggests that change only occurs within communities of like-minded people,
whereas heterogeneous societies are not uniform or static. In contrast I would argue
that what were previously normatively challenging meanings, such as the equality of
Australian Aboriginal people, become normalised when alternative patterns of social
interactions within existing communities result in changes to the power dynamic and
hence to the social roles and responsibilities of the various social identities (Babbitt
2001, 7). To take the previous example again, at some point in Australian history, a
dominant community understanding emerged in which the personhood of Indigenous
Australians was at least partially accepted, and this was reflected in widespread
support in the 1960s for recognising their entitlement to recognition. Another way of
thinking about this is that the way identity power conceptualised Indigenous
Australian identities changed. Undermining systems of domination requires
privileged and oppressed alike to understand the meaning of social practices
differently and to change social practices to instantiate new meanings.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued that self-defining by claiming multiple social
identities may be a means of resisting the dominant interpretive framework, which
restricts members of particular social groups by assigning them negative and
stereotypical classifications. Crucial to my argument is how central the complex
nature of social groups is to practices of exclusion and discrimination, and
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consequently to those resisting these oppressive forces. I have argued that our social
identities are not simply internal beliefs we have about ourselves, but are largely
social constructions, and the meanings attached to each identity determine what
opportunities and choices will be available to individuals. How social categories
have been historically constructed matters because these act as a means of
legitimising and normalising social practices that may be unfair or unjust in
hierarchical societies where the assignment of social identities operates as another
form of social control. The degree of privilege attached to a social identity either
creates opportunities or closes off avenues of action.
I have also argued that living under oppression generates critical insights
which are not available from the dominant perspective and that this perspective on
the situation is connected to the person's social identity. I have suggested that one
way for the oppressed to overcome the subjugating effects of being defined and
categorised negatively by others is to use the epistemic advantage gained from the
multiple perspectives arising from their plural identities to see through the dominant
interpretive framework. However, this is a problematic strategy, because, as I will
discuss in Chapter Three, as well as requiring the oppressed to develop the moral
competencies necessary to self-define, it also requires them to trust in their ability to
make knowledge claims. But one effect of oppression is to undermine persons
psychologically so that they may not be able to trust in or to assert the legitimacy of
their own experiences or identities.
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3. Marginalisation, limits on action, and capacities for moral agency
If going home is denied me then I will have to stand
and claim my space, making new culture—una cultura
mestiza—with my own lumber, my own bricks and
mortar and my own feminist architecture.
(Gloria Anzaldua 2007, 44)
Introduction
In this chapter I am concerned with the difficulty for members of subjugated
groups of developing the competencies necessary to exercise moral agency. I am also
interested in the attendant problem, for persons whose moral capacity, or their
perception of their moral capacity, has been impaired by the way they are perceived
by others, of gaining acknowledgement of their equal moral standing from other
members of the moral community. In the preceding chapters, I argued that social
identities derived from group memberships may contribute to oppression.
Consequently, I suggested that self-definition is potentially significant in terms of
resistance, but that before persons can self-define they have to first be able to see
themselves as having the moral status commensurate with being the kind of person
capable of claiming a social identity of their own choosing. However, practices of
self-definition may be compromised by a person's capacity to develop the necessary
moral competencies, particularly where a person's identity has been objectified by
forces of domination. I also argue that without a sense of acknowledgement from
others that they are capable of moral reflection and comprehension, persons are
diminished both in their ability to act as moral agents, which I will consider in this
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chapter, and to take responsibility for their actions or for who they are, which I will
discuss in Chapter Four. I suggest that barriers to self-definition and, by extension,
the effective exercise of moral agency may be overcome by discovering social and
discursive spaces, which, by allowing for the development of autonomy
competencies, are productive of the authentic self. Further, I suggest that claiming
multiple selves, or plural social identities, results in persons inhabiting the
borderlands between realities, identities, and ways of knowing, and that being
situated in this way can best be thought of as a critical positioning, where persons
may be able to see through the hegemony of oppositional discourses and interrogate
the normative expectations of privileged and oppressed social identities.
Unsettling the boundaries of the self
As mentioned earlier, a number of feminist theorists have attempted to
conceptualise identity in a way which acknowledges the multiple or plural self. This
project of redefinition is one way in which feminists have constructed theory that is
not oppositional to dominant discourses, but which shows awareness of the difficulty
of locating a space for resistance given that resistance is contained within meanings
and practices of oppression.99Anzaldua's conception of the mestiza, the hybrid self,
which is neither one thing nor the other—neither black nor white, neither male nor
female—and which exists at the boundaries or margins, which she calls borderlands,
is one such attempt at redefining the notion of the self. Although the terminology
differs from one theorist to the next, I agree with de Lauretis that the 'mestiza
consciousness' of Anzaldua (2007, 99), 'inappropriate/d other' of Trinh T. Minh–Ha
99 Luce Irigaray undertook a similar project with regard to describing female sexuality, given that
female gender and sex is constructed by and contained within male gender and sexuality. This Sex
Which is Not One (1985) identifies this problem in the title.
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(1987), plural or 'hybrid cultural self' of Lugones (1992, 35) and de Lauretis’s own
'eccentric subject' all refer to the marginalised self, where marginalisation is best
understood as a critical positioning (de Lauretis 1990, 116). De Lauretis describes
this "excessive critical position" as one "attained through practices of political and
personal displacement across boundaries between socio-sexual identities and
communities, between bodies and discourses" (1990, 145). These borderlands exist
wherever two or more cultures, tongues, races, or classes come together and are
places for transformations of many kinds, including identities and ethical values.100
Boundary crossing is similar to the notion of world-travelling which I
discussed in the context of privilege-cognizance in Chapter Two and will return to
later in this chapter. I would argue that the idea that one can attain knowledge of
others by moving between different worlds and different identities with a particular
attitude of receptiveness to the difference of others is important for suggesting not
only how we can gain knowledge of others, but also how we can gain knowledge of
ourselves. Self-knowledge is identified by Meyers (2000, 172) as integral to the
process of developing the autonomy competencies necessary for moral agency,
which I will discuss in the next section; it is also central to Lugones's approach to re-
conceptualising social categories, which I discussed in Chapter Two.
Similar to the significance of the outsider within or the multiple self for
interrogating dominant  frameworks of social categorisation, conceptualising the
marginalised self as border-dweller helps to undercut the oppositional nature of
dominant discourses, giving the oppressed a tool with which to reposition themselves
100 Borderlands cannot be conceived too broadly; they refer to any space, physical, psychological,
sexual and spiritual, where, in Anzaldua's own words, "two or more cultures edge each other,
where people of different races occupy the same territory, where under, lower, middle, and upper
classes touch, where the space between two individuals shrinks with intimacy" (2007, Preface to
the First Edition).
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politically. Awareness of privilege and oppression in one's social identity and seeing
the self as amorphous and inconstant allows one to conceptualise a self able to
traverse barriers between dualisms. As Patricia J. Williams makes clear: "It has to do
with a fluid positioning that sees back and forth across boundary, which
acknowledges that I can be black and good and black and bad, and that I can also be
black and white, male and female, yin and yang, love and hate" (1991, 130). For
Williams the self is not separate and well-defined but rather blurred, merged, and
indistinct. Conceiving of the self in ways no longer limited by inflexible conceptions
allows the self to cross over boundaries constructed by privilege and social
expectations.
In contrast to the way oppression categorises persons with multiple identities,
as fractured and flawed with dual personalities, which I discussed in Chapter Two,
Lugones's hybrid, or plural cultural self is necessarily impure. As noted earlier, it is
impossible to separate out the elements of group identities, just as it is impossible to
separate out the elements of mayonnaise—lemon, egg, water—into their pure
components. The 'curdle-logic' of the hybrid self is one response to Bar On's problem
with theories of resistance mentioned in Chapter Two; if it is impossible to separate
out the different elements of the self, then the oppressed and resisting self meet
Lugones's definition of mestizaje, "someone [who] is neither/nor, but kind of both"
(1994, 459).
Lugones contrasts the agency of the dual personality created by domination
with the plural cultural self. The dual personality is evident in someone who is at
home neither in one culture nor another, a hyphenated creation of the dominant
culture "animated from the outside" (Lugones 1992, 35), unable to respond and
create for themselves. In contrast, the plural cultural self exists in a space in which
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the boundaries between worlds are fluid not fixed, where, in Anzaldua's words, there
can be "racial, ideological, cultural and biological cross-pollinization" (2007, 99)
leading to the creation of a new consciousness which is the hybrid self "characterised
by the development of a tolerance for contradiction and ambiguity, by the
transgression of rigid conceptual barriers” (Lugones 1992, 34).101 This cross-cultural
activity is creative of space, subjectivity and resistance. Because this self is neither
one thing nor the other but exists in multiple forms in multiple spaces, it is able to
resist not only external oppressions, such as racism and colonisation from dominant
cultures, but also the oppressions arising from within a person’s own cultural space,
or homeland, such as homophobia and sexism.
One perceived difficulty with conceptualising the self as indistinct and
amorphous is that it blurs the distinctions between separate social identities and
potentially undermines political arguments for particular responses to counter
discrimination against specific social groups. I would argue that given the history of
political activism for and by members of oppressed groups, it is unlikely that
defining oneself as neither female nor male would undermine, for example, claims to
equality with men made by women. More pertinent to the argument here, assuming
that it is the perceived differences between the sexes, races and classes that produces
different expectations about moral competency and agency, then anything which
unsettles these expectations, such as claims to amorphous indistinct identities,
undermines the basis on which discrimination and oppression works.
101 Oliver (2001, 53) disagrees with my interpretation that Lugones sees these boundaries as fluid.
According to Oliver (2001, 51), world travelling differs to boundary crossing insofar as Lugones's
concept includes the idea of the different worlds continuing unchanged, their barriers and identities
fixed, whereas Williams's conception of boundary crossing involves the dissolution of the
boundaries between worlds and identities. Oliver mostly refers to Lugones’s "'World'-Travelling"
(1987) whereas I believe that "On Borderlands" (1992) suggests a different interpretation by
Lugones.
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In this section I explored the idea that the marginalisation of social identities
can be creative of a place of critical self-examination, focussing here on the notion
that such a positioning is important to disrupting the concept of a unified and fixed
sense of self. Conceptualising the self as multiple has political implications, since it
may also be possible to unsettle established identity categories thereby undermining
the foundations of discriminatory social practices and institutions. I will return to the
importance of place in developing a critical perspective later in this chapter, but first
I will consider the nature of the self in regard to moral agency in more detail.
The relational self and capacities for moral agency
How the self is conceived is important because the nature of the self is
implicated in our understanding of moral agency. Our sense of self is closely
implicated in our significant relationships and the accompanying duties and
responsibilities. This may be clearer if we consider how we feel when we let others
down. Expressions such as: "it wasn't like me to stand someone up" or "sorry I
snapped, I'm not myself," suggest that our sense of self is closely tied to our moral
understanding. Hilde Lindemann Nelson puts it this way: "Who I am, morally
speaking, is in some measure a matter of who others say I am, and this has a direct
bearing on how freely I am able to exercise my moral agency" (2001a, 34). How
persons conceive themselves and, importantly, how their sense of self is constructed
and (de)constructed by oppressive forces, therefore has a significant. Though not
completely determinative, impact upon their capacity for moral reflection and the
exercise of moral agency.102
102 Compare Walker, who argues that even under "circumstances of subordination, oppression, or
unfreedom of many types" persons are still capable of moral responses to stay "true to what they
value within the confines of the situation" (2007, 129–130).
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Moral agency, as it is understood here, is circumscribed in important ways by
both embodiment and relationality, as I discuss later, and efforts towards autonomous
reflection and action are further complicated by a multiplicity of social identities.
Conceiving of the self as plural impacts upon moral agency because it appears to
belie the notion of an authentic integrated self commonly considered necessary for
autonomy (Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000, 12).103 But this argument is rebutted by
several feminist theorists. Meyers (2000, 172), for instance, critiques standard
accounts for conflating integration with authenticity and for the notion that
integration is a pre-condition for autonomy. Instead, she argues that authenticity is
best understood as an ongoing activity, a practice that involves the exercise of
autonomy skills which I will discuss in more detail later in this chapter, and that
integration should be understood as "the emergent intelligibility of an individual's
autonomous self-discovery and self-definition" (Meyers 2000, 172). By re-
conceptualising integration and authenticity in this way, Meyers argues that her
dynamic model is consistent with multiple identities, an argument I find
compelling.104 In contrast, as mentioned in Chapter Two, Lugones argues that the
notion of a unified, integrated self is only in conflict with plurality if we categorise
the multiple self as necessarily fragmented.105 Given the conceptual complexity of
multiple selves and intersectional social identities, the difficulty arises as to how the
self is able to know itself, or even if there is a 'true self' able to be known; and,
103 "It implies that because different and sometimes conflicting group identities intersect in the
formation of individual identity, many individuals do not have a unified or integrated sense of self"
(Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000, 12).
104 Meyers uses the terminology intersectional identities or intersectional subjectivity to describe
multiple identities.
105 The diagnosis of medical illnesses, such as schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, certainly suggests
that the notion of multiple selves is considered abnormal, at least in the West, given that the
singularity and unity of the self is juxtaposed with the threat of madness. Of course, sometimes
experiencing feelings of being multiple selves in multiple realities may indicate destructive self-
conceptions, such as schizophrenia, but this mainstream understanding of multiplicity ignores the
ubiquity of the experience of the self as multiple.
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assuming the possibility of this critically reflective authentic self, how resistance to
destructive categorisation can be achieved within the constraints imposed by
dominant forces.106
As mentioned in the Introduction and Chapter One, agency is concerned with
the conditions necessary for, and the internal and external barriers to, action.
Similarly, the capacity for critical self-reflection and the ability to act in accordance
with one's deliberations, within certain internal and external constraints, is crucial to
the exercise of moral agency. Underlying social forces may mean that internal and
external barriers to action are significant for some persons as a result of their group
membership(s), "which is why agency implies power" and refers to the capability for
action rather than any intentionality (Giddens 1984, 9–10). However, saying as much
does not mean that those who are comparatively powerless are thereby unable to act
in accordance with their desires—a condition Meyers (1989, 212) stresses is
important for both self-respect and the exercise of agency—although a lack of social
status can impact upon what they can know about themselves and, therefore, their
capacity to formulate and/or recognise their true desires.
Constraints upon choice are not an indication of having no choice, nor does
reduced choice necessarily lead to demoralisation, understood as the undermining of
one's ability to make choices and the perception of oneself as someone capable of
making choices (Hoagland 1988, 212–13). Meyers even suggests that "self-chosen
constraints on choice" (1989, 212) are an indication of self-respect and the ability to
exercise agency, since self-respecting persons "take their own desires to be worthy of
consideration, but they give these desires only their proper weight in deliberation"
106 The notions of the true self and authentic self are contested in the literature. I will return to these
two concepts and some of the difficulties attendant upon them later in this chapter.
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(1995, 221–22). Additionally, there are also few situations, if any, that are completely
within our control, but this lack of control does not detract from our ability to make
choices (Hoagland 1988, 12–13); indeed, it might be better to say that there are few
situations, if any, in which we can be said to have no choice regardless of our
comparative power. Choices made in situations in which we have limited control still
count as the exercise of agency; whether they are limited by a particular ethic of
behaviour, the norms of a particular society, the relationships we are in, or the
constraints imposed by dominant forces in inequitable societies, they are still our
choices, and as such indicate the exercise of agential power. I will return to some of
these points about choice in my discussion on self-respect later in this chapter.
It seems that moral agency is as much about the choices we make as it is
about our capacity to make them, since in either case it is about the exercise of
agential power. Choosing one option always precludes the possibility of others,
which means we commonly think of choice as limiting, but we can also think of
choice as entailing creation rather than sacrifice, thereby giving it enabling power
(Hoagland 1992, 198–99).107 By making choices, we are creating specific
possibilities that are enabling of particular outcomes, and conceiving of moral
agency as a set of choices allows us to imagine and act upon our authentic desires.
If control over the situation is not essential for the exercise of moral agency,
what conditions have to exist to make a moral response possible? Or, to put it into
the contextual framework used here, what are the capacities we need to develop in
order to enable us to acquire the competencies necessary to exercise moral agency?
107 In one exercise, my students argued that they did not have to choose between a peach and
chocolate cake but could eat both, and further, that they could eat both together so they did not
have to choose which to eat first, a highly creative solution! But even choosing not to choose
between two options precludes another, in this case the possibility of savouring the unmingled
taste of either the peach or chocolate cake.
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As mentioned in the Introduction, Walker (2007, 10) suggests that moral competency
entails using diverse skills to undertake a "family of practices" that are "expressions
of our agency and what we value". This family of practices consists of "making
morally evaluative judgments", "paying attention, imputing states of affairs to
people’s agency, interpreting and redescribing human actions, visiting blame,
offering excuses, inflicting punishment, making amends, refining and inhibiting the
experience or expression of feelings", as well as "responding in thought, act, and
feeling" to any of these practices of morality. Although in this view moral agency is
the consequence of those relationships and social practices people value, as well as
being the result of a collaborative, interactive process between or among people
(Walker 2007, 10), two points I develop further later, in inequitable societies, contra
Walker (2007, 129–130), it is my view that some persons may be restricted in how
they undertake any or all of these practices of morality because of the presumptions
of others, and their internalisations of those presumptions, about their moral
competence or incompetence based on their social identities.
Any discussion of moral agency is likewise concerned with autonomy, since
to be autonomous "is taken to be the defining characteristic of free moral agents"
(Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000, 5). This is true of feminist theorists who frequently
focus on the problem of autonomy rather than agency. Although the concept of
autonomy can be understood in a number of ways, it is primarily concerned with the
idea of self-determination, or self-governance, or the idea of individual choice
(Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000, 5). Given that oppression can be thought of as an
"institutionalised constraint on self development" (Young 1990, 37), this makes
autonomy a problematic concept for theorists interested in those persons whose sense
of self has been impacted negatively by unjust or inequitable social institutions.
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The concept of autonomy has a contested place in feminist theory; theorists
do not want to discard the notion that agents have the capacity for critical self-
reflection because this is seen as integral to moral agency, but autonomy as it is
usually conceived is reliant on overly individualistic accounts of the moral agent and
ignores the inter-relational aspects of human lives.108Along with numerous feminist
theorists my claim is that any useful understanding of moral agency needs to
demonstrate an awareness that all human beings are embedded in a complex web of
relationships, since embodiment and relationality create dependencies and
interdependencies with others which, in combination with social institutions and
practices, determine our obligations and responsibilities towards others.109
Before taking up Meyers's notion of autonomy competencies, I will make use
of a number of theorists in order to think about how social group membership(s) can
impact agency and autonomy, finding Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar (2000)
especially helpful in this regard. Mackenzie and Stoljar contend that the many
approaches to autonomy can be divided into two main kinds. The first, procedural, or
content-neutral accounts, are those in which "the content of a person's desires,
values, beliefs, and emotional attitudes is irrelevant" (Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2000,
13; italics in original) to whether the person is autonomous with regard to their
motivations and actions; what is relevant is whether the person has subjected their
motivations and actions to appropriate procedures of critical self-reflection
(Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2000, 14). Conversely, substantive accounts, by rejecting
content-neutrality, attempt to address the criticism that procedural accounts ignore
108 See Mackenzie and Stoljar (2000, 5–12) for a summary of these positions in feminist thought.
109 Of course, social practices also construct relationships of dependency and interdependency, which
may be more significant in terms of oppression. However, here I am merely making the point that
independent of our social identities and group memberships we are all fundamentally involved in
relationships of dependency and interdependency, which are the nexus for questions of
responsibility and obligation, and which I will discuss in Chapter Four.
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socialisation. If an autonomous person is one capable of critically subjecting their
desires to self-reflection it is debatable whether persons in situations of oppression
have the capacity to differentiate between their own authentically held desires and
desires which reflect normative expectations for group members. For example,
heteronormative societies generate the expectation that women desire intimate
relationships with men, and individual women may assume that this is their own
preference without reflecting upon it.110 Strong substantive accounts require "specific
contents of the autonomous preferences of agents" whereas weak substantive
accounts suggest "further necessary conditions" that function as "constraints on the
contents of the desires or preferences capable of being held" (Mackenzie and Stoljar,
2000, 19).
Rather than attempting to identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for
autonomy, Meyers suggests that autonomy can be better understood as a set of
competencies persons are capable of acquiring. Autonomy competency is the notion
that "autonomy is a competency comprising a cluster of skills and capacities, in
particular skills of self-discovery, self-direction, and self-definition" (Mackenzie and
Stoljar 2000, 17) which all involve critical self-reflection. For Meyers, multiple
selves are not a barrier to autonomy; rather it is "failure to own up to and [failure] to
own one's intersectional identity" (Meyers 2000, 159) that undermines both
authenticity and autonomy. The failure Meyers is concerned with here arises from a
lack of self-knowledge; "impoverished, mistaken, or deluded views about one's
group memberships" (Meyers 2000, 159) lead to ignorance about one's multiple
identity. Meyers argues that, for persons with diverse identities, owning one's
110Adrienne Rich describes the presumption, either explicit or implicit, that heterosexuality is the
sexual preference of most women as 'compulsory heterosexuality', because the question is never
raised "as to whether, in a different context or other things being equal, women would choose
heterosexual coupling and marriage" (1986, 28; italics in original).
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multiplicity is part of the active practice of authenticity, since one of the skills
associated with autonomy competency is that of self-knowledge. Autonomy skills are
more or less encouraged for members of different social groups, and those persons
whose social identities are linked to groups whose members are discouraged from
self-knowledge and self-definition may find the practice of authenticity difficult. But
there are few persons, Meyers (2000, 173) argues, who cannot demonstrate some
proficiency, and therefore few persons who are incapable of autonomy.
Meyers's notion of autonomy competency suggests that desires which are
arrived at by the practice of autonomy skills and which reflect the authentic self are
more worthy of satisfaction than those arising from uncritical acceptance of
normative expectations. That is, how the desires are acquired is more important than
the content of those desires. This seems to agree with Schechtman's notion of self-
interested concern, which is the interest a person has in pursuing their "considered
desires under conditions of full information" (1996, 82; italics in original).
I suggested earlier in this chapter that any useful understanding of moral
agency must acknowledge its relational nature, and Meyers's understanding is
"explicitly relational in that she argues that autonomy competency can be developed
only in the context of social relationships, practices, and institutions" (Mackenzie
and Stoljar 2000, 17). Mackenzie and Stoljar (2000, 17–18) identify three ways in
which the social context is important to Meyers's concept of autonomy competency,
and hence to the construction of moral agency. Firstly, it is the capacity to develop
autonomy skills rather than the development itself that is important, and this capacity
is influenced by the kind of social environment in which one finds oneself. Secondly,
the aspects of oneself that are identified as worth developing may be those suggested
by normative expectations rather than stemming from more authentic desires; and
108
lastly, socialisation may result in a person developing certain competencies at the
expense of others. Women, for example, may develop emotional receptivity at the
expense of self-direction (Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000, 18). In other words,
autonomy competencies are formed in relation to others and, therefore, the
construction of moral agency is dependent upon others. This means that the kind of
relationships a person is involved in significantly effects their capacity to be self-
aware, self-defining and self-directed, and hence to develop autonomy competencies.
In summary, in this section I have argued that social identities impact upon
the development of a person's sense of self and agential competencies, and are
implicated in both the formation of authentic desires and a person's ability to act in
accordance with these desires. The social context is also important in developing
feelings of self-respect, which in turn impacts upon a person's ability to choose, as
well as on their ability to see themselves as a person and construct a coherent
narrative of their life choices, which I will consider next.
The addressable other and self narratives
I have not yet addressed what it means to be an integrated autonomous person
capable of self-reflection and competent to practise those autonomy skills of self-
knowledge, self-direction and self-definition that are productive of authenticity. In
the following discussion about the nature of the self, I am mainly concerned with
those philosophical approaches to the self that focus on morally relevant features. To
put it into the terminology developed by Schechtman (1996, 1–2), whose theoretical
approach to self-constitution forms the basis of this section, I am less concerned with
the "reidentification question", that is, what makes us the same person over time, and
more with the "characterization question", or what aspects of our history and
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character explain why we do what we do and, therefore, whether we can be held
responsible for those actions and choices.111 There is interplay between the two
concepts, however, and the constancy of the self, which is the focus of the re-
identification question, has implications for moral development. For instance, the
notion that the self is able to construct a coherent set of character traits over time, as
the characterisation question supposes, relies to some extent on the fact that we retain
the memories of our younger self over time regardless of whether the present self
shares the thoughts, feelings, behaviours and values or shares a physical resemblance
with the younger self, which points to the re-identification question.112Although
Schechtman (1996, 88) differentiates between the loss of a sense of self, for example,
as a result of living with an abusive spouse, and a loss resulting from addiction or
dementia, she argues that these are "points on a continuum" and in each case the
person is deprived of their identity. It is overly simplistic to claim someone is the
sum of their memories but loss of memory in the case of persons with Alzheimer's,
senility, head trauma or other forms of brain damage is co-implicated with loss of
self, particularly with respect to Schechtman's narrative self-constitution theory.113
111 Schechtman (1996, 2) is concerned with how personal identity is implicated in what she calls "the
four features" of personal existence: survival, moral responsibility, self-interested concern, and
compensation—where foregoing some desires may put someone in a better position to fulfil others
(1996, 86)—and she believes a characterisation theory rather than a re-identification theory best
explains the link between personal identity and these four features. Schechtman's focus on morally
relevant features is the reason I have chosen to base my discussion of narrative identity on her
description and analysis rather than, for example, the work of other significant theorists in this
field such as Paul Ricoeur.
112 This aspect of the self in terms of re-identification is important to my argument in Chapter Six,
where the notion that we can imagine ourselves otherwise depends upon us being able to recognise
ourselves as the same person doing the imagining.
113 Schechtman (1996, 114) argues that self-constitution narratives are limited by what she calls the
"articulation constraint", which stresses that factors contributing to characterisation must be
capable of being explicated and articulated by the agent. While agreeing that self-narratives must
be articulable "to some degree", the implication that subconscious or unrecognised motivations of
which the agent is unaware are considered unimportant to the self-narrative is criticised by
Mackenzie and Poltera (2010, 44–46) for conflating identity with autonomy; that is, although the
person may not be autonomous with respect to certain desires or motivations, these may still be
important to their identity. Nelson also critiques the articulation constraint (2001a, 91) for failing
to acknowledge that identity is not simply a function of self-knowledge.
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Characterisation can be thought of as "a relation that holds between a person
and particular actions, experiences, or characteristics" (Schechtman 1996, 77;
italics in original) of that person. However, although all the characteristics of a
person's history are presumed to make up the person's identity, some play a more
central role and, hence, are more salient in terms of the person's life story than others.
Meyers (1989, 70) describes the "distinctive set" of qualities that make up the
integrated self as "characterological strands" that "unite the disparate elements of the
true self". Characterological strands are "context-specific … reflective, flexible
networks of attributes, desires, abilities, emotional responses, values, and so forth"
which are also "the source of our normative reasons" (Atkins 2008, 130–131).
Schechtman (1996, 93) develops a theory of identity as narratively self-
constituting: essentially, a person creates an identity through an autobiographical
narrative, or life story, an identity which is constituted by means of the content of
their self-narrative.114 In stories, meaning is derived from a combination of the
elements of the story and the interpretation of these events by the characters in the
story or, in addition, the story gains meaning from external factors, in particular its
relationship to other stories (Nelson 2001a, 11–15). In some cases, the narrative of
who we were is an important part of the narrative of our present (or future) self-
conception (Schechtman 1996, 112–13), particularly with regard to physical or
socio-economic changes. For example, when someone undergoes a weight-loss
program they may continue to diet and exercise even when they are no longer
overweight because they still identify as someone with weight issues.115 Even
114 For Ricoeur, "our life ... appears to us as the field of a constructive activity, deriving from the
narrative intelligence through which we attempt to recover (rather than impose from without) the
narrative identity which constitutes us" (1991, 436; italics in original). Narrative self-constitution
theories developed by other feminist theorists frequently rely upon Schechtman's foundational
work, see, for example, Atkins (2008) and Nelson (2001a).
115 I will consider this in more detail in Chapter Six, especially Atkins's (2008, 119–20) suggestion
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inaccurate self-narratives and those containing trivial errors are not problematic
when they are at odds with external reality, unless the individual is recalcitrant and
refuses to recant116 on their version of themselves in the light of evidence from
outside (Schechtman 1996, 120).117
The "organization of experience into a narrative of self-conception" changes
one's sense of self (Schechtman 1996, 145), such that the creation of the "identity-
constituting narrative alters the nature of an individual's experience in a way that
extends consciousness over time, producing a persisting experiencer who is the
primary experiencing subject" (Schechtman 1996, 149). This raises the question:
what happens to the true self if the narrative of someone's beliefs, values and desires
no longer coheres, for example, if the person loses the capacity to construct a
coherent narrative of their life as a result of trauma or illness or ageing? Can the
person be said to be narratively self-constituted if there is no coherent self-narrative,
or if the person no longer knows who they are—if they no longer have memories of
their younger self—or if they claim to be someone other than who they are? Using
examples from both loss of self through dementia and the development of narratives
in children, Schechtman (1996, 145–48) argues there are degrees of capacity to
create a coherent self-constituting narrative, suggesting that some degree of personal
identity and subjectivity is possible, as long as one has some capacity for narrative
construction.
that self-transformation involves assuming the first-person perspective of the future self and being
able to relate one's future perspective to one's present first-person perspective.
116 In a strange late night phone call I was claimed as a sister-in-law by an elderly woman who
suffered from senility and who steadfastly disregarded the evidence I put forward that I was not
who she claimed I was. I could not convince her of the falseness of her beliefs since she
interpreted my denials as simple recalcitrance in the face of her assertions about our relationship.
117 Schechtman (1996, 119) calls this the "reality constraint"; as long as self-narratives cohere with
reality they are identity-constituting. Schechtman separates narrative errors which impact on
identity-constitution into errors of fact, for example, believing oneself to be Napoleon (1996, 121–
25), and inaccuracies of interpretation, for example, believing the CIA is spying on one (1996,
126–28).
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Narrative constitutions of the self rely on the possibility of an addressable
other, whether this other is internalised, or whether this is a separate person from the
one constructing the narrative.118 The inner witness, or what I am calling the
internalised other, is described by the psychologist Dori Laub (1991, 81) as someone
who can step outside the frame of reference in which events are taking place and
provide an independent frame of observation. In the previous chapter I described
how the situated standpoint of the outsider within may help members of oppressed
groups to see through the totalising framework of domination and challenge
dominant schemes of categorisation that contribute to oppression. Much like the
outsider within, or world travellers, the inner witness provides a means to develop an
alternative perspective to the dominant interpretation of events and may be a
powerful tool for persons who are denied an audience in the actual world. I will
return to the role played by departing from the dominant interpretive framework later
in this chapter when I take up the discussion of boundary crossing.
For those assigned or identifying with marginalised social groups, frequently
there is no external witness to hear and affirm their sense of self. The only possible
witness may be their internalised other, and one effect of domination is to sometimes
deny the possibility of an internal witness. Laub (1992), gives a number of examples
that illustrate how the lack of an addressable other to corroborate a self-narrative, by
preventing the construction of the historical self through narrative, may result in
impaired agency and sense of self. For example, Laub (1992, 82) argues that the
Holocaust removed the very possibility of address so that victims lacked an
addressable other, either internal or external. In this way Laub (1992, 80) suggests
118 In using the terminology addressable other and internalised other I am referring to an actual person,
not to a linguistic category or the discursive other. In some cases this person may also be the
person constructing the narrative—that is, the narrator and witness are one—since it is possible to
be an authentic witness to oneself.
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that the Holocaust produced no witnesses during its historical occurrence,119 not
simply because the event was denied by outsiders, but because the victims could not
describe what had occurred to themselves they came to doubt the reality of what they
had experienced. Without a historical narrative of the self one's sense of oneself as a
person with an identity is gone. Those who survived the Holocaust were only able to
do so, Laub contends, by creating and maintaining an inner witness, an internalised
other, who substituted "for the lack of witnessing in real life" (1992, 87). Because the
denial of a witness by dominant forces removes the possibility of being recognised as
a person, the act of witnessing to the "experience of objectification ... can help
restore self-respect and a sense of one's self as an agent or a self" (Oliver 2001, 98). I
will return to the importance of self-respect for agency in the next section and to the
importance of witnessing to one's own experience in later chapters when I discuss the
role played by the moral accounts given by members of subjugated groups in
resisting oppression.
Self-constituting narratives are not only important in establishing a sense of
self and identity, they are important for another reason: according to Nelson,
narratives that are identity-constituting are also indicative of moral competency.
Nelson, following Margaret Urban Walker, suggests that stories of strong moral self-
definition are in themselves a "kind of moral competence" (Nelson 2001a, 15),120 in
that it is "the ability of morally developed persons to install and observe precedents
for themselves which are both distinctive of them and binding upon them morally"
(Walker 2003, 5).121 For example, someone may choose to become a vegetarian
119 Laub defines a witness as "a witness to the truth of what happens during an event" (1992, 80).
120 In contrast, stories of weak moral self-definition are those that construct the individual as morally
competent and therefore as a functioning member of the moral community.
121 Walker's (2003) "Moral Particularity", was originally published in 1987 in Metaphilosophy 18
(3/4): 171–85.
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because they believe factory farming practices are wrong. The precepts the person
chooses to follow, in which harm and cruelty to animals is wrong and should be
avoided, are directly correlated to their self-narrative as an ethical vegetarian, in
contrast to someone who chooses to be a vegetarian for financial reasons, as I once
did. Identity-constituting narratives which are stories of strong moral self-definition
may, therefore, be revealing of moral competency.
It is evident, then, that moral agency not only requires that a person possess
competencies requiring critical self-reflection thus allowing them to act in
accordance with moral precedents, they must also possess the capacity to construct a
coherent narrative in which their choices and actions make sense in light of their
narrative self. Because competencies in narrative self-constitution and autonomy are
relational they can be problematic for some persons, particularly as they first have to
possess feelings of self-worth and self-respect in order to develop the necessary
competencies of self-discovery, self-direction and self-definition. I will examine this
aspect of moral agency in the oppressed in the next section.
Self-worth and self-respect (in relation)
In order to be considered, and consider themselves, equal members of the
moral community, persons have to feel that they are valued as equals by others.
Feelings of self-worth and self-respect are vital to self-development and therefore to
the capacity to develop autonomy competencies and moral agency. Where
relationships are inequitable and distorted, the effect can be detrimental both to one's
sense of self-esteem and, correspondingly, to one's moral agency. Persons whose
identities, relationships and practices are devalued on account of their group
memberships, often as a result of arrogant perception—or the valuation of others
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based on only the valuer's ideals—may feel that their moral qualities as persons are
overlooked, ignored, or undermined, making it difficult to develop feelings of self-
respect. Card argues that "when our primary relationships lack reciprocity in valuing,
we risk losing (or failing to develop) self-esteem" (1990, 205), suggesting a
mutuality between feeling valued and the development of self-worth and self-respect.
Respect can be thought of as the way in which we respond to the worth of
others, and, consequently, different kinds of respect are warranted by different kinds
of valuing. Because different sorts of worth are associated with different kinds of
respect, gaining the self-respect necessary for the development of autonomy and
moral agency is dependent on being valued in particular ways by others. How
persons are valued is therefore integral to their development of self-respect.
Robyn Dillon (1992; 2004) suggests there are two ways in which we are
valued by others, and, therefore, potentially two different kinds of self-respect arising
from these. The first is the value accorded to other persons on the basis of our shared
humanity, that is, the kind of worth "that each of us has simply by virtue of being a
person rather than a rock or a tree" (Dillon 1992, 54). Persons have value because
they are irreplaceable in a way nothing else is (Gaita 1991, 155). However,
recognising that a person has intrinsic worth as a result of being human does not
always translate into respectful treatment that fosters self-esteem and moral agency.
This first kind of valuation forms the basis of what Dillon (2004, 50) calls
"recognition self-respect", which is self-respect arising from someone recognising
that certain norms entail the worth they have as persons and valuing themselves
appropriately by living in accord with those norms. This kind of self-respect is based
on the recognition by others that because someone is a person they have an "intrinsic
moral worth" and the "status of a full and equal member of the moral community"
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and deserve to be treated "as the bearer of certain moral rights" (Dillon 1992, 54).
A second kind of worth identified by Dillon is the kind earned or merited
"through what we do and become" (1992, 54), and which we possess in varying
degrees. This kind of worth is cumulative and for every meritorious act our worth
increases correspondingly. As a result, some persons might accrue little or no
evaluative worth because they have done nothing to merit it. One problem with this
kind of valuing is that it is sometimes accorded to persons who possess certain
qualities which we value in ourselves so that the value we accord others, and whether
we see them as having equal moral standing to ourselves, depends upon similarities
of practices, relationships and actions, between them and us. Another way of
describing this is that we value others, not on the basis of how meritorious their
actions are, but on how well they meet our expectations (Frye 1983, 67–69); this
attitude has more in common with arrogant perception than an evaluation of
someone's virtues. Since we also judge others on the basis of values we hold we are
more likely to understand the motives and respect the actions of those with whom we
share certain qualities, something I will return to in Chapter Five.
The kind of self-respect arising from this second kind of valuing, which
Dillon calls "evaluative self-respect", is characterised as involving "an attitude of
positive appraisal of oneself" and one's merits, and the belief that one is measuring
up to "some standards of excellence" (1992, 54) and, therefore, evaluative self-
respect is something we can acquire more or less of, or lose entirely. This kind of
self-respect is sometimes identified as self-esteem and dismissed as morally
unimportant, according to Dillon (2004, 49). This kind of worth depends on "the
extent to which a person's character and conduct accord with and honor" (Dillon
2004, 50) the kind of person they are.
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However, while it is important to understand that different kinds of valuing
lead to different kinds of self-respect, describing what one feels as either recognition
self-respect or evaluative self-respect overlooks the way in which the two are
interconnected. As Dillon puts it, "the person with evaluative self-respect regards
herself as having worth because she lives in accord with the norms for recognition
self-respect" (2004, 50). Similarly, the two kinds of worth discussed by Dillon seem
to me to be in a reciprocal, complementary relationship, since before persons can
merit evaluative self-respect they need to act in praiseworthy ways; however, without
recognition of their status as full and equal members of the moral community their
actions may be unintelligible and misunderstood.
Dillon (1992, 55) questions the accessibility of both kinds of self-respect to
women, and I would extend this doubt to all social groups whose members are
objectified and/or marginalised by oppression.122 In order to gain evaluative self-
respect, persons have to be able to form practical goals, develop a worthwhile life
plan, and act towards it, and be valued for what good they can do; in other words,
they have to be accepted as functional members of the moral community. Before this
can occur they need to be seen as moral equals, which means they need first to be
accorded recognition respect. However, if recognition respect is not forthcoming,
persons may need to act in ways which demand evaluative self-respect in order to
gain the recognition that they are worthy members of the moral community and
entitled to recognition as such. For members of some social groups it may be
necessary to act as if one has already been given worth as a human being by making
choices which are indicative that one is self-respecting, even if one is not valued as
122 Dillon argues that not only does oppression work to impede the development of self-esteem, or
evaluative self-respect, but the conceptualisation of self-esteem is itself inimical to the
development of self-esteem in women.
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such by the wider community. The character of Sethe in Beloved is a good example
of someone who recognises herself as having intrinsic worth and acts accordingly,
although it is questionable whether her actions gain evaluative worth from the
community.
One's self-esteem may be impacted negatively by the social and economic
circumstances one finds oneself in, but my main concern here is with the way self-
esteem is impacted negatively by the internalisation of negative attitudes and
behaviours, in particular those that result from objectification and stereotyping of the
visible identities, and hence the bodies, of members of some social groups.
Devaluation of the self can lead to feelings of inadequacy and low self-worth which
result in reduced capacity to develop competencies essential to subjectivity and
agency, such as autonomy. Sarah Hoagland (1988, 213) argues that oppression and
comparative powerlessness work to reduce both one's sense of self-worth and one's
capacity for critical self-reflection and action. Only by developing feelings of self-
esteem can persons recognise their own desires as reflective of their true selves
rather than the result of internalised oppression and demoralisation. If choice is
important to exercising moral agency then being coerced or manipulated by others in
how one chooses, especially by those with more power, can undermine moral agency
and lead to demoralisation. However, in recognising the authenticity of their desires
as the basis of their choices, Meyers suggests that self-respecting persons are self-
limiting in their choices and do not act impulsively on those desires, adhering instead
to moral and personal standards and recognising the importance of "choosing well"
(1995, 222).
In summary, in order to act as moral agents persons need to develop feelings
of self-worth and self-respect, and to do this the oppressed may need to transcend
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others' unfair expectations of them which function to limit their self-development. If,
before being seen to be worthy the oppressed must see themselves as worthy, then
this may only occur through the presence of the internalised other and the
development of the skills in self-knowledge, self-direction and self-definition, which
Meyers argues are essential to autonomy competency. However, oppression also
operates to limit the development of competencies in autonomy and agency by
restricting both physical body movements and the social spaces where the oppressed
are allowed to act, and it is this added burden to the development of autonomy
competencies in the oppressed that I will address in the next section.
The embodied agent and socially prescribed spaces
A number of feminist theorists, notably Bartky (1990) and Young (2005),
have argued that understanding the psychological impact of oppression requires an
analysis of the embodied consciousness of the self. Persons experience themselves as
not only inhabiting a body through which they negotiate the world but also as living
as embodied beings in social spaces. Our bodies and the social spaces they inhabit, or
are allowed to inhabit, impact in significant ways on the development of autonomy
and agency. In this section I will argue that objectification of the oppressed on the
grounds of their embodiment not only impacts on them by psychologically
undermining their sense of themselves as effective moral agents, but also by limiting
and deforming what they can know about themselves and the world, and hence how
they can understand themselves and what they can convey to others about who they
are and why they act as they do.
The notion that how one is embodied impacts on how one experiences the
world has implications for autonomy and moral agency. In the previous chapter, I
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suggested that how we are embodied, in particular our visual physical characteristics,
play a significant role in the development of individual moral agency. Generally
speaking, our knowledge of the world is dependent on our embodiment. Not only are
our bodies the place where we interact with others and with the world and where we
discover knowledge of ourselves through physical connections with others, for
example, through sexual intimacy or pregnancy, but everything we know we know in
part because we interact with the world through our bodily senses. Even where the
imagination is at the forefront of how we experience the world, such as when an
artist creates a work of art or an author writes a book, our ability to communicate
imaginative ideas is through the medium of our senses, and hence the meanings we
impart to ourselves and our practices are, to varying degrees, at least partially the
result of embodiment.
If we find meaning through what we learn from the way our bodies interact
with the world, then unjust social institutions and normative expectations can impose
restrictions on our interactions with others, and hence on what we can know and how
we can know what we know. Experiencing the world through the perspective of the
dominant can result in the oppressed being unable to see themselves as having any
value or their identities and actions as being meaningful, leading to feelings of
alienation or disjunction, or a sense of dislocation, from both their bodies and
themselves. If the world is understood and made meaningful by interactions
mediated by the body, then feeling detached from one's body may mean one cannot
make sense of the world, and this may be the case for some persons affected by
oppression. Feeling estranged from one's body is an emotional response, but feeling
that what one thinks one knows about the world is wrong because it does not make
sense from one's own situated standpoint, is a moral judgement. For women
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becoming aware of themselves through bodies that inhabit biased social and
economic spaces, their embodiment affects both what they know of the world and
what they find meaningful.
A number of theorists, including Meyers (2000; 2004) discussed earlier, have
argued for the importance of self-knowledge for the expression of moral agency in
members of oppressed social groups.123 Placing constraints upon how persons
experience themselves as embodied beings limits and deforms what persons know or
think they know about themselves, which, in turn, can impact significantly on their
development of autonomy and agency. For example, normative expectations about
how women should look, dress and behave have resulted in restrictive bodily
movements, in "women's cramped postures and attenuated strides" (Frye 1983,
14).124 Young (2005, 32–34) details the ways in which men's and women's
comportment and body movements differ and concludes that for women this
difference is characterised "by a failure to make full use of the body's spatial and
lateral potentialities" (2005, 32). Learning to mediate one's knowledge of the world
through a body that is unnaturally constricted results in distorted perceptions of both
oneself and others (Bartky 1990, 67–69).125 Carrying oneself in an unnaturally
constricted way not only reduces one's ability to act, since one is unable to utilise a
full range of movements, it also diminishes one's sense of being a self capable of
acting in some ways because these do not accord with the way one sees oneself as a
result of the internalisation of these constraints. That the body is experienced as
123 For example, Hoagland says, "before I am really able to respond to you, I need to be clear on at
least some things about my self" (1988, 113). See also Mullett (1987) and Nelson (2001b).
124 For discussion on other ways in which normative expectations act upon the female body, which I
do not have the space to take up here, see, for example, Bartky (1990), Bordo (1993), and Young
(2005).
125 Rich (1986, 214–15) suggests that the body itself is where the subjugation of women is acted out,
and that, consequently, the body should be thought of as a location for oppression and resistance.
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constrained even when there are no physical restraints to action affects how one
experiences the world and hence what one can know about oneself. Internalised
constraints as a result of one's embodiment suggest embodiment sets limits on, and
may even distort, what persons can know about themselves and the world, and,
therefore, may not only affect the exercise of moral agency but also make actions and
choices unintelligible, an issue I will discuss in the following chapters.
Because one's embodiment impacts on one's sense of self in many ways, both
through events initiated in the body, such as puberty and ageing, or through bodily
trauma as a result of events which may involve others or be initiated by others, such
as accident, surgery, rape or torture, one's sense of self is almost constantly being
assaulted or affirmed by changes in the body. For the oppressed, these feelings of
being an embodied self are complicated by other ways one perceives the body, such
as internalised hatred or the perception of oneself as being lessor as a result of
devaluation by others. The body has an ambiguous role to play with regard to
autonomy and agency, at once a reminder of ourselves as separate from and
interdependent with others.
In addition, I suggested in Chapter One that the spaces we inhabit are
productive of our sense of self, and that for members of subjugated social groups this
means their understanding of themselves is constructed via marginalisation and
exclusion. As I mentioned in Chapter One, marginalisation is considered by Young
(1988) to be one of five ways in which oppression is experienced. To be marginalised
is to be "expelled from useful participation in social life", potentially "subject to
severe material deprivation" (Young 1988, 281). Providing for material needs does
not end marginalisation as members of these groups may lack self-respect, feeling
themselves peripheral to the productive society around them. Welfare provision
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itself, while essential for survival, can also be an additional source of injustice where
the material dependency of the recipient means they are subject to demeaning,
patronising, often arbitrary bureaucratic policies (Young 1988, 281).
The social space in which interactions with others occur also impacts on how
we feel and, hence, on our sense of self. For example, as a patient in hospital after an
operation, I experienced myself in relation to the doctors, nurses, friends and family
in different ways, depending on the social context and the discursive spaces we
shared. My interactions with the surgeon and anaesthetist were at the level of my
body and the organs affected so that I knew myself in relation to these medical
professionals solely as an illness or disease to be treated, not as a person. Marlene
Benjamin describes a similar experience when a radiologist is discussing her uterus
with a colleague, "paying no attention to the fact that the sheet had fallen off [her]
belly and a real person is there" (2007, 110). This sense of the body in a social
space—as, for example, a patient or a worker or a sex object—existing separately to
the person, changes not only the way we feel about ourselves and therefore our sense
of agency, but also how we interpret the experience and what meaning it acquires for
us. The kind of relationships we have are significant, not only because we need
others to affirm our sense of ourselves as persons with the capacity to develop
narrative and autonomy competencies, but also because they sustain our belief in the
meaningfulness of our actions and our lives. Relationships that objectify and
stereotype on the basis of our bodies undermine our sense of being persons with
moral agency. Our relationships with others, whether deep and enduring or trivial
and transient, affect and modify who we think we are, by changing what we think we
know of ourselves and others, and as a consequence impact on our ability to function
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effectively as moral agents.126
A person's sense of self not only reflects their embodiment and the spaces
they inhabit in the world, it also attests to their relationship to other bodies in social
spaces. It may appear then, that for persons whose ability to develop moral
competencies and express moral agency is impaired by oppressive environments, the
solution is to create social and discursive spaces of their own which allow them to
feel valued as equal members of the moral community. I will consider this idea in
more detail later in this chapter but, as I shall argue, it is a problematic strategy for a
number of reasons. Before doing so, however, I will consider another possibility, that
persons may be able to develop a sense of self which is authentic by separating
themselves from the negative aspects of being embodied.
Separation from and reconstruction of the self, and the lessons of trauma
survivors
A metaphysical conception of the true or authentic self underlies much of the
difficulty members of oppressed groups have with acting as embodied beings. There
are conflicting notions as to what constitutes a true self, which I do not have the
space to go into here, but in Western philosophy conceptualising the authentic self as
an integrated whole is in conflict with the notion of the self as plural. The notion of
the true self as existing somehow separately to the body has a long history in Western
thought but is deeply engrained across cultures, perhaps as a result of religious
126 Sometimes these experiences give one new knowledge, as when the nurse who was with my uncle
when he died described the experience for me, reassuring me that he had not been alone; and
sometimes they colour the attitudes and opinions we hold, as when a man of middle–eastern
appearance performed a kind deed for me. In either case, our understanding of someone we are in
relation to is affected and may undergo a change. Of course, if we learn something to someone's
discredit our thoughts may undergo a negative rather than a positive change.
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beliefs in a soul or mind enduring after death.127 I am not going to pursue a particular
theory of matter here; rather, I am going to argue that there may be potential benefits
to considering the true self as separate to the body. This notion might appear at odds
with a thesis in which the development of moral agency is linked to the privileging
or exclusion of persons on the basis of their embodiment, but any separation of self
from body is envisioned as a temporary strategy to enable disengagement from a
particular situation where one's embodiment is seen as setting a limit on one's moral
agency because of perceived moral deficiencies arising from one's embodiment.
Before I consider the philosophical implications for agency, I want to point to
at least one precedent for the separation of body and self in attitudes towards illness
in the West, where the body is seen as a space occupied by the self and the site of the
disease to be treated rather than the true self. For example, the removal of organs
such as the uterus, ovaries, and prostate, replacement of kidneys, heart, and lungs,
and use of radiation or chemotherapy for cancer, are not generally presumed to affect
one's sense of self, and the mind waking up from anaesthesia after surgery is
assumed to be the same as the one that existed beforehand.128Another way of
expressing this is that the space the body occupies is merely the space in which the
self is expressed, and bodily changes such as these are not deemed to affect the true
self.129
How can separating one's sense of self from one's embodiment assist one to
127 This belief is frequently repeated in popular culture, for example, in Western culture body swap
stories, such as the 1988 film Vice Versa (1988). However, it is also found and expressed in more
philosophical considerations of the nature of the self, such as in the Japanese anime Ghost in the
Shell (1995). In this film, the character of Major Motoko Kusangi has a cyborg body allowing her
to change physical bodies at one stage in the narrative without changing her essential nature.
128According to Dr. Sandra S. Vermeulen, in a conversation in July 2007, radiation oncologists
treating brain tumours with whole brain radiation are most commonly asked, 'will this change who
I am?', by which the patient means: will this change my personality, my essential self.
129 Other examples of bodily change that are presumed not to affect the true self are natural physical
changes, such as puberty and menopause.
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act? Susan Brison (2002) has suggested that the perception that change happening to
the body does not affect the true self can be vital to maintaining a sense of self or to
healing the self after trauma. An inability to dissociate from one's body can make
victims of trauma feel tied to the body and the traumatic event and be unable to move
past it, whereas being able to separate from the body may allow the survivor of
trauma to feel as though "an essential part of themselves was untouched" (Brison
2002, 48), allowing them to move on. The sense that a distinct self emerged during a
traumatic experience, or that an essential part of themselves was untouched by a
traumatic bodily experience, allows persons afflicted in this way to continue to
maintain a positive awareness of themselves in the aftermath of the traumatic
event—although Brison cautions that such responses are only ever partially
successful and the "survivor's bodily sense of self is permanently altered" (2002, 49).
Similarly, an awareness of oneself as possessing multiple selves, some of
whose values are endorsed independently of the forces of domination might be
beneficial to maintaining subjectivity, even when one's sense of a self inhabiting
particular social identities is devalued or undermined by stereotyping or
discrimination. Of course, dissociating from the body during trauma is not identical
to the alienation and fragmentation of the self experienced by members of oppressed
social groups as a result of stereotyping and objectification, and it could be argued
that I cannot draw an analogy between them. However, my claim is that both are
concerned with the self that has been harmed (by trauma, by domination) and both
point to the possibility of the existence of a self separate from the self harmed by
domination or trauma. Conceptualising the self as necessarily multiple rather than
fragmented addresses the difficulty for the notion of the integrated self and hence
autonomy, and points to possibilities for resistance.
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Traumatic events provide an example of when it might be psychologically
beneficial to separate from one's embodiment but they are also important for
suggesting that the self has the ability to change, to be destroyed and recreated. Later
in this chapter I will consider the idea that persons can define how they are seen by
themselves and others through re-imagining the nature of the self, and I suggest here
that the possibility for this re-conceptualisation of the self can be found in the way a
changed perception of the self facilitates survival in trauma victims. As Brison (2002,
44–49) describes, persons who experience trauma, whether as the result of an
accident or illness or interpersonal violence or torture, undergo a change in how they
perceive themselves. Victims of trauma frequently separate themselves from the self
who existed before or during the traumatic event insofar as there appears to be an
end to the old self who underwent trauma. One possible outcome of surviving
traumatic events then, assuming the person is able to recover from the trauma and
create new meaning, is the creation of a new post-traumatic self. The psychological
process that results in this changed perception of the self may be beneficial to
transforming the self in those persons who have internalised oppression and
compromised agency.
One effect of trauma is losing one's trust in the world or no longer feeling at
home in the world, as Jean Amery (1995, 136) describes this, and I argue later in this
chapter that the oppressed may also experience themselves as not being at home in
the world. Trust is belief in the fundamental goodness and non-maleficence of others;
without trust in others one cannot feel safe, and, as I shall argue in the next section,
the oppressed frequently experience being in the world as being unsafe. Although the
analogy here is weaker, since survivors of trauma often experience themselves in a
fundamentally different way from their experience of themselves before the
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traumatic event(s), there may still be some benefit to be gained in terms of
understanding the resilience of the self. Of course some trauma survivors are not
resilient, and some experience themselves as having died as a result of trauma, once
again interpreting a dualism between their own true self (which is dead) and the body
which is alive.130 However, an alternative outcome seems to be a revaluation of what
is meaningful, since actions such as torture or arbitrary life and death judgements
make a mockery of human morality and make choices and actions seem meaningless.
What seems to occur, going by accounts of some Holocaust survivors, such as Elie
Wiesel (1981), is that one's moral centre has changed, since the value system which
gave meaning to events prior to trauma is perceived as irretrievably damaged by the
traumatic event. I will be arguing later that an important part of resisting oppression
involves critically interrogating the values one has followed unthinkingly as a means
of allowing oneself to be open to new interpretations and values of relationships and
behaviours. Trauma survivors have no choice but to embrace new meanings and
values if they are to continue to survive in a world in which the old values have been
made meaningless; I would contend that persons overcoming oppression also need to
subject the accepted values and meanings of social identities and practices to critical
examination and actively seek out new meaning and value.
Since we gain meaning from telling a story about the events that happen to
us, another way of looking at the loss of meaning is to say that trauma disrupts the
narrative self-conception that allows us to make sense of the world and how we see
ourselves in relation to others in the world.   These aspects of trauma—the disruption
to the narrative of who and what one is that gives a particular meaning to the world,
and the loss of previously held values and moral ideals and practices—suggest
130 See for example, the 1985 memoirs of Charlotte Delbo (quoted in Brison 2002, 47–48).
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possibilities for those who experience oppression.131 Being able to re-invent the self,
to reconstruct one's moral view and to begin a new narrative of meaning are
important skills for resisting the negative constructions of social identities that are
oppressed. What is evident from the example of trauma survivors is that changes to
one's moral view of oneself and the world are possible. Assuming a narrative
construction of the self, as discussed earlier in this chapter, then it may be possible to
reconstruct the self, or to repair the damaged self and reclaim moral agency as
Nelson (2001a; 2001b) suggests, by means of narrative.
In the last two sections I suggested that embodiment affects not only how
persons are seen by others, it also affects how they are able to act in the world and
consequently is central to agency, and therefore to moral agency. I have argued that,
using the example of trauma survivors, it may be possible, however, for persons to
separate their sense of self from their embodiment, at least partially, in order to
regain effective agency. I have further argued that the perception of trauma survivors
of having died, although their bodies survive, points to the psychological possibility
for reinventing the self which I will discuss later in this chapter. Before doing this,
however, I will argue that for persons to reclaim social identities and a sense of self
requires them to, at the least, discover spaces where it is possible to examine
themselves and their positioning in the world critically, and that to do so may require
leaving behind their sense of being at home, that is, the unexamined assumptions that
make privilege possible.
131 Cathy Winkler, in her 1991 article "Rape as Social Murder", suggests that feeling themselves to be
"defined out of existence" (quoted in Brison 2002, 45) as a result of trauma, survivors may
redefine who they are by giving themselves new names (Brison 2002, 47). I will return to the idea
of renaming as part of recreating the self in Chapter Six.
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Reappraising social spaces and the nature of 'home'
In Chapter Two I described how the forces of domination organise members
of oppressed groups in two important ways that contribute to their subjugation. The
first, the categorisation of out-groups as homogeneous groups of people, so that the
multiplicity of social identities held by group members is simplified or
reconceptualised as fragmented and incoherent. The second kind of organisation is
through institutions and social practices that function to exclude members of
oppressed groups from the mainstream, marginalising them both physically and from
the moral community. These two dynamics of group organisation commonly result
not only in discrimination against the oppressed but also in their demoralisation, in
part because the oppressed internalise constructions of their social identities as
flawed or fragmented, and partly because any expressions of moral agency may be
interpreted as madness or immorality by others since they do not always conform to
normative expectations. However, these two means of organising the oppression of
individuals on the basis of social identities and group memberships may also provide
opportunities for the oppressed to respond; in the previous chapter I described how
this may be possible by re-categorising social groups. Here, I will suggest that by
self-defining on the basis of self-evaluation and re-evaluating the spaces in which
action is curtailed by oppression, members of oppressed groups may gain a sense of
self-respect and develop the capacity to make moral judgements and act on these as
moral agents. The key to doing so is found in the re-conceptualisation of spaces of
exclusion and marginalisation as spaces of critical self-reflection and knowledge. In
this section, I consider some aspects of space and how reclaiming social and
discursive spaces may be important to resisting the construction of negative social
identities by forces of domination.
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I have suggested that moral agency is compromised for persons whose
embodied selves are located in oppressive socio-political spaces, and here I will
argue that developing a sense of self and exercising moral agency for such persons
entails claiming social and discursive spaces. Speaking may be easier somewhere
where one feels safe, such as in a feminist space, but speaking to an audience which
is in agreement with one's expectations and unchallenged by one's values differs to
claiming a space in which to be heard where those listening do not identify with
one's group identity and have no sympathy for one's values. As Parmar has said:
"The appropriation and use of space are political acts" (quoted in hooks 1991, 152),
and may therefore present a challenge for persons whose social identities cause them
to be unseen, or objectified or made invisible. However, Maria Pia Lara (1998, 1)
argues that the act of reclaiming social spaces, by asserting social identities and ways
of knowing in the public sphere which are not typically represented, may itself be
morally significant. For example, Lara suggests that autobiographical narratives by
women intersect the aesthetic and moral spheres, and by contesting notions of
"'values', 'beliefs', 'self-images', 'boundaries' and 'frontiers'" (1998, 7), function as
examples of agency and transformation.
I suggested earlier in this chapter that the social spaces in which relationships
play out may impact upon a person's sense of self-esteem and therefore on their
capacity for self-direction. Public spaces, more often than not, are ambiguous in their
effect upon the development of autonomy capacities and the exercise of agency from
the perspective of the subordinate. Although I suggest here that appropriating social
spaces may be an act of resistance, it is important to remember that in inequitable
societies there are no spaces that are only inclusive and empowering since they are
also sites of oppression or are created by oppressive contexts. It follows that even
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those spaces of inclusion, such as separate women's spaces, black or lesbian spaces,
have the potential to be exclusionary. For example, the segregated housing of some
ethnic and race groups in Western societies may provide an inclusive empowering
space away from oppression, but these spaces are created and ghettoised by
oppressive forces. Similarly, separate lesbian spaces may be empowering of lesbian
relationships by being free of heteronormative values but may also be affected by
racism or domestic violence.
Oppressed social groups create a sense of identity by finding their place, and
locating this place at the centre; to put oneself at the centre is to privilege one's own
experience (Miller 2007, 176). The idea of moving from the margins to the centre is
echoed in the writing of bell hooks, who develops the notion of homeplace as a place
that black experience is privileged, somewhere African Americans can create a sense
of themselves as persons and resist white racism. Finding a home in the world may
also be part of recovering a sense of self as a person for members of oppressed
groups, since feeling alienated from mainstream society and culture is an aspect of
oppression. However, the notion of home as a place of safety and nurture is a
contested one, since home is not always, or only, a place of resistance; it can also be
the locus of oppressive practices, particularly for women. In experiencing home as
the site of sexist or heterosexist oppression, women may develop perspectives on it
that contradict the notion of home as a place of security or safe haven. The
ambiguous nature of home, as both a place of safety and refuge and as a place of
rejection and harm, makes it difficult to interrogate the values and practices learnt, or
to completely escape these values, since they are carried within us. In this section I
will consider some feminist approaches to notions of place and home and safety,
before suggesting that in order for change to occur it may be necessary to give up the
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idea of being at home in the world, of moving to the centre, and instead use the
knowledge gained from inhabiting the margins to resist oppression.
The resistance value of home is well exemplified in the writing of hooks
(1991, 47), who argues that among African Americans homeplace has a subversive
value because it is the one place where African Americans have been free of the
objectifying effects of white racist aggression. The importance of homeplace lies in
its being the only space in a racist culture in which African Americans can affirm
their value and develop feelings of self-worth and self-respect (hooks 1991, 42).
Historically, the construction of homeplace involved the literal construction of a
black space, a piece of real estate from which white racism is shut out, but
homeplace signifies more than this; it is also a location for the creation of a sense of
oneself as other than a product of racism, allowing for the possibility of resistance
(hooks 1991, 42). hooks argues that as well as being a physical, mental and
emotional space in which African Americans can experience themselves as people
away from the violence of ever-present white racism, homeplace is also a theoretical
space, one in which the self damaged by racism can be re-constructed. It is,
therefore, a space in which African Americans can resist forces which seek to
objectify them, and by affirming their sense of self, homeplace allows African
Americans to actively resist the destructive forces of racist oppression.
hooks's description of homeplace suggests that, although it can have a
physical existence, it is not primarily an actual space; rather, it is the affirmation of
oneself as a person gained from relationships that reinforce one's sense of self-worth
and self-respect. Consequently, homeplace does not always have four walls and a
door in a single location; it can be more transient and ephemeral, as hooks makes
clear in her example of Frederick Douglass's mother, a slave who travelled long
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distances to spend nights with her son (1991, 44).132 Since in the era of black slavery
in the US the children of slaves were considered property, neither they nor their
mothers were believed to have emotional bonds equivalent to those of white mothers
and their children. hooks (1991, 42) argues that black women in the post-slavery era
in the US have continued to negotiate the difficult task of creating a space in which
their own children could develop feelings of self-worth while putting most of their
energy into working as domestics in white households and nurturing white children
during the day. This task was made more difficult by their subjection to racism at
work and on their way to work since segregated housing usually meant they were,
literally, travelling between black communities and white neighbourhoods. If
homeplace is a relational space, then although it is one which in the main black
women have struggled to create, it is potentially available to everyone. However, the
idea of homeplace suggests that in order to have a space in which to resist racism it
may also be necessary to work against political policies and social practices designed
to prevent members of subjugated groups from gaining a place of their own, either
by restricting or preventing them from working or by preventing them from owning
real estate.133
The yearning for a safe space reflects a very real psychological need, since
we all desire to feel safe and free from harms. However, many people feel unsafe in
their own homes or walking on the street in the daytime, a feeling that stems from an
awareness of our vulnerability to harms and our expectations about how other
132According to hooks, Douglass himself seems unaware in his narrative of the sacrifices his mother
made to spend time with him.
133 "An effective means of white subjugation of black people globally has been the perpetual
construction of economic and social structures that deprive many folks of the means to make
homeplace" (hooks 1991, 46). For example, in the US after the National Housing Act of 1934, the
practice of redlining, or the designation of black neighbourhoods as areas of high risk by banks
and other lenders, made it more difficult for African Americans to obtain a mortgage. One result of
this was the defacto racial segregation in US cities according to where lending risk boundaries
were drawn (Woods 2012).
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persons may behave based on their social identities. Even in places we may think we
are safe from violence and aggression women may be vulnerable, as Brison's (2002,
2) description of her assault in the peaceful French countryside in the daytime
reminds us. Although hooks develops the notion of homeplace as a place of freedom
from particular oppressions, such as white racism, she is aware that it is also a
conflicted space, particularly for black women, and never suggests that it is a place
that is itself without discrimination, conflict or struggle. In Collins’s (1990, 186)
opinion one reason for this is because African Americans are in danger of equating
emancipation from racism with the espousal of white patriarchal values that
discriminate against and devalue black women. hooks's conception of homeplace is
one that has to negotiate a difficult course through these two objectives: to combat
white racism, which objectifies both black men and black women, and at the same
time to counter sexism and heterosexism.134
The difficulty with hooks's notion of homeplace, is that, for women in
particular, domestic violence and child abuse undermine the notion of home as a
place of safety. The experience many women have of home is of a sometimes
dangerous but always conflicted place, which may be the location of the same
struggles and contradictory positions as the outside world, and therefore it is
ambiguous as a place of resistance. The concept of home as a refuge needs to be
challenged, since mothering and nurturing are not the only activities that occur in
homes and the idealisation of motherhood as pacific is itself open to dispute. Instead,
as Bonnie Honig (1996, 269) argues, the way in which home is conceptualised must
be changed and home must be re-signified so that it is seen not only as a place of
nurturing but also as a site of conflict and struggle.
134 For example, see hooks (1989, 120–6) and Collins (1990, 192–6) for more on homophobia in black
communities.
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I would suggest that one of the difficulties in considering the nature of home
is the tendency for members of oppressed groups to seek a place in which they feel
empowered. For women, because their power is frequently associated with home and
the relationships forged there, home may be seen as the place from which they can
draw strength. While this may sometimes be the case, seeing home only in this way
ignores the complexity of power relationships between persons. Traditionally, too,
the home has been seen as separate from relationships and practices negotiated in the
wider moral community, and what occurs there has been largely unobserved and
undisclosed, making it a dubious place from which to base practices of resistance.
When we think of home as a safe place it becomes difficult to recognise the potential
for harm; we may also feel that victims of violence in a domestic environment should
have been safe and that they must have somehow been responsible for any harm they
suffered. Acknowledging that the home is frequently an unsafe place because
inequitable power relationships can be distorted there may be a necessary step to
recognising some behaviours and social practices as harmful. Therefore, although the
home may be considered women’s space it is not necessarily one in which they are
significantly empowered or able to exert much control.
This problem is complicated for persons who belong to colonised peoples or
oppressed minorities, and who may find themselves in an ambiguous position
fighting against violence within their community while defending their culture from
oppression from without. According to hooks, self-censorship within many
oppressed communities means those seeking to resist overt oppression from outside
may first have to "struggle and resist" within their own culture (1991, 148). Although
hooks is not explicit about why this is, it may be that self-censorship helps to keep
together a community which is under siege from external forces. Because colonised
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cultures are under siege from external forces such criticism from within brings with
it the risk of being seen as a traitor to one’s own kind. Colonisation, war and exile
can result in displacement and dispersal away from one's original home, so that the
experience of home is significantly altered for some persons. Home may be found in
more than one place, or it may be synonymous with fragmentation of oneself across
the globe. For people oppressed from outside or whose home has been disrupted,
there may be an imperative to affirm the value of their own culture (Narayan 1989,
259), so that any criticism, for instance, of sexist or heteronormative aspects of that
culture, is seen as risking that sense of having a place in the world. To be a member
of an oppressed group and to be able to examine critically both one’s native culture
and that of the oppressor can lead to insights about both cultures, but it may also
come with the price that one feels as if one belongs to neither (Narayan 1989, 266).
In describing this dislocation Anzaldua (2007, 44), however, suggests it entails
positive possibilities—the opportunity to create both physical space and culture for
oneself out of one’s own body and mind.
When the oppressed seek a home in the world they are usually seeking two
things: safety from the continuous threat of violence, and a sense of being known and
understood for whom they are without having to make continual explanations.135
Notwithstanding this struggle, there is another kind of home, of safety, that most of
us carry with us regardless of whether we still feel accepted in our natal home, and
this is the sense of belonging to a group that frequently pits us against others. As I
described in Chapter One, this involves identifying differences between members of
our own group and members of other groups and characterising those who do not
belong to our group in stereotypical ways, so that creating a sense of belonging
135 I will discuss this problem, which is identified by Babbitt (2001), in more detail in Chapter Five.
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commonly involves making a distinction between us and them, our family and theirs,
our religion and theirs, our culture and theirs. Since home is where values are taught,
it may be the place where we have learnt toleration of particular injustices and
prejudices, and we may cling to the idea of home because it is the place in which we
feel comfortable that our biases and fears are shared and understood. In considering
Pratt's narrative and how home and place inform her sense of identity, Martin and
Mohanty (1986, 196) argue that Pratt comes to understand the illusory nature of
home as a place of safety when it is constructed on the subjugation of others. In
considering the social and physical spaces of a privileged upbringing, persons have
to recognise that the familiar structures representing stability and safety conceal
histories of struggle against repression that made that privilege possible. For the
privileged, being morally responsible may involve acknowledging that their sense of
safety and stability and feeling of being at home in the world, has only been made
possible because of the displacement and suffering of others.
Consequently, in inequitable societies, notions of the self and space must be
considered with regard to the implications for power and privilege. In seeking to
overcome their complicity with oppression, persons may have to risk losing this
sense of feeling at home in the world in order to acknowledge that feeling
comfortable and secure requires them to treat some people as objects not persons. In
order to interrogate the privilege that accrues to a particular social identity, it may be
necessary to leave behind the values learnt in the home; and for those who have
undertaken this work of self-reflection there may be no going back. It may also be
necessary to leave home to find out who we can be away from the expectations of the
culture we were raised in (Anzaldua 2007, 43), or to confront the ways in which our
own family or community have been damaged by the burden of oppressive violence
139
and fear. We may have to leave the place of physical, emotional, linguistic and
epistemological safety that home represents (de Lauretis 1990, 138) in order to find a
space in which resistance is possible. Later in this chapter I will argue that for
persons to develop the critical perspective necessary for resistance requires them to
re-position themselves, to inhabit threshold spaces which are undefined, and to do
this it may be necessary for both privileged and subordinate persons to leave the
safety of familiar places and values behind in order to resist social practices that are
oppressive to some groups. In the next section I will explore the notion that
resistance to oppression and complicity involves both "dis-placement and a self-
displacement" (de Lauretis 1990, 138), and that for critical engagement to be
possible a sense of dislocation may be inevitable.
Place as Situation
I have argued that the kinds of moral agency accessible within different social
spaces is crucial in resisting oppression, but I have not yet considered a potential
difficulty with thinking about space as location, particularly with regard to the idea
that persons have multiple identities. According to Marjorie Miller (2007, 180), when
we think of space as location, where one moves from one fixed point to another, then
identity becomes something we have to define as being of a particular nature in a
particular space, and this is obviously problematic when we consider the multiple
nature of social identities and group affiliations. Thinking of space as location forces
us to define here, as opposed to there, and the process of doing so results in a
fragmentation Miller (2007, 180) does not explain, but which I understand to be
similar to Lugones's conception, where fragmentation results from a failure to
understand identity as multiple and oppression as intersectional.
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Miller (2007, 176) argues that the goal of moving from the margins to the
centre, which is seen by some theorists, including hooks, as important for resistance,
is predicated on thinking about space, and hence about identity, in this way. But
because not everyone can be located at the centre and because some identity groups
are inevitably marginalised, it becomes a race in which the different identity
categories—often in the same person—compete against one another (Miller 2007,
177–78). Instead of understanding movement as location, Miller (2007, 180) thus
suggests we understand movement and space as situational with regard to identities,
so that, as Lugones also argues, each interaction between persons depends upon who
they are in that place. As Alcoff puts it: "Social identities ... are more properly
understood as sites from which we perceive, act, and engage with others. [And] these
sites are not simply social locations or positions, but also hermeneutic horizons
comprised of experiences, basic beliefs, and communal values" (2006, 287; italics in
original). And because it is possible to simultaneously find ourselves in more than
one situation—while we cannot inhabit multiple locations—a situational
understanding of identity and place can embrace the complexities of being multiple
selves interacting with other multiples selves in different circumstances.
The idea of situated identities is similar to the notion of world-travelling,
which I would contend, given Lugones's use of the terminology reality, reflects a
more nuanced understanding of social spaces than simply as location. For Lugones
(1990b, 504), the liberatory potential of world-travelling lies in having the ability to
remember how one is in another reality, in particular whether persons remember their
intentions from one reality to another. This is a difficult undertaking for many
people, particularly the privileged, since there are many reasons for not remembering
oneself in other realities. For example, Lugones suggests that people may not want to
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remember who they are and how they behave in front of domestic servants, because
they lack moral integrity in the eyes of their servants. Another reason persons may
have difficulty remembering is that doing so may involve confronting some
uncomfortable assumptions about entitlement and exclusion, and involve breaking
faith across class or race lines—of being a class or race traitor. For example, when
Pratt faces the exclusions and discriminations that make her own privileged
childhood home possible she breaks ranks with those members of her own class, race
and/or faith who are still holding on to privilege.
Although world-travelling, as an exchange of realities or situations, seems to
argue for a different approach to the critical position that is the outsider within, I
would suggest that they are similar insofar as they both possess liberatory potential
because persons retain knowledge gained as marginalised identities when they move
into other worlds or situations. The epistemic advantage gained by critically
positioning oneself as a world-traveller or outsider within is that of being able to see
outside the explanatory framework of domination to other ways of understanding.
However, like Miller, I think there are more profoundly transformative possibilities
to be found in a situational approach to place and identity than simply changing the
frame of reference, and in the next section I will consider what happens when we
unsettle the boundaries of the self.
The "space of radical openness"136
I suggested earlier that members of oppressed groups may experience
themselves being in the world as disrupted and disjunctive, either because the home
to which they belong is irretrievably lost, or transitional, or because home exists non-
136 Partial chapter title in hooks's Yearning (1991, 145); the full title is "Choosing the Margin as a
Space of Radical Openness."
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continuously from place to place, or because it is not a place they can return to.
Being in the world in this way means being excluded from mainstream experiences
and mainstream life; it means experiencing the world and oneself in the world only at
the margins. While it may seem to follow from this that the goal of the oppressed
should be to move to the centre, as discussed above, there are problems attached to
this movement. I therefore argue instead that we may need to continue to inhabit the
margins to engage critically with what we know and what we think we know in order
to become open to others' ways of knowing. In addition, for those who are privileged
and those who are unsafe in their own homes or cultures, moving away from the
centre may be essential to interrogating the values of home, which privilege some by
excluding others.
Lugones and Collins both argue that ways of knowing in marginal situations
challenge what is thought to be known by privileged knowers, and hooks suggests
there is a space of radical openness where the oppressed can not only hear other
voices but also articulate their own knowing.137 The way in which inhabitants of
marginal spaces experience themselves as persons affects the way they can know
things. Experiencing themselves as being multiple selves in multiple worlds, or as
existing at the boundaries between different realities, identities or ways of knowing,
creates a momentary freedom from oppressive reality, which allows the subject to
imagine themselves otherwise.138 Epistemologies of oppression provide alternative
perspectives that work to undermine the status quo of power hierarchies by
questioning the logic of privileged ascriptions of identity, and in doing so open up a
closed system of meaning to other interpretations.
137 For example, black women working in white households may realise that white privilege does not
reflect superior intellect or ability but exists merely to retain specific advantages (Collins 1991,
40).
138 Paraphrased from chapter title by Mackenzie in Mackenzie and Stoljar (2000, 124).
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Lugones, Collins and hooks all suggest that resistance involves taking what is
known in one reality and articulating it, or making it intelligible, in another reality.
Part of this struggle involves finding one’s voice and finding a space in which to
speak, since in inequitable societies privileged and oppressed identities do not have
the same authority to speak, or may be authorised to speak about different subjects in
different social situations. The struggle to articulate one's experience and to have
one's experiences witnessed includes the use of what hooks (1991, 150) calls a
"counter-language", which she defines as ways of speaking which may originate in
the coloniser’s tongue but which are irrevocably changed by the experience of
oppression.
Because marginalisation contrives to exclude and silence marginalised
persons while privileging the speech of some, as mentioned in Chapter One,
dominant voices may pervade discourse making it more difficult to hear other voices
and creating expectations about who will speak and be heard in different contexts.
These discursive practices are normalised in inequitable societies so that it may seem
natural that some persons are effectively silenced, excluding them from being full
members of the moral community. For example, Williams (1991, 92–93) regards
impersonal and objective writing as being an exclusive form of discourse which is
empowering to oneself at the expense of the other and she instead aims to maintain a
dialogic relationship with the other.139 Dominant discourses retain discursive
authority by excluding, silencing, or erasing other voices (hooks 1991, 151), by
making assumptions about what values are important and whose voice should be
heard. The dominant expect the oppressed to move from the margins to the centre
139 Mae Henderson (1992, 146) suggests that black women's writing is, in general, essentially a
dialogic relationship, not only with the external other, but also with the internal other that, she
suggests, exists within multiple selves and implies acceptance of difference and identification with
the other.
144
and assume the values and concerns of the dominant, in other words to accept
arrogant perception over their own experience.
Rather than moving in the direction dictated by the dominant, hooks proposes
the oppressed inhabit a space of open-ended acting, which she describes as the
"space of radical openness". The space that hooks refers to could be the limen
described by Lugones as the place in between different realities, different worlds of
sense, a space in which one can be aware of the plurality of different selves. It may
also be the spaces "in the margins of hegemonic discourses" described by de Lauretis
(1987, 20), social and dialogic spaces which are not only un-represented but un-
representable in mainstream discourses. It may also accord with the liminal or
threshold spaces between worlds described by Anzaldua, in-between or boundary
spaces which are "unstable, unpredictable, precarious" and "always-in-transition"
(2002a, 1), in which transformations may occur. Inhabiting this space involves
recognising the ways in which one is pushed to the edges, both socio-economically
and in mainstream discourses, and creating new meanings for oneself, one's
relationships and one's social practices, meanings which are resistant to oppressive
discourses and practices.
De Lauretis has suggested there are possibilities that can be found in spaces
between gendered identities or notions of the self to question established meanings.
In hooks's words, marginality is "much more than a site of deprivation ... it is also the
site of radical possibility, a space of resistance" (1991, 149). Both social and
discursive, "real and imagined", "interrupted, appropriated, and transformed" (hooks
1991, 152), these are spaces in which social change can occur as well as spaces in the
discourse where meaning is amorphous, unfixed, or fluid. The "counter-hegemonic"
discourses of marginality are "not just found in words but in habits of being and the
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way one lives" (hooks, 1991, 149).
However, as I mentioned earlier, although hooks uses the terminology of
marginalisation, such spaces are probably best thought of as the transitional threshold
spaces Anzaldua refers to, spaces that, as Parmar (1990, 101) notes, thwart
oppositional discourses. For example, Monique Wittig's use of the term "lesbian
society" refers to "a conceptual and experiential space carved out of the social field, a
space of contradictions" (de Lauretis 1987, 144), where a lesbian "has to be
something else, a not-woman, a not-man" (Wittig 1992, 13; italics in original)
because, Wittig argues, lesbians do not belong to the natural kind that is 'woman'.140
These "social spaces carved in the interstices of institutions and in the chinks and
cracks of the power-knowledge apparati" (de Lauretis 1987, 25) are where dominant
understandings of social practice and language can be resisted, and where the
meanings of social practices, such as lesbianism, can be challenged by alternative
interpretations.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued that spaces within the hegemony of hierarchical
societies exist where the oppressed can challenge epistemologies of domination by
developing the competencies needed for autonomy and moral agency. When the
historical context which has resulted in some identity categories being oppressed is
either hidden or denied, then being born poor or black, for example, rather than being
a matter of moral luck, as I shall discuss in future chapters, becomes an apparent fact
about the world. Critically positioning oneself, for example, as an outsider within or
140 Wittig makes the argument that being lesbian involves the rejection of being a 'woman'—since in
heterosexual reality women are naturally heterosexual—but that refusing to be a woman "does not
mean that one has to become a man" (1992, 12).
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world-traveller, allows persons to see through the explanatory framework of
domination, and identify and acknowledge the exclusions and discriminations that
permit the privileging of some social groups and the inequitable treatment of others.
Re-conceptualising social identities as multiple permits persons to see themselves as
they truly are and makes possible self-understanding and hence narrative self-
constitution. This kind of critical positioning is attainable, I suggest, because there
are social spaces and spaces in discourses where it is possible to challenge the
meanings of identities, relationships and social practices.
I also argued in this chapter that relationality is central, not only to
developing autonomy competencies and moral agency, but also to the construction of
the narratively constituted self. Many of the social and relational identities assigned
to us come with preconceived attributes, expectations and duties which complicate,
and in some cases inhibit, the exercise of moral agency. In the next chapter I will
consider the possibility that members of oppressed groups can overcome some of
these barriers to moral agency and take responsibility for themselves by making their
lives more intelligible to others.
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4. Moral agents and responsibility
Introduction
Until now I have concentrated on what might be called the situational aspects
of moral agency: what competencies are necessary in order to gain acknowledgement
that agency is being exercised, why members of subordinate groups might be lacking
in those competencies, and how persons whose agency is diminished can situate
themselves in order to develop the necessary competencies. In this chapter I focus
less on the idea of developing the capacity for moral agency and more on the
possibilities available for members of subordinate groups to exercise moral agency,
which I consider from the perspective of persons taking responsibility for their
choices. If Walker (2007, 16–17) is correct in arguing that practices of responsibility
are central to how we practise morality, then what is needed is a conception of
responsibility that is appropriate to persons whose self-development has been
negatively impacted by inequitable power relationships and who may, as a
consequence, lack the capacity to develop the competencies necessary for the
exercise of full moral agency.141 In my view members of subordinate social groups
are not well served by recognised understandings of responsibility, particularly in the
sense of being held and holding others accountable, and would benefit from an
alternative approach, such as the care-taking sense of responsibility, which involves
actively standing behind one's projects, identities and values. One way for persons
whose moral development has been negatively impacted by systematic
141 Having or lacking the capacities necessary to develop moral competencies to demonstrate full
moral agency may make us less responsible, in the sense of being responsible or being worthy, but
it does not necessarily impair our ability to take responsibility. In Babbitt's words: "We can take
responsibility for actions or events that go beyond our capacities" (2001, 3).
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discrimination to take responsibility in the care-taking sense is by making their
choices intelligible to others. Intelligibility as it is understood here is a social activity
whereby a person provides, not justification, but an explanation of their actions to
others which is coherent in terms of the person's individual narrative of their beliefs,
values and desires, and which is, therefore, meaningful with reference to their life
story. The ability to give moral accounts, and hence make sense of one's choices to
oneself and others, is also central to Walker's (2007, 114–121) conception of
morality. Walker identifies three different kinds of moral accounts given—narratives
of identity, relationship and value—which between them explain why someone chose
to act as they did. In summary, persons who are diminished in their ability to exercise
moral agency as a result of oppression may demonstrate moral competency by taking
responsibility for their choices by giving moral accounts that make these intelligible
to others.
The significance of intelligibility
Before moving on to talk about some different understandings of
responsibility and why these might not be appropriate in situations of systematic
discrimination, I want to briefly consider why intelligibility-as-responsibility might
be a useful alternative strategy, even though there are obvious difficulties for
members of subordinate groups—such as the presumption of moral incompetence,
and the absence of epistemic credibility to be discussed in Chapter Six—which
distinguish their attempts at intelligibility from those of others.
What does it mean to be intelligible to others? Schechtman (1996, 159)
considers a person's actions to be intelligible when the actions taken stem from a
person's "beliefs, values, desires, and experiences", and cohere with one another in
the sense of being understandable with reference to the rest of a person's life story.
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The capacity for moral agency is directly correlated with the ability to see oneself as
"a persisting individual whose actions cohere with one's beliefs, values, and desires
(which should also cohere with one another) and whose current actions have
implications for the future" (Schechtman 1996, 159), that is, a person whose actions
may be judged by others. Without an intelligible narrative connecting a person's
internal psychological states with their actions they are "incapable of making the
kinds of decisions necessary to agency" (Schechtman 1996, 159) and cannot properly
be held responsible for their behaviour. Intelligibility, then, is the outward expression
of an agent's moral competency.
While intelligibility requires an unbiased hearing from others it does not
presume the unthinking acceptance of, and agreement with, the intelligible other's
point of view. Indeed, Hoagland stresses that while one aspect of intelligibility is
offering explanations for our own behaviour, a second aspect is understanding the
choices made by others, "particularly choices we don't approve of" (1988, 223).
However, since making oneself intelligible to others requires an attempt to convey
why a particular course of action has been chosen, or why one is prepared to support
a particular project or relationship, it may be more realisable within a community of
like-minded individuals where values and social practices are held in common and
others may be presumed to be sympathetic to, if not in agreement with, the choices
made. It is not surprising, then, that making oneself intelligible to others in order to
take responsibility for one's choices and actions was initially considered by theorists
as an alternative to notions of responsibility-as-accountability and blame within
marginalised communities.142 In fact, it could be argued that there are few incentives
for members of privileged groups to make themselves intelligible to the subjugated,
142 The earliest reference I can find is in Hoagland (1988) who acknowledges Frye (1986, unpub.) as
the source.
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especially as members of privileged groups are frequently those who demand
explanations for behaviour rather than those being held accountable, a point I will
return to below.
The concept of responsibility
Before considering the concept of intelligibility as it applies to responsibility
in more detail I will review some of the different ways we think about responsibility,
starting with some distinctions developed by Card (1996).143 It is possible to
differentiate between taking responsibility in the sense of accepting praise or blame
for our actions or being responsible in the sense of having some quality or virtue. In
taking responsibility "we locate ourselves as morally relevant centers of agency"
(Card 1996, 28), whereas being responsible for something is not necessarily morally
relevant. This is apparent if we consider that we can be responsible for something in
the same way, for example, a computer can be responsible in the sense of being the
immediate cause for traffic lights not working or a dog can be responsible for
chewing on a cushion; while both computer and dog can be responsible neither can
take responsibility for their actions or choices in the way people can and do.144 It is
also possible to distinguish between freely chosen responsibilities, which always
require us to show initiative, and those assigned or inherited, those responsibilities
we call obligations, which may be accepted or refused but require less initiative on
our part.145As long as the responsibility is accepted these all count as instances
143 Especially Chapter Two.
144 In other words, causal responsibility does not necessarily translate into moral responsibility.
Compare the computer being responsible for the traffic lights not working and the Director of the
Department of Main Roads taking responsibility for the ensuing traffic gridlock.
145 Card (1996, 29) says we may accept or refuse responsibilities that we inherit or are assigned, for
example, taking care of elderly parents. As Card points out, these assignments are governed by
ethical norms, and I would argue that the normative pressure involved ensures the oppressed, in
contrast to the privileged, are rarely able to refuse the responsibilities thrust upon them. In the case
of caring for elderly parents, for instance, anecdotal evidence from friends whose parents are aging
and observation within my own family suggests this responsibility falls more often upon female
than male children, or at least, that they are less able to refuse the responsibility when it is
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where responsibility is taken, but an agent is more responsible when the
responsibility taken requires initiative (Card 1996, 28–29). The insight that freely
chosen responsibilities require initiative is useful in thinking of those times when
there is no initiative, such as when our actions result from following orders.
Even after teasing apart these different notions of responsibility there still
exist what Card (1996, 27) has called the ambiguities of responsibility. The concept
of responsibility can refer both to capacities, as in the capacity for moral agency, and
to virtues, such as the ability to follow through on something, thereby showing
conscientiousness and integrity. Since it is possible to fail to follow through on a
responsibility freely undertaken, the ambiguity then arises of being judged to have
both fulfilled and failed to fulfil an undertaking (Card 1996, 28). However, as my
focus here is on the expression of moral agency, I am concerned with a failure to
follow through on our obligations insofar as it is an indication that a person's
capacity to exercise moral agency has been compromised.
Card (1996, 28) differentiates four kinds of moral agency which suggest
different senses of taking responsibility: deciding what should be done and how (the
"administrative" sense), determining who is responsible for what and to whom
("accountability"), committing oneself to some project and making good on this ("the
care-taking" sense), and (the "credit" sense), accepting praise or blame for what one
has done or failed to do.146 I find these distinctions useful when thinking about
members of subordinate social groups because looking for where the exercise of
assigned to them. This observation is so obvious it may appear redundant; however, my claim is
that where there is no consideration of oppression it may not be at all evident.
146 More commonly the notions of accountability and credit are conjoined, so that accountability is
understood in a backwards-looking sense rather than in a forwards-looking sense, as Card
understands it here. Usually persons are held accountable for something after the event and praised
or blamed according to whether or not they met their obligations. In other words, 'being held
accountable' refers to taking responsibility in the credit sense; since it would be confusing to
discuss other theorists' work in terms of the credit sense I will distinguish these from Card's notion
of accountability by referring to them as 'being held accountable' or 'responsibility-as-
accountability'.
152
moral agency is allowed, or conversely, where it is denied, can tell us whether there
is a presumption of moral competence or incompetence. For example, Belinda
Morrissey's (2003) study of women who kill—which I will discuss in more detail in
Chapter Five—found that the blame, and, therefore, the responsibility for killing,
was repeatedly assigned to others, denying the women's own culpability and,
consequently, denying them moral agency. However, before considering the
problematic nature of responsibility in relation to the oppressed in more detail, I will
look at practices of responsibility and how these arise.
The social nature of responsibility
According to Walker (2007, 16), morality consists in "complex practices of
certain kinds", which correspond to practices of responsibility, and which "cannot be
extricated from other social practices" (2007, 17). Practices of responsibility
"implement commonly shared understandings about who gets to do what to whom
and who is supposed to do what for whom" (Walker 2007, 16) within a given society.
These practices may differ depending on the nature and history of particular
relationships, for example, whether one is responding to a stranger or a friend or
family member. They may also change over time given changes to relationships, as
when a former teacher becomes a friend, or when there are changes to the way those
relationships are understood, for example, when a child or grandchild takes on
responsibility for elderly parents or grandparents. Practices of responsibility may
also vary as the normative values of society adapt and change over time. For
example, fulfilling one's obligations as an employer in the West now entails
consideration of workplace safety, and an employer would usually be considered to
have acted morally reprehensibly, as well as being legally at fault, if they failed to
provide a safe working environment. Practices of responsibility specify not only who
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is accountable to whom and for what, they also encapsulate the limits and scope of
each individual’s agency, as well as revealing relationships between individuals.
Because of the interconnectivity between relationships, social practices and practices
of responsibility, obligations to respond to others can appear to arise naturally rather
than being inherited as a result of the structure of social institutions.
According to John Searle, social institutions are a "system of collectively
recognised rights, responsibilities, duties, obligations, and powers" (1995, 83)
attached to a social entity, and come with rules and expectations that give authority
to social practices and enable individuals to determine whether or not they are
conforming with or deviating from the norm.147 Social institutions give authority to
what Searle calls "institutional facts" (1995, 27), or those facts which are dependent
on a social institution for their existence and meaning, in contrast to those facts
which continue to exist independently of human institutions. Institutional facts
continue to have an existence, in Searle's opinion, simply because "the individuals
directly involved and a sufficient number of members of the relevant community ...
continue to recognise and accept the existence of such facts" (1995, 117). For
example, property rights exist for as long as they have the status of an institutional
fact; as soon as they are rejected by the majority of community members property
rights cease to exist within that society. Given that institutional facts depend upon
what may be unspoken agreement for their existence they may appear to be naturally
occurring facts about the world rather than social constructs.
Similarly, although practices of responsibility may appear innate rather than
being reflective of morality, in reality they reflect social rules and expectations which
in turn attest to the values of the institution generating them. For example, the
147 I do not have the space here to investigate the reasons social institutions arise and why some social
practices are given the status of social institutions and others are not, and the reader is referred to
Searle (1995) for more discussion on this topic.
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institution of heterosexual marriage assigns men and women different responsibilities
which reflect the values, expectations and rules attached to that institution. There is
generally an expectation that women will be the nurturing partners in heterosexual
marriages, creating and maintaining a home space and caring for any children
produced by the relationship. These sorts of expectations, arising as they do from
economic and historical traditions, may not be overtly articulated within a society,
but they are nevertheless able to be articulated by all the members of the community
to the extent that deviations from the norm may be identified. In contrast, where
institutions lack clearly articulated values and expectations—and this is particularly
the case for new institutions—when things go wrong, as Babbitt (2001, 73) suggests,
the institution itself may be identified as wrong rather than a particular individual's
behaviour.
Responding to others
When someone is held responsible for someone else it is expected that they
will respond to the other’s needs in some socially determined way. Walker’s
conception of how practices of responsibility fit into morality seems right because it
is in accord with an intuition most of us have that moral practices are in essence
ways of responding to others ethically which are dictated by our relationships with
one another. If an accounting is demanded for some action or inaction the demand
arises from expectations about behaviour which stem in turn from the relationships
involved and how those relationships are played out in practices of responsibility.
Similarly, when judging another’s actions as acceptable or unacceptable the
judgement is made in response to expectations about appropriate responsiveness
which are determined by the relationships involved.
Walker (2007, 113) suggests that an obligation to respond to another arises
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because some individuals are vulnerable to specific others and this relational
dependency creates the moral obligation.148 However, Walker rejects the idea that the
obligation to respond corresponds to innate vulnerabilities, and that our
responsibilities arise simply because some persons are vulnerable to other persons'
actions and choices. Although vulnerabilities may appear to arise independently,
Walker argues that in fact social practices underlie how vulnerabilities are conceived
within any moral system. Instead, she suggests that social relationships are created
and shaped in ways which produce specific vulnerabilities in some individuals to
specific others, for example, children to their biological parents (Walker 2007, 95). It
is our social arrangements, or social notions of responsibility, that create
understandings of vulnerability which in turn create moral obligations, and hence in
moral practice "our vulnerabilities take the forms they do as they are 'fitted' to the
socially normed responsibilities of others" (2007, 96).
The social institution of motherhood, for example, conventionally assumes
that mothers are responsible for the full time care of infants, and most mothers are
presumably happy with this practice given this institutional fact still exists. Although
it cannot be denied that infants are intrinsically vulnerable to others, vulnerability to
their parents is a reflection of social relationships and social practices within a given
society. This becomes clearer if we consider the many ways in which the
construction of infant vulnerability has varied socially, for example, in the historical
use of wet nurses and the present use of nannies to provide primary care to infants.
However, even in Western societies, where paid child care professionals frequently
care for infants for long periods of time, the ultimate responsibility for the child’s
148 Walker is wary of applying a principle of vulnerability whereby we respond to others on the basis
of the other’s vulnerability, arguing that this is an overly simplistic analysis. Instead, Walker
(2007, 90) argues that there exists what she calls "dependency-in-fact", or dependency within a
particular relationship, which creates an obligation to respond. These dependencies arise from
societal arrangements.
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wellbeing continues to reside with the parents, particularly the mother. In Western
societies, where the mother finds the burden of this responsibility overwhelming,
social institutions (for example, child care nurses, counsellors, child protective
agencies) exist to assist her to be able to continue to care for the infant, reflecting the
expectation that with help the mother will acquire the competencies necessary for
being a primary care giver, and intervention to replace her with another carer only
occurs when the parents are shown to fail catastrophically (Walker 2007, 96).149 The
expectation that mothers are in every case the appropriate carer is rarely challenged,
and there is no questioning of the allocation of responsibility at the level of social
practice. Instead, when things do go wrong, the mother, or the failure of society to
respond to her failure, is treated as the problem. This was illustrated in a 2009
Western Australian case, the court heard that the mother committed infanticide
because she was unable to cope. The commentary on the case emphasised the social
resources available to new mothers who struggle with the responsibility but did not
mention that there were other persons, such as the father, who could have taken on
responsibility for the child (Gibson 2009). It is not coincidental that the re-allocation
of the responsibility of primary care for a child occurs only after the legal mother has
failed to fulfil that responsibility. It can be seen from the foregoing that practices of
responsibility, by holding persons accountable in situations in which they inherit
responsibilities as a result of being assigned a particular identity, may place an unfair
burden on some social identities, the implications of which I will consider in more
detail in the remainder of the chapter.
If we accept that an obligation to respond arises not so much from the
vulnerability and necessity of the other, although these are important, but from
149 Walker (2007, 95) suggests that support given to primary care givers, in the form of state welfare,
for example, not only underlies but also serves to propagate the norm that parental duties are
exclusively the responsibility of the child's mother.
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expectations that arise out of our social practices,150 we can begin to appreciate how
problematic the notion of responsibility is for the oppressed. In societies where
individuals are treated unequally or where social institutions are unfair or unjust then
the responsibilities generated may themselves be unfair or unjustly onerous for
members of certain social groups. The vulnerability of persons who experience
systematically unjust practices and social institutions may be heightened as a result
of distorted power relationships, making them even more at risk of burdensome
responsibilities.
The notion that the practice of ethics should be one of responsiveness to
others has both its supporters (for example, Gilligan 1982) and its detractors (for
example, Grimshaw 1986; Houston 1987).151 Hoagland (1988, 221) is one of its
strongest proponents, arguing that responsiveness to others and/or empowering the
other to respond, where the aim is understanding the other rather than agreeing to
their choices and actions, should be central to ethics within lesbian community.152
Hoagland (1988, 121–22) rejects the notion of responsibility as accountability
because she believes it is (mis)interpreted in lesbian community to mean taking
control. If being responsible means taking control over their choices and actions,
then when individual lesbians fail to control the situation they become less
responsive to others, which is detrimental to lesbian community as a whole.
Hoagland (1988, 123) argues that lesbians understand power as control as the result
150 For example, a drowning child may or may not impose an immediate obligation to respond. From a
classical utilitarian perspective there would be no doubt that a drowning child requires an
immediate response from an able bystander. In Walker's (2007, 91) more nuanced analysis, which
considers the context in which the event takes place, such as whether the drowning occurs in the
middle of a war zone, or in a society in which children dying young due to disease or famine is a
regular occurrence, the requirement to respond may be viewed quite differently.
151 This is not to say that its supporters do not see potential problems with an ethics of responsiveness;
for example, Carol Gilligan differentiates responsibility from "self-sacrifice" in developing an
"understanding of the causes of suffering" and an "ability to anticipate which actions are likely to
hurt" (1982, 134).
152 Hoagland (1988) is talking specifically about ethical behaviour within lesbian community. For
another view of ethics as primarily being about understanding the other, see Oliver (2001).
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of living in a patriarchy, so they may assume that the exercise of power requires them
to take control over another. Hoagland's description of lesbian responses in specific
situations suggests that members of subordinate groups may evade questions of
responsibility because they lack control over their ability to respond. However, if
Walker's analysis is correct it suggests that those who try to control the situation they
find themselves in not only misunderstand the nature of power in a social setting, but
they also misconstrue how responsibilities arise. Perhaps the real issue here is the
way in which the construction of rules and expectations hinders the ability of
members of subordinate groups to act responsibly. To use Hoagland's example,
perhaps one reason some lesbians struggle to take responsibility without taking
control is because they apply the values and expectations of the institution of
heteronormative patriarchy to lesbian community. For example, Card notes that "if
lesbian love-making is then regarded as another kind of sexuality, there is the risk of
importing the same values" (1996, 161), that is, the values of oppressive
heteronormative sexual politics.
In the previous sections I considered the socially determined nature of
practices of responsibility and how an obligation to respond to others may be
connected to social constructions of identity and vulnerability. Since, if we accept
Walker's analysis, it would appear that morality itself is imbued with the practices of
responsibility, it may be inevitable that we retain a conception of responsibility
within any ethical program. However, embracing an ethic of responsibility may
require the oppressed to reject some commonly understood aspects of responsibility,
particularly in the sense of being held accountable, where persons can be judged for
their actions and praised or held to blame for acting, or failing to act, in accordance
with normative expectations. I will consider this idea in more detail in the next
section.
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The problematic nature of responsibility for the oppressed
If we understand responsibility as it is understood in the accountable or credit
sense, then moral competence involves understanding who is responsible for what
and to whom in light of shared values; it does not entail reflection on these values or
on the social practices that arise from them. Consequently, who is accountable for
what and to whom is determined at the level of social practice rather than at the level
of moral reflection. It follows that some people are less able than others to give
moral accounts or demand them from others (Walker 2007, 18), placing an unfair
burden on some members of the community. As a result some persons may find
themselves faced with moral obligations that are impossible for them to meet. More
troubling, in non-egalitarian societies it is possible to be morally virtuous, in the
sense that one is compliant with social practices, while at the same time being
complicit with injustices towards others (Calhoun 1989, 389), as Pratt discovered in
uncovering the history of her own racial privilege.
The reasons responsibility-as-accountability is problematic for members of
subordinate groups, both in terms of being held accountable by others and in
demanding accounts from others, are complex. To help explicate these it is necessary
to reiterate the distinction between those who are in "power-laden but distorted
relationships", to use Harvey's (1999, 39) terminology, and those who, while they are
subordinate in an inequitable relationship, do not necessarily suffer oppression, for
example, some employees, medical patients, students. Those in subordinate roles do
not always have the ability to determine what behaviour is acceptable, perhaps
because they lack access to certain knowledges; for example, a patient may not be
able to determine the appropriate level of medical intervention they will receive
because they lack an understanding of the disease, human physiology, or the surgical
and medical treatments available. Lack of knowledge may be experienced as
160
disempowering in certain circumstances; for example, the patient may feel unhappy
about a treatment as a result of not understanding the alternatives, but this is not
usually indicative of an oppressive relationship between themselves and the
physician(s) involved.153 It may also be the case that some of those in subordinate
positions, for example, children, people suffering dementia, and the mentally ill, lack
competence in terms in moral reasoning and, therefore, are unable to determine the
acceptable behaviour in a situation: in the self-constitution view, because they have
not yet developed the capacity for, or are no longer capable of, constructing a self-
narrative. In these cases it is appropriate, and not necessarily indicative of unjust
coercion, for others to take responsibility for their choices.
In these kinds of relationships, although there is an inequality in power, there
may be nothing especially onerous about the subordinate being held to account, for
example, for a policewoman to demand an account of my actions following a traffic
accident. The converse, however, is not true, as the subordinate, like the oppressed,
are often in an inequitable position in demanding an account from those with more
power, and it would be less easy for me to obtain an explanation of the
policewoman's actions following the traffic accident. The inequitable distribution of
power in the kinds of relationships conceived here, parent/child, police/citizen,
doctor/patient, is manifestly a factor in who can demand accounts of whom.154
Therefore, it might seem unremarkable to claim that members of subordinate social
groups likewise suffer from a lack of power in demanding an account from others or
when others demand accounts from them, even when they are praised or blamed for
153Although it can be. A friend who is a nurse described how an Australian Aboriginal woman from a
remote area, transported to a hospital in the city by the Flying Doctor Service, repeatedly removed
a plaster cast from her broken arm because she did not understand the reason for it. Rather than
address her fears (the airplane flight, the big city, the large Western hospital, and the separation
from her traditional lands), medical staff treated her as if she was acting irrationally.
154 I am thinking here of when the oppressed conform to a normative expectation, such as when
women dress to please men. For example, a friend told me that she never purchased revealing
clothes as her husband would not allow her to wear them.
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actions over which they had limited control.155 It is less evident that members of
subordinate groups may also suffer from the presumption of moral incompetence
and/or the absence of epistemic credibility. For example, it may be assumed that they
cannot possess certain knowledges, or, alternatively, that the knowledges they do
possess are not relevant to moral reasoning.156
While being held accountable for things over which one has no control may
be onerous, it can be equally harmful to deny that someone has the ability to give an
account of themselves. Sometimes members of subordinate groups, by reason of
their subordination, are treated as though they lack moral competence and cannot
claim responsibility or be held responsible for their actions. I have already mentioned
that there are those who are not expected to take responsibility for their own actions,
and hence are not held accountable by others. Children, persons suffering from
dementia, and the mentally ill may be deemed by others either incapable of the moral
reflection necessary for acting responsibility, and/or the ability to act successfully on
their moral deliberations. When the moral competence of members of subordinate
groups is questioned on the basis of their perceived inability to deliberate morally or
to act in particular ways, then their moral accounts may likewise be considered
comparable to those given by children, the senile or the insane. For example,
historically when women failed to act in accordance with social norms they may
have been deemed mad rather than acting in accordance with non-normative values
because the values they espoused conflicted with the social expectations of the
times.157
In addition to the difficulties already mentioned, in a moral system which
155 The oppressed may be held accountable for the actions of others over which they have little or no
control, such as when women are held responsible for rape because of the way they dress or
behave, according to Elizabeth Boskey's 2010 UK study of attitudes towards rape (quoted in King
2011, 35).
156 See Fricker (2007) for examples of this.
157 For example, see Phyllis Chesler (2005) Women and Madness.
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interprets responsibility as accountability, members of subordinate groups may be
automatically disadvantaged because they may be considered less worthy members
of the moral community. They may not be considered worthy of respect in the same
way as other members of the community and this unequal playing field may make it
problematic for them to be responsible in the sense of being held accountable, since
neither they nor their concerns are taken seriously. Devaluation of a social group may
also make it impossible for some persons to stand by their identities and
relationships, particularly when these are depicted in mainstream discourse as
normatively deviant. For example, the portrayal of gays and lesbians as morally
defective may make it difficult for these individuals to stand behind these sexual
identities, causing gays and lesbians to pass as heterosexual. Sometimes devaluation
of a group is used as an excuse to deny members of that group some benefit, for
example, historically, the depreciation of female intelligence was used as the
justification for denying higher education to women.158 In addition, feelings of being
devalued may be internalised by group members who may then consider themselves
morally inferior or flawed, causing them to act in ways which are contrary to the
rules and expectations of the broader community.
A more subtle impediment to exercising moral agency occurs when members
of subordinate groups are expected to meet expectations arising out of values held by
privileged groups which are inimical to the subordinate group’s own wellbeing or
contrary to their value system. For example, indigenous people may be stereotyped
as ignorant and stupid and impossible to educate, but the education provided may be
in the language and cultural traditions of the coloniser. Indigenous people are often
158Although providing women with an advanced education was also considered a waste of resources
as women were intended for tasks not seen as requiring formal education, such as child rearing.
Educating those intended for menial tasks or those of lower social classes may also be seen as
problematic, since a better informed sub-class may lead to revolt. In developing nations today girls
often miss out on education due to a more subtle form of discrimination; when parents have the
resources to educate one child they commonly choose to educate a son (UNICEF 2005).
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expected to put aside the history of dislocation from language, culture and land, and
to conform to the values of the colonisers. Rarely are the colonisers' actions or the
history of interactions between colonisers and indigenous communities
acknowledged in considering who is held accountable and for what. Members of
subordinate social groups are commonly held accountable to the same standards as
the privileged while being deprived of the same advantages, a technique which keeps
them focused on their own individual shortcomings. Success or failure becomes a
matter of individual strengths or weaknesses, deterring the oppressed from joining in
common causes or questioning how the presumption of individual responsibility
benefits the privileged by maintaining the hierarchical status quo.
From the preceding discussion, it can be seen that notions of being held
accountable, praise and blame are highly problematic from the standpoint of
members of subordinate groups for a number of reasons.159 Inequitable social
practices may result in unjust or unfair assignment of responsibilities, making any
demand for an account unduly onerous. Members of subordinate groups may be
deemed morally incompetent or less competent and unable to reason and respond to
demands for accounts; therefore, they may not be offered the chance to account for
their actions, or their demands to be heard may be ignored. Devaluation of members
of subordinate groups and their knowledges may result in them being unable to offer
an explanation for their actions because they are considered unreliable or
unbelievable, or their accounts are not offered in the language of the privileged.
Finally, for the reasons given above, and because they are comparatively less
powerful, members of subordinate groups may not be able to demand an account
from others, particularly from the privileged, so that for members of some social
159 Compare Barbara Houston (1992), who argues against eschewing the concept of blame on the
grounds that doing so diminishes, rather than enhances, moral agency.
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groups being held accountable is a one-way process.
The care-taking sense of responsibility
Considering the problems identified for members of subordinate groups, the
concept of responsibility can be seen as setting up a conundrum of sorts, which
feminists need to address: how to conceptualise responsibility within an ethics of
resistance in a way that not only allows for agency and autonomy but does not
contribute further to oppression?  Although there have been arguments for dispensing
with the concept of responsibility, particularly notions of responsibility-as-
accountability and praise and blame, in regard to members of subordinate groups,160
there are also compelling reasons offered for retaining some aspects of responsibility
within an ethical theory. Walker (2007) offers one such defence, which I discussed
earlier in this chapter, in her description of how moral values and expectations are
expressed in the assignment of moral responsibilities.
Card's (1996, 28) care-taking sense of responsibility—in which taking
responsibility involves making a commitment to a project, value or relationship—
suggests an alternative way of thinking about responsibility, and one that may be
more acceptable to those who feel socially disempowered. To make a commitment
does not merely indicate giving support to a project, it also requires making any
necessary follow-through should one neglect or fail to fulfil a commitment. As
Cheshire Calhoun explains, "standing for something is not just a matter of personal
identification with certain values; it is also a matter of insisting on the endorsability
of those values" (1995, 246; italics in original). If this is the case, then such a
160 See, for example, Paul Benson (2004, 185) who suggests that since assigning responsibilities itself
plays an oppressive role, we would be better served by moving beyond responsibility attribution
and blame, and their associated dilemmas, into alternative modes of moral address; and Hoagland
(1988) who argues that practices of accountability and blame are counter-productive in lesbian
community, since they keep the focus on self rather than the relationship(s) involved.
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commitment implies that we have reflected upon and decided for these values. It
implies not only affirmation but also a willingness to recommend or ratify the values
in some way, to take action in support of a commitment. Taking responsibility in this
sense is not simply a matter of being resigned to the outcome of our actions. It is not
enough to stand by one's decisions, if by that is meant being prepared to own the
outcome of our actions. Neither is it simply a matter of having a belief in something.
Taking responsibility is not simply something we think or feel, rather it is an active
practice. It is not enough, for example, to say 'I stand by what I did'; we must be
prepared to take action to ameliorate any harmful effects of that action.
Another way of thinking about this is to say that by standing behind our
practices we are showing moral integrity of a kind described by Walker (2007, 113)
as "reliable accountability". As Walker understands it, integrity is not so much a
reflection of moral principles as it is an indicator of our dependable responsiveness
to others. By this, Walker does not mean giving unlimited access to another,161 or
even that we will always be responsive in the same way in the same relationship,
since not only do relationships change over time but we may be ''differently reliable''
(2007, 124), depending not only on the relationship but on what is at stake. That our
accountability in different situations varies is obvious if we consider how differently
we behave in different relationships and how even within one relationship we may
respond differently at different times and under different circumstances. Walker
argues that although these differences in accountability sometimes reflect
inconsistency, more frequently they attest to what is important to us at that moment
with respect to that particular relationship.
Walker's understanding of integrity, like Card's care-taking conception of
161 There is a whole argument here about the ethic of care and women's role as care-givers in
patriarchal societies which I do not have space to discuss in detail. Readers are referred to Peta
Bowden (2000) for an overview of the discussion.
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taking responsibility, emphasises how we respond when things go wrong as well as
what we can bring to a situation or relationship at the outset. Acting with integrity is
sometimes thought of as showing morally exemplary behaviour, but few people (if
any) manage to live their lives without letting someone down, somewhere, at some
time. Moral integrity is as much about facing up to our moral inadequacies and
making some attempt to make amends for our choices and actions as it is about
trying to do the right thing in the first place. If we are differently reliable, as Walker
claims, it may mean we are not responsive in the way we once were; consequently,
we may need to respond to the damage that occurs as a result. For example, if
changes to our circumstances, such as illness or a new relationship, make it difficult
to be there for a friend in the way we were in the past then this needs addressing.
Instances of integrity are often identified in specific, impressive performances,
particularly when a person admits to involvement in choices or actions that were
damaging to others, and if the admission could easily have been avoided, or if the
person taking responsibility was not the one directly to blame (Walker 2007, 124–
25). The reparative responses made when damage results from our choices are part of
being reliably responsive to others.
The care-taking approach to taking responsibility suggests a solution of sorts
to the many problems inequitable and oppressive power relationships create for the
less powerful in terms of justification of their choices, but it also contains a
conundrum of sorts, which is how to make those same choices understandable to
others. If the care-taking approach requires persons to recommend or ratify their
choices, which may be non-normative, then it requires them to be able to offer an
explanation of their choices to others, in other words, to make themselves intelligible
to others. I will consider what is required for intelligibility and the potential problems
with this approach in the remainder of this chapter.
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Intelligibility and the role of self-knowledge
The idea of making oneself understood as a means of taking responsibility for
one's choices is not only implicit in Card's care-taking approach to responsibility, it is
also explicitly argued for as an alternative to justification-based approaches by
Hoagland (1988). Hoagland develops an idea suggested by Frye (in Hoagland 1988,
221), that, rather than appealing to notions of accountability or justification with
regard to moral choices, members of subordinate groups should develop a concept of
intelligibility. The concept of making oneself intelligible as a means of taking
responsibility appeals to Hoagland because it avoids those potentially coercive
situations in inequitable societies of some persons demanding accounts of others
when those others may not be able to make similar demands.
The concept of intelligibility requires being able to offer explanations for
one's choices, and hence it necessitates a degree of self-reflection and self-
understanding (Hoagland 1988, 223);162 it also requires being "willing to situate
ourselves in such a way that others who make choices different from ours can be
intelligible to us" (Frye in Hoagland 1988, 226). There are two distinct aspects at
play here: firstly, self-knowledge and self-understanding and the ability to convey an
explanation for actions so that responsibility can be taken for them; and secondly, a
way of positioning ourselves in order to hear and understand the actions and choices
of others that may be different from those actions we might take and choices we
might make.163 This kind of repositioning of the self is made possible if we
162 I have already suggested in Chapter Three that there are limits to self-knowledge arising from one's
embodiment and from one's social positioning, particularly in inequitable societies, and these
epistemological limitations circumscribe the applicability of the concept.
163 Hoagland (1988) distinguishes three different aspects of intelligibility: being able to offer
explanations for our own choices; understanding others' choices, in particular those we do not
approve of; and being able to perceive what others perceive. I would argue that the second of these
is subsumed by the third, since if we can see from the other's standpoint then we can begin to
understand their choices, including those we do not agree with. For example, understanding the
fear and isolation of being a battered wife may help us to understand why a woman remains with
her partner.
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understand identity as situational, as I suggested in Chapter Three. Because the
concept of intelligibility contains these two aspects it implies a degree of mutuality,
and may require persons to consider both their own social positioning as well as their
perception of others' social positioning. I will consider the first of these aspects in
this section and the second aspect in the next section when I look at the role played
by ethical attending—or fully attending to one another in a non-judgemental way—
in making oneself intelligible.
Because persons have to be able to convey reasons for their choices,
appropriate self-knowledge would appear to be the minimum requirement for making
those choices, and the persons making them, intelligible to others. If appropriate self-
knowledge is the minimal requirement for making oneself intelligible to others, it
elicits the question: what barriers might exist to the requisite self-awareness and self-
understanding?164 For members of subordinate groups a significant impediment to
self-knowledge is the distortion of their identities, emotions and experiences in
mainstream discourses and social practices. In the previous chapter, I discussed how
embodiment might limit what some persons can know about themselves, giving the
person a distorted sense of self and view of the world, and resulting in interpretations
and explanations of their behaviour which may be misleading. Another example is
that members of subordinate groups may be denied the expression of certain feelings,
such as anger, and consequently may have difficulty identifying and naming these
emotions.165Alternatively, members of subordinate groups may not be able to
legitimately express their emotions or the moral attitudes that accompany them in
164 Butler (2005, 85) casts doubt on whether we can have appropriate self-knowledge, or perhaps more
accurately, she argues for a notion of responsibility which acknowledges the limits of self-
knowledge, since the other is implicated in the formation of the self and we cannot claim to fully
know the other.
165 See, for example, Frye (1983, 84–94); Lorde (1984, 145–75); Campbell (1994); and Spelman
(1989, 264) Frye and Spelman both mention how women's anger is reinterpreted as hysteria,
craziness or rage.
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ways that are meaningful to others within certain contexts, such as when they are in
the presence of members of privileged groups in the public domain.166As a result,
the only legitimate expression of the feelings of members of subordinate groups may
occur in private, where it may be misdirected against other members of their own
group or at members of other subordinate groups.167 If "social hierarchies are
maintained by outlawing some emotional responses on the part of members of
disesteemed groups" (Calhoun 1999b, 223) then, conversely, recognising the
expression of those emotions, particularly anger, is to recognise that the person is
"authorized to judge wrongdoing" (Calhoun 1999b, 224), and, hence, is a member of
equal standing in the moral community.
Not only does intelligibility require persons to offer an explanation for their
behaviour and choices, and thus take ownership of what they have done, it also
requires an agreed normative framework within which those choices and actions
make sense. This mutually understood "scheme of social interaction" (Calhoun
1999a, 83) allows persons to measure themselves against community standards and
justify their choices and behaviour because there is agreement about what behaviour
is considered praiseworthy or blameworthy. These schemata of social behaviour are
integral to the structuring of societies: they not only set standards of behaviour but
they also dictate what virtues are considered essential for members of different social
groups to live morally exemplary lives, something I will return to in Chapter Five.
Where there is no such mutual agreement as to what constitutes normative
166 On a train journey in Perth, Western Australia, I once witnessed the near paralysis of response from
a predominantly white audience to an Aboriginal man's vocal anger against whites. As a white
member of his audience I was silenced both by the legitimacy of his anger and by my own feelings
of indignation at being confronted in a 'safe', that is, predominantly white, place. I will return to
the importance of place for resisting oppression, which I discussed in Chapter Three, in the final
chapter.
167 Lorde talks about how anger at racist attitudes among whites can be suppressed by white women
because they are afraid of expressing it to other whites; the unexpressed anger is then redirected
"at the first woman of Color who talks about racism" (1984, 127).
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behaviour, it is difficult for individuals to stand behind a social institution or to make
their choices intelligible to others. For example, resistance to the idea of gay
marriage reflects normative expectations arising from shared understandings, in
terms of behaviour and values, of what constitutes the institution of marriage. The
idea of gay marriage not only challenges the social institution of (heterosexual)
marriage, it also challenges those underlying, sometimes unstated, agreements of
moral rightness, which in this case inform a particular moral view in which
heterosexuality is morally acceptable behaviour. Standing behind a choice of gay
marriage is often difficult because there are no socially agreed values as to what
constitutes gay marriage, and this is in part because there is as yet no social
institution with rules against which people can compare their own behaviour and
determine if they are going right or wrong (Babbitt 2001, 73). However, if we recall,
from the earlier section on the institutional nature of responsibility, that institutions
are manifest in institutional facts which continue to have an existence only because
they are recognised and accepted, then the potential always exists for these facts to
be rejected and new facts come into existence. Therefore, although there may be
barriers within existing institutions for the acceptance of certain behaviours because
they are non-normative, the acceptance or rejection of behaviours within societies is
dependent upon institutions which are themselves open to changing or even ceasing
to be.
It is possible for a person to have appropriate self-knowledge to be able to
convey the reasons for their actions without others being able to comprehend why
they act as they do. That this is the case is often, but not always, indicative of
inequitable power relationships. For example, the manager of a company may be
unable to understand or may be dismissive of the reasons given by their employees
for going on strike, either because these reasons contradict their own beliefs about
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appropriate work conditions or because the employees' claims lack credibility in their
eyes, perhaps because the claims are made by subordinates who the manager feels
lack epistemological authority.168 While an employer/employee relationship in
Western countries is normally free of violent coercion, in situations of oppression
this inequity in power between the respective positions is significant because, while
the powerful command attention and audience by the authority of their position, the
subordinate may struggle to be heard at all, much less understood. Where a person is
attempting to explain the motivation for their choices or actions that deviate from
standard social practices there is a danger that the explanation given may be distorted
by normative expectations. Standing behind normatively transgressive practices
involves the risk of being misunderstood and the possibility of moral failure. I will
discuss this in more detail in my discussion later in this chapter on giving moral
accounts.
This problem of (un)intelligibility is described by Fricker as hermeneutical
injustice, or the injustice that arises "when a gap in collective interpretive resources
puts someone at an unfair disadvantage when it comes to making sense of their social
experiences" (2007, 1).169As a result, who and what we are and the choices we make
may not fit the explanatory frameworks available to us. For example, in Beloved,
Sethe is unable to offer an explanation for killing her children that makes sense
within the norms of a slave-owning society, both because killing children is at odds
with normative understandings of a mother's love, and, conversely, because a slave
and her children are property, and if her loving them is understood to be the same as
a mother loving her children it challenges the notion that she and her children are
168 I will return to the question of epistemological credibility later in this chapter.
169 Rebecca Mason disputes this analysis, arguing that "marginalised groups can be silenced relative to
dominant discourses without being prevented from understanding or expressing their own social
experiences" (2011, 301); however, I agree with Fricker insofar as having certain ways of knowing
denied by mainstream discourses creates uncertainty about the validity of these experiences even
when they are affirmed by other members of one's own group.
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merely property (Babbitt 1994, 10–11). Sethe's claims (to personhood, to being
morally responsible for her children) are frightening to others because they represent
a challenge to the social status quo (Babbitt 2001, 144), which denies subjectivity
and agency to slaves. Consequently, to take responsibility by making oneself
intelligible to others may involve an epistemological challenge,170 a task which
involves envisioning a reality different from this one (Babbitt 2001),171 one in which
one's actions are open to an alternative interpretation. The point here is not simply
that dominant discourses effectively silence some experiences or knowledges, for
example, the way women are often invisible and unheard in boardrooms or seminars.
Instead, the argument is that the socio-political reality may deprive some individuals
of explanatory power because there is no shared framework within which those
individuals' experiences make sense to others. Therefore, for those individuals to
take responsibility for their practices, including those they reject, may require them
to re-examine practices "at the level of meaning and definition" (Card 1996, 148). I
will discuss the problem of unintelligibility arising from standing behind normatively
transgressive practices and its implications for taking responsibility by making
oneself intelligible in more detail in Chapter Five.
Perhaps rather than requiring a shared explanatory framework, the concept of
mutual intelligibility minimally presupposes a community sympathetic to the notion
that we are all capable of reflecting upon and rejecting or adopting particular values
and making choices in accordance with those values.172 This would suggest that
170 This is a separate claim to the argument that marginal identities are epistemically privileged.
171 In Babbitt's terminology it requires an act of imagination. I find Babbitt's arguments for how
imagination transforms moral understandings compelling, but see Mavis Biss (2013) for a detailed
critique of Babbitt's position.
172 With a few exemptions, for example, children, the insane or the senile. Interestingly, diseases such
as Alzheimer's disease and dementia progress by destroying memory, both of oneself and one's
history, and of one's knowledge of the world and how one's body interacts with the world, making
it impossible for the sufferer to hold onto any notion of self and past, and, consequently,
impossible to support a project or relationship; those afflicted frequently disavow the relationships
that previously sustained their life choices (Dosa 2010).
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intelligibility minimally requires all of us being open to, and willing to engage with,
others in a way that is both attentive to, and respectful of, difference. While we may
neither agree with another's values and motivations, nor be sympathetic to those
values, neither of these conditions is essential for the reasons for another's choices
and actions to be made clear. It follows that if we do not necessarily have to agree
with the choices others make then trying to understand another's reasons does not
prevent us from making judgements about their choices and actions. However, we do
this with a greater understanding and knowledge of both who the person is and why
they act as they do. Another way of describing this is that intelligibility does not
imply the uncritical acceptance or rejection of the other's point of view; rather, it
suggests a mutual working-through of difference,173 particularly difference(s) that we
may find threatening (Oliver 2001, 10) because we have internalised stereotypes of
social identities.174 Rather than casting a 'veil of ignorance' over one another,
intelligibility requires that we see the other in all their particularity, and discriminate
without prejudice.
In this section I have considered the first aspect of intelligibility, that of
gaining and conveying self-awareness and self-knowledge in order to make oneself
and one's choices understandable to others. The second aspect I referred to involves
positioning oneself in such a way that the choices and actions of others make sense.
In the next section I will consider the circumstances necessary for this to occur,
including the potential drawbacks to ethically attending that result from power
imbalances in relationships.
173 Oliver (2001, 10) argues that the Freudian notion of working-through is required by any theory of
social transformation.
174 This can be seen in the example discussed later in this chapter, where a man does something
criminally wrong because of his commitment to a transgendered partner. Without working-through
the (possibly threatening) difference of this relationship, there may be no mutual understanding.
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Power imbalances and attention-giving
In the previous section I suggested that the difficulties involved in obtaining
appropriate self-knowledge may impair intelligibility. In this section I will address
what I see as the main difficulty faced by those with subordinate social identities in
wanting to make themselves intelligible to others, which is that power imbalances
between subordinate and privileged social identities in inequitable societies produce
a corresponding imbalance in attention-giving toward the privileged. Where
inequalities of attention giving and receiving are constitutive of social institutions
because of inequalities of power, it may be difficult to uncover these without
questioning the very nature of the institution itself. One of the difficulties in
considering these imbalances of power and the consequential imbalance in attention-
giving is that, as I explored in more detail in Chapter One, they are not necessarily
indicative of unjustly coercive or oppressive relationships. For example,
relationships of attention-giving in which the majority of power rests with one party,
such as students giving attention to a teacher, patients attending to doctors, citizens
attending to police, may be neither coercive nor oppressive. The difference seems to
be that although someone is in a subordinate position in each of these relationships
they are not necessarily subordinate on account of a social identity arising from a
non-voluntary group membership. This becomes clearer if we elaborate on one of
these examples and ask what the doctor's duty is if they are a white practitioner in a
remote Australian Aboriginal community. In these kinds of situations, where the
relationship between the one attending and the one attended is complicated by
histories of discrimination and injustice, the subsequent imbalance in who is
attending to whom can lead to further injustices or harms, as was seen in the
experience of the traditional Indigenous Australian woman in a Western hospital
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described earlier in this chapter.175
In contrast to the inequalities in attention-giving that arise out of non-
oppressive relationships, Frye has suggested that the non-reciprocal nature of
attention-giving in oppressive relationships is a reflection upon who is considered a
real person and who is considered merely an object. Frye (1983, 171) describes the
invisibility and silencing of women in heteronormative patriarchal societies as
arising from the way in which women are background to the lives of men, rather than
being equal members of the moral community. In societies in which discrimination is
present in many forms, persons with social identities that are discriminated against,
such as women, people of colour, lesbians and gays, people with disabilities, and
older people, may find themselves the backdrop against which the lives of 'real'
people, those given agency, are played out. Lugones vividly describes this experience
when she writes of the dominant: "they ignore us, ostracise us, render us invisible,
stereotype us, leave us completely alone, interpret us as crazy. All of this while we
are in their midst" (1987, 7). An example shows how deep-seated this foregrounding
of some groups can be, where being asked to switch attention to another group
requires explanation because it is not self-evident that members of subordinate
groups should merit attention. In a television interview, Toni Morrison was asked by
the interviewer when she would write a book that focussed on white people (Wendt
1998).176 The implication seems to have been that no-one, not even a black woman
writer, could find the topic of black women's lives interesting enough to write about
for their whole career; at some point they would have to address themselves to the
175 Often the injustice is compounded because of the systematic nature of discrimination. In cases of
domestic violence in Australia victims can apply to the court for a Violence Restraining Order
(VRO) to protect themselves from an abusive partner. However, for VROs to be effective they
have to be enforced; the lack of enforcement points to institutionalised failure to take domestic
violence within the police force (and society as a whole) seriously.
176 The frankly racist nature of the question was not recognised by the white interviewer until
Morrison pointed this out for her.
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lives of 'real' persons, that is, white people.
Being intelligible to others requires that persons are able to construct a
narrative of identity, relationships and values (Walker 2007, 116–121) which makes
it possible to identify their choices and actions as arising from authentic desires, but
the notion also presupposes that someone is addressed, even if that someone is the
internal addressable other. Given a relational understanding of the self the meaning
of one's choices and relationships can only ensue with input from both self and the
other. Consequently, Frye suggests that as well as making ourselves understandable
to others, the concept of intelligibility requires that we situate ourselves in such a
way that we can understand the different choices of others. The repositioning of the
self required by the situational approach is similar to Lugones's notion of locating
ourselves in another's world in order to better understand both their identities and
their choices. By situating ourselves in a way which is both open and non-
judgemental we can hear others without succumbing to discriminatory or prejudicial
notions. Such a stance is an ethical response and requires a critical engagement with
the other; it is not simply a matter of unthinking acceptance or agreement with the
other. The person attending is responsible for the moral narrative at this point to the
same extent that a midwife is responsible for the birth of a child, that is, not for the
events that have led to the story being told but for facilitating the telling of the story
in a way which is attentive and responsive to the process.
Ideally, attending ethically to empower the other involves a transformation on
the part of the one attending, not in terms of who they are and the biases and
prejudices they may unconsciously adopt from being members of a non-egalitarian
society, but in terms of their awareness of these unexamined preconceptions.
Therefore, attending to the other is self-reflective but it is also an act of love, and it is
not possible to love the other while seeing the other arrogantly (Lugones 1987, 8).
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Seeing the other arrogantly means seeing the other merely as a reflection of oneself,
much as Toni Morrison's interviewer did, seeing not a black woman writer with
stories stemming from the identity, relationships and values of a black woman but a
woman who puzzlingly refused to grant white people's lives prominence. In contrast,
the "loving eye" "is the eye of one who knows that to know the seen, one must
consult something other than one's own will and interests and fears and imagination"
(Frye 1983, 75). It is reflexive in the sense of being aware of oneself but it is selfless
or passive in the sense of abandoning one's preconceptions, not in the sense of losing
one's particularity but of being able to actively suspend the biases that stem from
being who one is in the relationships and with the values that one has. Or, perhaps a
better way of putting it than 'suspend one's prejudices' is as the active 'letting go' of
what one thinks one knows. It seems to me that this requires us to do something
essentially contradictory:  it requires being able to see difference where one could
only see one's own reflection before, and at the same time see one's likeness to the
other where the other's difference had previously clouded one's vision. To be able to
see the other's essential humanity and see the other's difference all in the same gaze
is to move beyond recognition in order for there to be a true acknowledgement of
difference (Oliver 2001). For example, Hoagland appears to me to be arguing for
intelligibility within lesbian communities on the basis that all lesbians share common
values, but Hoagland's own examples—which include lesbians with disabilities,
lesbians of colour and older lesbians—indicate that difference is inescapable even
within like-minded communities. Acknowledging difference within social groups and
across social identities is a prerequisite for an ethic of care-taking responsibility
based upon a plurality of identities and selves.
Frye's description of the loving eye suggests that an awareness of one's
situation is the basis of the kind of moral perception necessary for the attention-
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giving required for ethical attending to work. The moral perception necessary in
order to live in terms of the principle of good was called by Iris Murdoch "loving
attention", by which she referred to "the idea of a just and loving gaze directed upon
individual reality" (1970, 34). Bridget Clarke (2003, 126) identifies Murdoch's
description of perception of individual realities with Frye's description of a kind of
perception in which the perceiver is able to discern patterns in their lives because
they share common experiences with others. According to Clarke, this kind of
situational pattern-perception is implicit in Murdoch's account of the perception of
individual realities, whose agent must be sensitive to social patterns if they are
"going to appear capable of clearsightedness" (2003, 123). Another way of thinking
about this is that loving attention is a kind of critical positioning in which persons
have an awareness of themselves and others as plural selves, each with their own
particularity and embedded in a particular social reality, in which some of those
selves may be privileged and some oppressed. Developing an awareness of one's
multiple self is, therefore, not only the first step towards moral competency, as I
argued in Chapter Three; it may also be a necessary stage in displaying moral agency
through making oneself intelligible to oneself and others.
In the last two sections I have considered the two main aspects which affect
intelligibility: having appropriate self-knowledge and being able to convey this to
others, and situating oneself in such a way that one can hear accounts given by
others. I have also considered a number of potential barriers to ethically attending
arising from inequitable power relationships and the impact this can have on persons
making themselves intelligible to others. In the final part of this chapter I will use the
example of the actions taken by the character Sonny in the film Dog Day Afternoon
(1975), which is based on a true story, to look in more detail at the kind of moral
accounts given by members of subordinate groups and how these accounts relate to
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taking responsibility by making oneself intelligible to others.
Giving moral accounts
Taking responsibility for oneself and one's choices by making oneself
intelligible to others entails giving moral accounts. The kind of accounts persons give
will vary depending on the situation, particularly on the relationships involved
between the person giving the account and those who are attending to the account.
Moral narratives reveal the values that are important to us, those we are most
committed to, because they are present in the relationships and things we have
chosen to support. No-one can be infinitely responsive to others' needs; instead we
are all selective about what relationships and causes we choose to support, and these
choices are reflected in the narratives we construct about who we are and how we
have come to be this person, and what is important to us.
The kind of moral accounts given by members of oppressed groups, none of
which claims to be the definitive account of being, for example, gay, black and
female, or female and Jewish and middle-class, makes it possible to challenge
hegemonic discourses because accounts of marginalised identities, relationships and
values are antagonistic to totalising discourses.
I mentioned in Chapter Three that people make sense of events and
experience and are affirmed in their humanity by gaining acknowledgement of these
experiences from the addressable other who is normally another person but who may
be internalised. Since, as I explained in Chapter Three, in cases of extreme
oppression the addressable other is denied, then telling these kinds of stories to one
another is central to being considered an equal in the moral community. Moral
accounts play a significant role in the exercise of moral agency because not only are
they the basic form of representation for moral problems (Walker 2007, 116), but we
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cannot conceive of situations responsibly without knowing the before and after, how
the individuals involved got there, including what values and obligations propelled
them into their choices and actions.
In suggesting that giving moral accounts is central to moral agency, I am not
endorsing the accountable approach to responsibility. Instead, I would argue that the
care-taking kind of responsibility, which involves persons actively supporting the
identities, relationships and projects they invest with value, lends itself naturally to
the concept of making oneself intelligible through moral narratives. How choices are
presented to ourselves and others is important in making them intelligible, and this
usually results from a story we tell about our motivations and desires. In other words,
conveying the reasons for following a particular course of action reveals the practices
and values the person is standing behind, and this makes their behaviour more
intelligible. For example, if someone robs a bank and offers no explanation we would
be inclined to proffer reasons for their action, perhaps condemning the act as
criminal and wrong, and the person as immoral and greedy. However, in the movie
Dog Day Afternoon the knowledge that Sonny is robbing a bank in order to raise the
money to pay for a sex change operation for his partner may make us moderate our
response, since while we may neither condone his actions nor fully comprehend his
reasons for acting in this manner we can at least acknowledge that his actions stem
from values that are important to him even if they are not values we share. If Sonny's
behaviour is to count as taking responsibility for his actions in the care-taking sense,
he must be able to show a commitment to particular relationships, practices and
values, which make his action in robbing the bank apprehensible—if not
commendable—to others. In other words, his actions have to show integrity in terms
of the values he espouses. If what he considers most important is that he is, in
Walker's phrase, reliably dependable in terms of his actions with regard to his closest
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relationships, it may be more comprehensible that he feels obliged to do everything
within his power to support his partner, even if this requires him forsaking some of
his other values.
I stated earlier that we cannot conceive of situations responsibly without
having the full picture of what has gone before and what will occur later, and we can
only arrive at this knowledge through ethically attending to the other. For example,
an ethical viewer would need to bring an awareness of their biases to their response
to the unconventional relationship between Sonny and his transgendered partner in
Dog Day Afternoon in order to maintain a critical stance in relation to Sonny's
actions which is unencumbered by identity prejudice. Sonny makes the decision to
rob a bank because he feels obliged to take responsibility for his partner's need to
have a sex change operation; his actions grow out of responsibility for someone he
cares about and are implicated in a relationship in which the other person's
embodiment is at odds with their sense of self. Although it may be easier to
understand the motivations of those with whom we share values, this does not mean
that we cannot relate to those whose values differ from our own, as long as we can
agree that those values are sufficient motivation for the agent to act. Even if the
viewer does not share either Sonny's, or his transgendered partner's, values—insofar
as the viewer may not see value in a relationship with a transgendered person or they
may not see the desire to have a sex change operation as an authentic desire because
they cannot comprehend someone not feeling at home in their body—they may still
relate to his story because they can understand the notion that relationships bring
specific obligations which persons invested in the relationship have a duty to respond
to. By ethically attending to the other we may be able to understand the obligations
that compel them to act as they do, even if we disagree about the action to be taken
to fulfil those obligations.
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It may appear from the example of Sonny that, for the care-taking sense of
responsibility, morals are relative to the individual, that there are no overarching
values that we should all ascribe to, and someone acts for the good if they act
according to their most important values. It may also appear that Sonny has simply
selected between two types of moral reasoning: the rightness or wrongness of
stealing from banks versus the importance of taking responsibility for a relationship,
the so-called justice versus care styles of reasoning. It is my contention that the
actual process of moral reasoning is more complicated than it may appear from the
example given. Each of us, in every moment, makes choices which potentially curtail
other possibilities.177 In addition, since no-one can be responsive to all the demands
made upon them, we each need to be selective between competing values in order to
respond to anyone at all. In every decision we make we prioritise one value over
another, according to what we see as most important in that situation, a decision that
reflects on who we are and how we see ourselves. What makes the account of
Sonny's actions credible is that we can imagine an alternative scenario where he is
unable to break the law to obtain the money, not because the relationship with his
partner is less important but because he values himself as someone who abides by the
laws of his society and this value is integral to his sense of self.
I have suggested that Sonny may not see himself as someone who breaks the
law and steals money, and he may regret having to do so, but he may find it easier to
reconcile his actions and his beliefs if he holds in higher regard another value which
is only achievable by robbing a bank. There is a counter argument here that there are
alternative ways of standing by his relationship than robbing a bank to raise the
money for his partner's sex change operation. It could also be argued, as is done by
177 Peter Howitt's (1998) film Sliding Doors gives a dramatic example of how one choice can cut off
other possibilities.
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the girl, Amy, in response to the Heinz dilemma,178 that breaking the law may have a
detrimental effect on Sonny's most important relationship, the one he is most
concerned to support. In response to these criticisms I am going to suggest that
Sonny acts as he does because he stands behind a relationship which was not
acknowledged as legitimate either morally or legally at the time, and that because
their practices are normatively transgressive the oppressed may not be able to openly
own the values, identities and relationships which are most important to them. Sonny
may either not be able to see alternatives, or the alternatives available to others may
not be available to him, and the choice may indeed be an oppositional one between
robbing or not robbing a bank.179 Because Sonny is in a normatively transgressive
relationship it may not be possible for him to go to his family or a financial
institution and request a loan for the operation since to do so would require him to
own the relationship publicly. Consequently, in considering what action to take to
make his partner happy, Sonny may not see many options available to obtain the
money required, either because he could not see them, or because they were not
available to him because he did not conform to normative expectations.
In response to the Heinz dilemma, Amy questions whether Heinz should
steal, not just because it is wrong to break the law, but because if he is caught and
jailed he would be no longer be able to care for his wife (Gilligan 1982, 28).180
Similarly, one could also question whether Sonny is right not only in putting his own
freedom at risk but also in potentially depriving his partner of his support. One
178 The classic moral problem, the Heinz dilemma, involves a man needing expensive medication for
his dying wife. He is faced with the decision whether or not to steal the medication when he
cannot raise the money to purchase it. See Gilligan (1982, 25–26).
179 Victims of domestic violence who kill sleeping partners give accounts that suggest they feel as if
they had no other option than kill or be killed, although those around them believe they could have
sought help from friends or authorities, or that they could have left the violent relationship.
Because the threat is not "imminent", whether their actions are considered "excessive self-defence"
or "killing for preservation" varies depending on the jurisdiction (Sheehy, Stubbs, and Tolmie,
2012), suggesting that this is as much a legal grey area as it is a moral grey zone.
180 Gilligan says of Amy that she sees in the dilemma "not a math problem with humans but a
narrative of relationships that extends over time" (1982, 28).
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response to these arguments is that sometimes it is simply the case that a relationship
is valued so much that the other person's health and happiness outweigh any negative
consequences of the action to the agent. It is clear, however, that, as with Sethe's
decision to kill her child, the explanatory framework available does not allow Sonny
to make his actions intelligible, since the values he holds are at odds with the
expectations of a heteronormative society. To make himself understood means
uncovering the prejudices of heterosexuality as an institution, just as any explanation
Sethe makes requires her to unpack the institutionalised inhumanity of slavery.
The potential moral accounts given by Sonny in Dog Day Afternoon point to
the problem of normative difference as a possible drawback to the notion of making
our choices and ourselves intelligible to others as a way of taking responsibility. In
the previous section I suggested another possible drawback to this approach to taking
responsibility for members of subordinate groups is that the power imbalance
between privileged and subordinate aspects of social identities makes it difficult for
the subordinate to be heard by others. I also suggested that there may be limitations
on self-knowledge as a result of inequitable power structures which restrict what the
person can know about themselves, and hence what can be conveyed to others.
Although failure to develop self-awareness is a major stumbling block to moral
competency and the exercise of moral agency, as I argued in Chapter Three, failure to
convey self-knowledge to others presents its own problems, especially for the
oppressed, as it may make one's actions appear unintelligible. It is the problem of
unintelligibility and the role played by moral luck that I will consider in Chapter
Five.
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Conclusion
Since taking responsibility—in the sense of being held or holding others
accountable—is problematic for members of subordinate groups responsibility is
conceived here in the care-taking sense, which involves actively standing behind
one's identities, relationships and practices. I argue that standing behind one's
projects and values can be achieved by making oneself and one's choices intelligible
to others. The idea of giving moral accounts, which are effectively stories we tell
each other, is suggested as a means of offering explanations for one's choices and
actions. However, since the notion of intelligibility involves both the idea of self-
knowledge and understanding as well as the ability to convey this to others, and the
ability to situate oneself in such a way that one can hear others' accounts, given the
disadvantages confronting the oppressed, being heard is itself not uncomplicated.
The complexity involved in the process of making oneself intelligible
through moral accounts which I described in this chapter hints at the difficulties in
utilising this approach to exercising moral agency, particularly for the oppressed. In
the next chapter I will consider further what is involved in making oneself
intelligible to others, including the consequences when a person is unsuccessful,
whether this constitutes a moral failure—particularly when the behaviour is non-
normative—and what the implications are for exercising moral agency.
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5. Intelligibility and moral luck
Introduction
In the last chapter I suggested that members of subordinate groups can
exercise moral agency and take responsibility by making themselves intelligible to
others. I also mentioned some of the impediments to doing so, in particular,
distortions and limits on self-knowledge which impact on one's self-understanding
and one's ability to convey one's choices to others. In my discussion on the necessary
conditions for intelligibility in Chapter Four, I touched briefly on the key associated
concepts of social uptake, the meaningfulness of social practices and identities,
personal integrity, what is involved in living a morally good life, and the possible
consequences of being unintelligible, and I will take up these ideas in more detail in
this chapter. I will discuss the idea, introduced by Card, that there is a degree of
moral luck—that is, luck that is implicated in our moral choices and our ability to
develop a moral character—involved in whether our actions, relationships and
identities receive social uptake, and, consequently, in whether we are able to take
responsibility by standing behind those practices and projects we find meaningful.
Throughout the chapter I will consider some arguments related to intelligibility for
the oppressed, first presented by Babbitt (1994; 2001), including her suggestion that
for some persons standing behind one's projects may involve taking a moral risk, that
is, the risk that if the meanings one stands behind are not socially validated then one
may not see oneself as possessing self-worth, and, as a consequence, may lack the
expectations appropriate to a person who sees themselves as having value (Babbitt
2001, 4). Calhoun (1999a, 83–84) has argued that, "given sufficient bad luck", moral
lives can fail either because they are frequently unintelligible to others or because the
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choices made are unable to be defended "in terms that others find meaningful",
suggesting that unintelligibility will necessarily produce moral failure. In response,
Babbitt (2001, 82) argues that unintelligibility is sometimes unavoidable when
pursuing a certain kind of moral agenda, especially one which may be in conflict
with normative values and social expectations; in these cases, the possibility of moral
failure is a moral risk worth taking as a necessary step toward resistance. I will also
consider a potential criticism to the notion of intelligibility suggested in Babbitt
(2001, 6–7), which is that in inequitable situations the act of explanation is already
an unduly onerous one for some persons, so that the requirement to be intelligible
may add to the burden for these persons.181 Finally, I will use this chapter to present
the idea, first suggested by Babbitt, that a certain kind of unintelligibility ensues
when a person's response to a situation demonstrates an epistemic awareness of a
situation which is not accessible to others because social expectations generate
narratives of a kind that do not cohere with how the person understands themselves.
It will be my contention that the potential benefit of being able to live a life that is
authentic outweighs any of the negative aspects associated with the goal of making
oneself intelligible.
Moral luck and moral failure
Before discussing the conditions essential to being intelligible to others, I
want briefly to consider the probability that the meanings one assigns to one's
identity, relationships or practices will not gain social uptake, since this is key to the
problem members of subordinate groups face in making themselves intelligible to
others. To do this I will examine the role played by moral luck in social uptake and
181A similar idea, although not articulated in the same way, is also found in the writing of Williams
(1991).
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making persons intelligible, and whether, as Calhoun (1999a, 83) asserts,
unintelligibility constitutes moral failure. Although one can fail morally because one
has failed to live up to the ideal of what morally exemplary behaviour should entail
this is best described as a failure to follow through on a commitment rather than
failure to agree on what actions are morally right in the first place. The latter is the
kind of moral failure I am concerned with here.
Like Calhoun (1999a, 83–84) and Card (1996), my claim is that there is
moral luck involved in our ability to make ourselves intelligible, either because we
have limited control over the social identities we are assigned or the power
relationships and social institutions within which these identities acquire meaning.
Consequently, there is luck involved in whether persons are considered moral
failures. It is a matter of luck that one is born a particular person at a particular time
and place, and therefore subject to particular events as a particular social identity, for
example, being born Jewish in Germany in the 1930s. What "makes luck moral",
according to Card, is "its involvement with our choices (or failures to choose) to do
what is morally right or wrong or with our having a moral character" (1996, 22;
italics in original).182 Hence, moral luck is not only implicated in whether persons are
held responsible, as, for example, Germans who lived through the Nazi era being
held accountable for having participated in what happened to the Jewish people,183
according to Card (1996, 27), it is also central to our capacity to take responsibility
in the first place.
For one's moral life to be intelligible to others, Calhoun (1999a, 83) argues
that both parties need to share a mutually understood scheme of social interaction
182According to Calhoun (1999a, 83; italics in original) Card's understanding of moral luck differs
from that of Thomas Nagel, because Nagel emphasises the luck "that enters into our being held
responsible, blamed, or praised" whereas Card emphasises the luck involved in our ability to "take
responsibility for ourselves".
183 The example is from Calhoun (1999a, 82).
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within which their actions and behaviour make sense to others. According to
Calhoun (1999a, 83), "among the ideals of what human moral life should be is the
ideal of living a moral life" where "one's moral understandings are shared by others",
making it possible for persons to defend their choices and actions in a way others
find meaningful. Without a shared scheme of social cooperation, persons run the risk
that the projects, relationships and identities they choose to stand behind are
misapprehended or appear meaningless to others; in either case, such behaviour risks
unintelligibility. In addition, in my view such behaviours may be unintelligible not
only because they are unrepresented, but because they may be unrepresentable in
mainstream discourses, a point I will return to later. If there is no social uptake, no
social recognition that the identity, relationship or practice has value and therefore is
meaningful, then persons risk moral failure, understood by Calhoun (1999a, 83–84)
as the failure to make oneself understood as part of a moral community. Being
unintelligible therefore represents a failure of social uptake of what one finds
meaningful.
Calhoun (1999a, 94) argues that there are two ideals for moral lives, the ideal
of doing what is right, or living according to moral principles which can be justified
to others, and the ideal of living within a shared scheme of social co-operation. On
the basis of this understanding of what is involved in living a morally good life,
moral failure is the result of one's commitment to a moral principle which is
unintelligible to others. Calhoun (1999a, 89) suggests that moral resisters, that is,
those persons who try to do what is right in situations of systematic discrimination,
may act in ways and produce results that are perceived as wrongdoing rather than
acting for the good; furthermore, that "resistantly trying to do the right thing might
produce moral failure" (1999a, 88; italics in original). Calhoun gives, by way of
example, the refusal to take "custody of one's children upon divorce" as appearing
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"coldly unloving rather than a resistance to compulsory motherhood" (1999a, 89).
Therefore, doing what one believes is right but which violates normative social
practice becomes a matter of moral failure because there is no shared understanding
that the action undertaken constitutes the right thing to do in the circumstances.
It could be argued that living according to generally agreed upon moral
principles, for example, following the categorical imperative, cannot result in moral
failure; instead, it represents a social failure if a person's actions are at odds with
normative expectations. Calhoun (1999a, 91) considers this argument—that what is
happening represents a failure to live up to social mores rather than moral failure,
one which sees moral resisters as morally correct social failures—to rest upon
mistaken assumptions about how we determine what constitutes morally exemplary
behaviour. Given that "morality is a scheme of social cooperation", contrasting
"social norms with genuine morality is misleading" (Calhoun 1999a, 91). I agree
with Calhoun to the extent that I would argue it is difficult to judge the
appropriateness of moral responses separately from non-compliance with normative
social practices, since normative social practices determine practices of responsibility
and therefore social norms underlie morality. It follows that, although we may invoke
moral ideals of what constitutes a morally excellent life, there is no separate morality
which is independent of socially determined norms. As I suggested in my discussion
on giving moral accounts in Chapter Four, for persons whose choices conflict with
mainstream community expectations arising from social norms, the difficulty lies in
justifying the moral correctness of those choices given conflicting social
expectations.
The problem I find with Calhoun's analysis is that it makes moral failures of
the lives of moral resisters, which is at odds with our perception of the lives of
people who stand up to injustices. Babbitt (2001, 81–82) addresses this issue by
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suggesting that rather than representing a kind of moral failure as Calhoun believes,
unintelligibility may be a necessary step to resisting because, for some persons,
social expectations about the way in which they should behave may result in skewed
moral meanings. I will return to the problem of persons acting on a moral principle
when social expectations deny them the capacity for this ability in the second half of
this chapter, after first considering the conditions under which intelligibility is made
possible.
Meaningfulness and social uptake
As I discussed in Chapter Four, to be intelligible, a person's actions have to
stem from their beliefs, values and desires, and these have to cohere with one another
in a way that makes narrative sense in view of the rest of their life story. A person's
capacity to make narrative sense of their own story has implications for moral
agency insofar as any action taken must be comprehensible with respect to the
person's beliefs, values, desires and experiences in order for the person to be seen to
have agency in respect of that action (Schechtman 1996, 159). Unintelligibility may
arise because of moral incapacities that impair a person's ability to construct a
coherent life story, and this inability might have serious consequences for the
person's ability to exercise moral agency but it is not necessarily an outcome of
inequitable and unfair power relations. For example, someone who is seriously ill
may be unable to make sense of the world or construct a coherent narrative of events;
some drugs make the recipient paranoid and/or delusional and the person may
interpret events around them incorrectly as a result, as a friend of mine did when she
was convinced her hospital admission had been shown on the television news.
However, unintelligibility may also arise because members of some social groups
lack epistemic credibility because their lives are not valued in the same way and are
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not accorded equivalence to the lives of persons who are accepted as members of the
moral community. It is not surprising that persons who are deemed to lack intrinsic
moral worth as human beings are also seen to lack the skills necessary for moral
competency, and their perceived deficiency is made manifest in their inability to
articulate the story of their choices in a way which is comprehensible to others.
Sometimes persons in this situation internalise the way others see them and come to
believe that they do not have the capacity either to exercise moral agency or to offer
an explanation for their own actions.
The issue of unintelligibility arises because for actions, choices and identities
to acquire meaning there has to be social uptake, and social uptake requires social
awareness and appreciation of the meaningfulness of one's relationships, choices and
practices, on the basis of agreed moral values and shared social institutions. The
presence of established social institutions with settled expectations facilitates social
uptake, since the acceptance of certain identities, relationships and practices is
predicated on expectations that arise out of particular ways of being. In other words,
for meaningfulness to emerge, one's practices must accord with the range of social
expectations which only arise in the presence of established social institutions. For
example, heterosexual marriage is understood by many people as meaningful
because of the existence of conventions and rules associated with it as a social
institution. Without institutional support, that is, where social institutions do not
exist, perhaps because the social practice is novel, individuals lack agreed codes and
practices of behaviour against which their own actions and choices can be judged
and their practices may appear to some as random or meaningless or immoral. In
short, for social uptake to occur, actions and choices must be meaningful to others,
and for meaningfulness to emerge there must be proper institutional support (Babbitt
2001, 101).
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Social uptake can, therefore, be thought of as the attribution of appropriate
meaning to one's actions and choices as a result of agreement about what behaviours
are acceptable within a particular social institution. Social institutions possess both
explicitly stated rules and practices, as well as constraints on ways of being which
are not overt but are nevertheless understood and followed by the majority, and
which allow for the inherent flexibility within all social institutions. However, this
flexibility only extends so far, beyond which the meanings that are being individually
asserted may be rejected as false by the wider community. For example, although
there are no explicit injunctions against women having facial hair, women are
discouraged from doing so because a bearded woman creates gender confusion in a
heterosexualy normative society. Because not all behaviours are codified explicitly,
this is one reason why, for example, when some behaviours disappear other less
obvious forms take their place, such as the social expectation that women wear
physically constrictive clothing, which I mentioned in Chapter Three, which meant
historically women have worn corsets, bustles and crinolines but may result in them
wearing high heels today.
An analogy can be seen in the institution that is scientific endeavour:  new
theories are acceptable in a particular scientific discipline only insofar as they mesh
with the established way of viewing the natural world in that discipline (what
Thomas Kuhn called the scientific paradigm); theories which postulate notions
inimical to the accepted rules and practices of the paradigm are rejected (Kuhn
1962). Challenging moral understandings differs from proposing new scientific
theories, however, because it involves how an agent sees herself and her place in the
world, not simply the way the world, social or natural, is constructed. Proposing
alternative meanings associated with social identities, behaviours and relationships
involves questioning the underlying, mostly implicit, values associated with the
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practices and rules of social institutions. The arguments about gay and lesbian
marriage, for example, raise issues not only about marriage between men and women
but also about the presumed naturalness of heterosexual relationships. Change to
social institutions frequently only occurs after the underlying assumptions supporting
certain behaviours are made explicit, for example, the racism underlying the
presumption of lower intelligence of members of non-white racial groups,
exemplified by the use of intelligence tests aimed at white subjects (Gould 1981).
Divergent meanings can receive social uptake as long as they do not directly
contradict these underlying values and expectations associated with a social
institution.
In Chapter Three I talked about some of the ways in which persons gain value
or feelings of self-worth, and I briefly referred to the notion of individual worth
arising from our sense of other human beings as irreplaceable in a way nothing else
is. In order to understand the potential implications of making oneself intelligible it is
useful to consider what it means to treat human beings as replaceable rather than as
unique individuals. When persons are treated as replaceable, Raymond Gaita
suggests, it is because "their desires and projects are denied a certain content—the
content that conditions our sense that persons are irreplaceable" (1991, 155); this is
revealed in the meanings ascribed to their actions and practices in contrast to those
ascribed to persons who are seen as irreplaceable. For example, Gaita describes the
different feelings a slave owner has in response to the suicide of a slave and the
suicide of a friend, which he suggests "bring with them different conceptions of
human individuality" (1991, 155). The different responses arising from the same
event are not only because one man is his friend but because of the different ways the
two lives are thought to have meaning. By characterising the suicide of a slave using
language which we would use to describe the euthanasia of an animal, rather than the
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death of another human, the slave owner denies that the slave's life has the same
content as that of his friend. When we do not see the lives of others as having
meaning equivalent to that of our own lives then we have denied them the value we
accord to other human beings on the basis of their uniqueness. In order to give
credence to the projects and desires of others, we have to take those others seriously,
something we can only do in the human context when we consider those persons to
be irreplaceable. Where social institutions are unjust, for example, in the presence of
systematic discrimination, or where no recognisable social institutions supportive of
a person's choices exist, it may be difficult for members of some social groups to
stand behind their choices if others are unable to see appropriate value and meaning
in their identities, relationships and practices because they are not considered unique,
irreplaceable human beings.
Taking responsibility for oneself in the care-taking sense I described in
Chapter Four means standing behind the meaning of one's choices, relationships and
identity. Standing behind something or standing for something requires the person to
actively support the meanings attached to the relevant identity or practice; it is not
enough to merely affirm one's commitment to a project. Actively supporting the
meanings attached to social practices does not normally present a difficulty for
members of privileged groups because social expectations support their shared
understanding of the correct behaviour in any situation. Having social agreement
about what actions constitute ethical behaviour normalises certain behaviours and
social practices, so that persons may not have to provide any explanation for their
actions because the meaningfulness is inferred from the fit between the action taken
and what action is considered appropriate in the circumstances, according to the
agreed social framework. For the privileged, doing what is right may not present a
challenge precisely because their own inclinations mesh with social expectations,
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which, in turn, facilitates their exercise of moral agency. In contrast, those who are
assigned to less privileged social groups may find that their projects, desires and
selves are taken less seriously by others, and that mainstream social expectations
about group members are detrimental to their exercise of moral agency. Where
institutions are unfair or unjust this may result in the misunderstanding or rejection
of identities, relationships and practices claimed by less privileged members of the
community. If social uptake is dependent upon one's behaviours and practices
matching expected responses in particular situations, it poses a particular problem for
those moral resisters whose behaviour is non-normative by making their attempts to
respond authentically unintelligible to others. I will consider this aspect of taking
responsibility by standing behind the meanings one ascribes to particular practices in
the next section.
Morally right, socially wrong?
Arguing that moral meaningfulness, and hence intelligibility, is contingent on
one's situation and community, in effect, one's moral luck, suggests that doing what
is right involves adherence to a particular moral code associated with a particular
way of being. Accordingly, making choices that are intelligible involves making
moral judgements based on settled expectations about what kinds of behaviours are
permissible to whom and in what situations. In other words, what is right is largely
contextual rather than resulting from some externally applied morality, such as
adherence to Kant's categorical imperative. In addition, because there has to be social
uptake for behaviour to be meaningful, for the 'right thing' to emerge from a
sequence of options available to the agent, the choice has to be meaningful in a larger
context than simply what appears to the agent to be the morally correct response; it
also has to be understandable in terms of socially normative behaviour. Difficulties
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emerge because persons experiencing systematic discrimination may find that acting
in accordance with settled expectations is contrary to their wellbeing, suggesting that
conformity to normative expectations alone does not constitute a morally feasible
position for them.
If doing what is right places persons in a morally indefensible position insofar
as they can either act in accordance with expectations arising from inequitable social
institutions, which are inimical to their own wellbeing, or they can act in accordance
with their own moral convictions, which may not be supported by social uptake, then
this creates a moral problem.184 Either they can act in ways that are morally right for
them and socially wrong, or they can act in ways that are socially right but
potentially complicit with their own oppression, which would be morally wrong;
either course would leave the person in an untenable position. This suggests that the
question has not been approached in the appropriate way. Is the problem one of
failure of social uptake (meaningfulness), or failure to reach agreement with all
members of the moral community as to what constitutes living a moral life?
The general moral problem of what is involved in acting well and living a
moral life constitutes a complex philosophical question in itself, one about which
there is considerable disagreement, and which I do not have the space to consider
here in depth. The problem of 'doing the right thing' also brings with it a number of
other conceptual issues, such as what is involved in living a good life. In addition,
how we ask the question often implies assumptions about how it should be answered,
184As well as being inauthentic, conformity to social practices that are contrary to one's own
wellbeing cannot be morally defensible if one does not subscribe to the normative meanings
attached to those behaviours. I am thinking here of behaviours such as passing and not examples
such as the subversion of the normative meanings attached to social identities or practices as the
mothers of the disappeared did in Argentina, for example. Passing is inauthentic because it
involves pretending to be something one is not and subscribing to meanings that may be contrary
to thriving as a person, for example, if an Aboriginal person passes as white and embraces racist
attitudes towards Indigenous Australians. In contrast, in drawing upon "the constraining societal
norms of gender roles and motherhood" (McLaren 2004, 223), the mothers of the disappeared
changed those gender norms, particularly the meaning of motherhood.
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for example, by asking if the 'right thing' involves acting in accordance with settled
expectations of what constitutes the good. However, Calhoun's (1999a, 84)
suggestion of four principles that form the basis to living a morally exemplary life
seem uncontroversial: affirming one's self-respect by claiming a place in the moral
community, acting in accordance with mutually agreed rules, acting in accordance
with a conception of the good, and cultivating a virtuous character. Calhoun (1999a,
84–85) describes these principles as the moral commitments an agent must bring to
their actions; however, as moral lives are lived in the actual world where agreed-
upon social practices and moral frameworks already exist, being virtuous may be
regarded by others as conformity to the standards and concepts arising from existing
social institutions and structures rather than, for example, acting in a way that is true
to one's authentic desires. If doing good or doing what is right involves conformity to
the moral practices of a community in which some members are treated unequally
then this creates a conundrum for those members of the community and for anyone
else who recognises their treatment as unjust. For some persons doing what is right
in terms of living a life true to their own beliefs, values and desires might involve
defiance of existing social institutions and resistance to normative values and social
practices (Babbitt 1994, 13–14; Calhoun 1999a, 85–86). However, where social
expectations conflict with the actions needed for persons to live a good life they may
find it difficult to convince others that their choices have value and meaning.
Another issue in considering the intelligibility and moral defensibility of
actions is whether or not it is always the outcomes that matter—whether we should
be judging particular acts on their consequences rather than the attributes and
attitudes brought to the situation by the agent. Purely consequentialist or instrumental
accounts which consider the value of actions based solely on their instrumental
outcomes miss something of the complexity of practices of responsibility (Walker
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2007, 99–100). For example, one problem with judging actions based on their
consequences or intended consequences is that quite often we have no intention of
performing those acts before doing so, or we may intend quite different outcomes
from those that occur, which is why Anthony Giddens (1984, 9–11) argues that, in
terms of agency, the intentions people have matter less than their capacity to act.
Babbitt's (1994, 13) analysis suggests that the context determines which outcomes
matter and why, so the significance of the consequences may have more to do with
social expectations than particular outcomes. Babbitt (1994, 13) illustrates her
analysis with the example of Sethe in Beloved, whom we may judge to act rightly
because we understand her actions within the context that it is a reasonable aspiration
for African Americans to resist slavery, although such an understanding involves
standards and concepts that differ from the time and place, specifically the belief that
racism and slavery are wrong.
These complexities influence how we judge the appropriateness of one
another's actions and have implications for the possibility of unintelligibility and
moral failure. How complicated such judgements can be and how difficult it may be
to judge whether or not some action is the right thing to do from the consequences
alone can be seen from Sethe's example. Simplifying Sethe's actions into specific
consequences, such as the death of her daughter, makes them not only less defensible
but also less comprehensible. To consider her actions purely on the basis of their
outcomes misses the point that Sethe acts on the basis of values that are
incommensurate with those qualities and attribute assigned her by the institution of
slavery. Judging others on whether or not they can defend the outcomes of their
choices also makes any moral failure (in the sense of unintelligibility) a matter of
individual responsibility rather than socially predetermined by their conformity or
nonconformity to socially agreed standards. Card argues, on the contrary, that "taking
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responsibility requires me only to try, not to succeed, because I can embrace the
values I find in my relationships whether others recognise them or not" (1996, 150).
It is not clear if having social agreement about what constitutes an appropriate
choice or behaviour in specific circumstances prevents the uptake of other meanings
persons might want to attach to particular identities, relationships and practices.
However, for persons attempting to inscribe new meanings onto identities,
relationships and choices, the social consequences of standing behind what are often
non-normative practices can be profoundly negative as the new meanings are
resisted. Card has argued that "the need for social uptake in changing meanings
suggests a certain moral problem in a society in which the existing meanings of (a
social identity) are deeply negative" (1996, 149–50). In the context of systematic
oppression doing the right thing may involve imposing meanings on relationships
and practices which may not be recognised as meaningful by others; or it may
involve laying claim to identities which have negative meanings associated with
them. Rejecting new meanings, however, is not the same as disagreeing about the
right response in a situation and it may be possible to have new meanings taken up,
especially if they accord, to some extent, with social practices, while the proper
response is still being debated. An example of this is the acceptance by the wider
community that gay and lesbian relationships are meaningful in some undetermined
way, while the debate continues about what kind of meanings should accrue to them
and whether they should be considered meaningful in the same way as heterosexual
relationships. This lack of uptake of meaningfulness is another indication of the
problem mentioned in the previous section, that the content of some persons' lives is
not taken as seriously as the content of others.
Another problem in justifying choices for members of less privileged social
groups arises because members of some social groups are prevented from exercising
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full moral agency, so that acts that stem from deeply held beliefs and values may
seem to both the agent and others to be counter to their wellbeing if the behaviour is
contrary to social expectations, particularly when the action or choice is at odds with
what is considered paradigmatic behaviour for someone possessing that social
identity at that time and place. Following one's authentic desires in these situations
may result in actions which appear confused or self-contradictory to others, for
example, Sethe's love for her children in Beloved expressed as a desire to see them
dead rather than enslaved.185 The dilemma for persons in this situation lies in the fact
that because moral norms may be detrimental to wellbeing, doing what is right may
involve behaving in ways considered non-virtuous, and acts of rebellion against
social conventions may appear to others to be immoral, or trivial if not taken
seriously, rather than instances of standing behind a project.
Where social institutions do not support their wellbeing, for some persons
doing what is right for them may appear instead as instances of acting wrongly, not
only in terms of social norms, but also in terms of self-interest. This is the case
whether the social group(s) involved reflect privilege or not, since such actions
unsettle social expectations. In these situations, actions which arise directly from the
characteristics of the individual and reflect the person's beliefs, values and desires,
may appear to others as contrary to self-interest. For example, a slave owner who
feels it is wrong to own slaves, or a white person opposed to segregation during the
Apartheid era in South Africa, may be viewed as traitors to their social group rather
than persons acting on conscience. As mentioned in Chapter Four, rebellion against
restrictive or unjust social conventions can appear to be an act of socially and
185A slave escaping from slavery seems criminal or immoral to those for whom slavery is normative.
The fact that we do not find anything strange about a slave's doing so today reflects our current
understanding of the paradigm of slavery, one in which the institution of slavery is considered evil
and wrong, and any action taken to alleviate the slave's condition is morally sanctioned.
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psychologically damaging behaviour, and regarded as "deviant, outlaw, perverse,
crazy, extremist" (Calhoun 1999a, 91) rather than morally commendable behaviour.
For persons in the situations described above, that is where systematic
discrimination exists, doing what is right may involve taking a moral risk—as well
perhaps as a political risk. It is a moral risk because such an action has to do with
how a person understands themselves, and, therefore, how they can act and be
understood (Babbitt 2001, 4). Actions and choices are measured against normative
expectations of what constitutes good behaviour or the right approach and are
considered good or bad depending on how well they measure up to established social
practices; behaviours are, to some extent, codified and judged accordingly. If one has
the bad moral luck to claim an identity or choose a relationship which attracts
negative meanings, or to act in ways not in accordance with recognised moral norms,
then it may be difficult to demonstrate to others that one is living a morally
exemplary life, because the meanings one attaches to these identities, relationships
and practices are not taken up by others. In claiming one is doing what is right when
it appears one is acting contrary to normative values, one has to be able to justify
identities, relationships and behaviours that conflict with social expectations about
the kinds of identities, relationships and practices that are meaningful.
When what is considered normative behaviour contributes to systematic
injustices, persons in these communities have to decide what is right by
differentiating between social practices which are unjust and those which reflect truly
virtuous behaviour. This is complicated for persons with multiple social identities,
because what is right for members of one group may be construed as contrary to the
interests and wellbeing of another social group. For example, rejecting attitudes and
behaviour prevalent within one group, such as heterosexist attitudes among
Hispanics or racism among lesbians (Lugones 1990a, 142), may be interpreted as an
203
attack upon the group and be met with opposition on this account. In standing behind
multiple social identities, persons need to attain a critical positioning which achieves
a balance between awareness of injustices perpetrated within each social group and
discriminatory attitudes and behaviour directed at their group from outside.
Attempting to do what is right may result in marginalisation within groups, but, as I
suggested in Chapter Three, marginalisation may have a positive aspect if persons
use it to attain a critical position on their multiple selves.
For those persons finding themselves members of less privileged groups there
may be significant difficulty in rejecting practices that are inimical to their wellbeing.
Incurring psychological damage from the internalisation of negative attitudes
towards members of their group may prevent some persons from being able to see
value in their own lives and relationships. Rejecting external devaluation of a social
identity is not simply a matter of exchanging positive values for the negative values
attached to the identity by others; if they are not to be demoralised by negative
evaluations of their social identities, individuals have to begin to see themselves
differently and to instantiate this difference by acting in ways that reject negative
constructions of their identities. For example, Sethe needs to reject the devaluation of
herself as a slave and see herself as a human being, but to do this she needs to act in
ways which are commensurate with having full moral agency; in other words, she
needs to develop the autonomy skills to be able to act as a moral agent before she can
see herself as a subject not an object.
Because the right thing to do in any situation is socially and normatively
framed, doing what is right may prove to be a complicated undertaking, and one that
may result in negative outcomes for persons who have the moral luck to belong to a
subordinate social group or to have multiple social group affiliations.
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Integrity and moral agency
As mentioned in Chapter Four, being intelligible to others requires that a
person's choices make sense in terms of their espoused values, beliefs and desires.
For an action or choice to be meaningful, the person has to be choosing or acting in a
way that is consistent with their authentic desires, rather than acting as they think
they should or as others would have them act; in other words, they have to show
integrity in their choices. Although there are a number of ways of thinking about
integrity, the kind I am referring to here is the notion that persons show integrity
when they act in a way which is consistent with their core values and principles. This
is similar to Lynne McFall's (1987, 9) conception, but she suggests integrity is only
shown where persons continue to uphold these commitments and principles in the
face of challenges, and that they do so for the right reasons. It is tempting to think of
this kind of integrity as acting in a way that is faithful to one's true self, whereas in
actuality this notion of integrity does not require the notion of a 'true self', merely
that there is coherence between one's actions and one's desires, attributes and values.
Further, the notion of a true self is misleading, since it suggests a singular
unchanging entity, whereas I have argued throughout this thesis for a conception of
the self as multiple and changeable. Walker argues that given "multiple and
sometimes competitive" responsibilities, "the self to which one would be true is not
just given" but is "constructed and affirmed in intertwined histories of identity,
relationship, and value" (2007, 125).
If actions are meaningful insofar as they arise out of a person's authentic
desires what does this actually mean? If a person claims to believe in monogamy but
has countless extra-marital affairs while married, then there is an obvious conflict
between the person's asserted beliefs and values, and their actions, undermining the
integrity of their beliefs. Alternatively, if someone asserts they are anti-racist and
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stands up to racist bullying or teasing of others, they display integrity between their
beliefs and their actions. In other words, for someone to show integrity there must be
internal coherence between their choices, acts and practices, and their professed
beliefs and values.186A difficulty emerges in demonstrating integrity when someone's
judgement of what is the right response in a situation is at odds with normative
expectations of the good. For example, if there is a social practice that male relatives
control a woman's reproductive capacity, a doctor who consents to assist a woman
with contraception may have difficulty explaining her actions as the right thing to do
given accepted ideas about how women and doctors should behave. Showing
integrity by following one's own judgement when it is contrary to normative
expectations may leave persons vulnerable to being judged as acting in ways which
are either immoral or criminally wrong.
However, for a person to demonstrate integrity, the values they espouse must
be both morally significant and reflective of a life in which their actions are
meaningful. According to Walker, persons cannot show integrity or find meaning in a
life committed to immoral or criminal pursuits, or in an unreflective life lived in
accordance with a set routine, as an account of such a life would show no
"intelligible moral personality" (2007, 111; italics in original). Similarly, a life of
deliberate violence or one devoted solely to a person's own pleasure (McFall 1987,
9) is not a life of self-worth or moral significance.187 Other behaviours we sometimes
think of as indicative of moral integrity may also be lacking, such as a life spent
following social principles without subscribing to them, or a life in which a person is
186 McFall (1987, 7–8) describes several kinds of coherence that contribute to integrity: 1) consistency
"within one's set of principle or commitments", 2) coherence between principle and action, insofar
as they must correspond at some level of description, and 3) constraints between principle and
how one is motivated to act.
187A life of deliberate violence differs from the case of a moral agent whose life involves violence but
as result of a commitment to a greater ideal, such as freedom from domination, and in McFall's
opinion a life devoted to pleasure does not involve integrity because "there is no possibility of
conflict—between pleasure and principle—in which integrity could be lost" (1987, 9).
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responsive in terms of their moral duties without having any particular emotional
investment in them (McFall 1987, 16). To show integrity one must be able to
demonstrate a commitment to a life which has meaningful values; one must not only
be honest about what values one subscribes to, one's actions must be consistent with
regard to those values.
McFall (1987, 17) distinguishes between the set of moral principles and
commitments held by an individual that are partial to particular others and the set of
moral principles adhered to within a community that are characteristically impartial.
I am understanding moral integrity here as both local (Walker 2007, 125) and partial
and, above all, as a sign of one's reliability (2007, 122); on this understanding,
integrity is neither universal nor impartial, nor is it a matter of living in accordance
with abstract moral principles. In the previous chapter, I discussed Walker's notion of
one's dependability in terms of one's responsiveness to others and one's preparedness
in giving an account of one's response or failure to respond as indicative of moral
integrity. However, one's connections to others, the relationships one values, may
influence how reliable one is in terms of one's responsiveness. For example, Sethe
puts her relationship with her children above that of others and she is consistently
accountable in terms of how she acts towards her children, if we accept the premise
that a mother who loves her children would prefer to see them dead than enslaved.
This approach agrees with Calhoun's view of integrity as both a social and a
personal virtue which is premised on a view of the self as relational. Because
integrity has a social as well as a personal aspect, as well as making reference to our
own judgement we are obligated to give due consideration to what others judge the
right thing to do and to take others' doubts and contrary opinions seriously (Calhoun
1995, 260). Therefore, we need to give due consideration to the values endorsed by
the community before dissenting from those values, and consequently we may be
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ambivalent about endorsing our own judgement over the judgement of others. For
example, some religions have conservative factions whose rules about dress and
behaviour are quite restrictive, and an adherent may reject these practices as outdated
while still maintaining a belief in many of the values espoused by the religion. To
have integrity means to understand that one's own viewpoint matters to others within
a community of co-deliberators (Calhoun 1995, 258). However, adherence to one's
own convictions when these conflict with social principles more commonly leads to
others believing that one is acting without judgement, without due consideration for
others, immorally, or criminally. One's co-deliberators may find it difficult to
perceive one's actions and choices as arising from deeply held moral convictions
when they conflict with community values. When social principles conflict with
personally held commitments, moral integrity may consist in standing behind choices
which others misconstrue or find incomprehensible.
I have argued in this section that for social uptake of meaning to occur a
given community must agree to a moral framework which reflects which ways of
being are allowed and, in turn, creates particular expectations about which social
practices are acceptable. Other kinds of moral choices are not necessarily meaningful
to others because they involve different expectations about what constitutes living a
morally good life from those expectations originating in normative values. In some
situations, however, we may have to acknowledge that we lack the understanding
necessary to allow us to judge whether someone has shown integrity in acting in a
particular way. For example, it may be difficult to reconcile our notion of the
practices and values of motherhood with killing one's child. However, if, instead, we
acknowledge that Sethe has access to experiences that are denied to us, which make
her actions and behaviours meaningful, such as the knowledge of what it is like to be
denied subjectivity and to live life as an object or piece of property, we may be able
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to give credence to her actions as morally deliberated choices and practices that are
nonetheless unintelligible to us. Judging whether someone has acted for the good
might require us to acknowledge the limits of our own comprehension and that there
may exist other ways of understanding. In summary, behaviours or social practices
which do not conform to normative expectations may be (mis)interpreted as being
contrary, rebellious, or even immoral rather than an expression of genuinely held
values. The agent then runs the risk that others do not recognise their actions as
meaningful, making it difficult for them to make themselves intelligible to others. If
moral resisters are more likely than other members of the moral community to have
their actions misunderstood or misinterpreted, then the attempt to make themselves
intelligible may involve moral risk taking.
Moral risk taking
In the rest of the chapter I address the problem that moral risk taking creates
for the possibility of making oneself understood by examining in more detail what
constitutes a moral risk, what taking a moral risk involves, and why moral risk taking
is important for those suffering systematic oppression. Firstly, moral risk taking is
not political risk taking, although it can involve actions which involve political risk.
Political risk refers to actions which can result in political, economic and even
physical harms, such as the loss of employment, imprisonment, torture, or loss of
life. For example, taking part in a political protest about the treatment of members of
one's group can entail verbal and physical violence and result in arrest or assault by
authorities. Although political risk taking can accompany moral risk taking, it is not
necessary to be at political risk to be vulnerable to moral risk taking.
As I said in the introduction to this chapter, moral risk taking relates to the
risk that if the meanings one stands behind are not socially validated, then one may
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not see oneself as possessing self-worth, and, as a consequence, lack the expectations
appropriate to a person who sees themselves as having value (Babbitt 2001, 4).
Although choices involving a moral risk may also involve a political risk, Babbitt
argues that they differ because moral risk taking is about how an agent sees
themselves, how they understand who they are and make sense of their own
behaviour, and how they are understood by others. Moral risk occurs when someone
stands behind a relationship or a behaviour that is capable of being misunderstood
due to its nonconformity with the normative values of the person's society, so that
they run the risk that their actions will not be understood or accepted by others.
An individual is potentially placed at moral risk in one of two different
situations. The first situation occurs when the ethical nature of a person's actions and
choices is considered questionable, because they have attached non-normative
meanings to an identity, relationship or social practice. Although, in theory, this can
occur in response to anyone's choices, in practice it is mainly members of less
privileged groups who challenge normative values. In the second situation, members
of some groups are denied certain kinds of moral agency, since they are believed to
lack the capacity to exercise it. As we have already seen, this commonly occurs in
hierarchical societies where expectations generated by social norms function as a
means of constraining or disempowering certain individuals from certain choices and
actions. When individuals appear to demonstrate these kinds of diminished agency
their choices and practices are re-interpreted to satisfy expectations about their moral
capacities. Although I will be discussing these ways of interpreting moral risk taking
separately—beginning with the difficulties arising for the oppressed with regard to
standard meanings attached to social identities, relationships and practices—in
practice they are interrelated. Social institutions generate both standard meanings and
social expectations based on normative values, and in a hierarchical society both may
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be detrimental to members of out-groups demonstrating moral agency and standing
behind what is important to them.
Normalisation of certain social practices
To make sense of one's actions, the relationships and practices one chooses to
stand behind must have meanings which are morally defensible. If one's actions only
acquire meaning(fulness) through being defended against criticism by others, then it
follows that one's actions and choices and identity only acquire meaning when they
are made intelligible to others, so that "even the most private parts of our lives
require a public justification, where this means shared intelligibility" (Walker 2007,
121). This is not a particularly contentious claim, since there is no human activity
which is not dependent on social uptake for meaning. Just as artistic activities or
artefacts assume an audience which will negotiate meaning with the artist, all human
activities require an(other) to engage with for meaning to emerge. Moral risk taking
sets the agent up to be vulnerable, not only to rejection by others but to confusion as
to whether his or her own choices are ethical and meaningful.
Social institutions normalise certain relationships, and are productive of
standards and practices which are then taken for granted and do not usually require
additional explanations to be comprehensible to others. For example, in most
cultures if a person says they are getting married this suggests to others the practices
attached to the activity and, because the meanings are standard, the person does not
have to unpack the meanings attached to the institution of marriage in that society.
The standard meanings attached to normative practices can be distinguished from the
alternative meanings attached to social identities and practices that members of out-
groups choose to stand behind because, unlike alternative meanings, they do not
require further explanation. In addition, because standard meanings are reflective of
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social institutions, where these are hierarchical such alternative meanings may be
negative or critical, particularly with regard to the social identities and practices of
members of out-groups.
If meaningful actions and choices consist of morally defensible social
practices, what makes behaviour lose meaning for others? Two kinds of behaviours
are associated with moral risk in terms of the meanings being (mis)understood by
others: firstly, behaviours which are novel and therefore lack appropriate social
institutions to support them, and secondly, behaviours whose meanings apparently
deviate from normative values. Where social institutions either do not exist or have
not developed enough to provide guidelines on what behaviours are acceptable, then
it is difficult to justify one's choices because there is no standard of comparison. This
is especially true of novel social behaviours or activities, such as the use of modern
reproductive technologies which have produced new forms of reproductive
behaviour without corresponding institutional support in the form of accepted social
practice, for example, sperm donors, surrogate pregnancies, and in vitro fertilization.
The second kind of behaviours that risk unintelligibility because the meanings that
come with them may be unclear to others are those that are non-normative.
Normative meanings that accrue to social practices, for example, a heterosexual
couple having a child, do not need to be explained to others, as these come packaged,
part and parcel with the social institution, in this case the institution of heterosexual
marriage or cohabitation.188 In contrast, a single woman who makes the same
decision may have her capacity to be a parent questioned and it may be assumed that
a single woman having her own child is both morally irresponsible and
188 Typically, a heterosexual couple that chooses to have children does not have to defend their choice,
but a heterosexual couple in which both suffer disabilities, for instance, may find they do have to
explain their decision to others. Parenthood as a social institution is invested with complex
meanings, which are difficult for the non-normative family to negotiate. There may exist an
expectation that parents who do not fit the social institution of the heterosexual, nuclear family
will fail to succeed as parents and the children of such parents are at risk of harm.
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reprehensible, since social expectations attached to being a single mother include
sexual promiscuity and welfare dependency, where such dependency is seen as a
kind of welfare cheating. Where social behaviours are novel or non-normative, it
may be difficult to defend choices because there is no social institution with
acceptable practices to corroborate that the behaviour is appropriate.
As well as a potential political risk, claiming alternative meanings for non-
normative or novel practices, identities and relationships therefore poses a
considerable moral risk, the risk that the choices made will be rejected as not
meaningful or not morally defensible. In addition, the negative meanings assigned to
the identities, relationships and choices of members of out-groups by dominant
discourses may prove difficult for those members to challenge because these
meanings are supported by the normative values and powerful social institutions of
the in-group. Whether individuals are able to stand behind their choices is to a large
extent dependent upon moral luck, which I have referred to above and will now
consider in more detail.
The role of moral luck
Card argues that there is a degree of moral luck involved not only in whether
we find ourselves being held responsible, that is, in the situations in which we find
ourselves, but also in our ability to take responsibility for ourselves and our actions,
that is, in our capacity to respond. As Card puts it:
There is luck involved in the validation requisite to successfully creating
meanings. Insofar as taking responsibility for ourselves and our character
involves imposing meanings on our lives that we can stand behind, that luck
becomes a kind of moral luck (1996, 150–51).
What makes it moral good luck and not simply good luck is that a moral ideal exists,
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in this case the ideal of what human moral lives should be, what a good life is and
what is involved in living a morally exemplary life. Since living one's life well and
doing the right thing as a moral resister involves making choices that may appear bad
or wrong in the light of normative expectations one has to be able to provide a moral
context in which the choices are understandable. As Card demonstrates, and I have
already discussed, having the freedom to act on meanings that one can stand behind
relies, to some extent, on social uptake, and without the necessity for social uptake
there would be no moral risk. However, this does not mean that individuals should
wait for optimum social conditions before embracing identities and choices that are
meaningful, as the example of Sethe demonstrates.
If moral luck is involved in taking responsibility for one's choices then
members of oppressed groups have the bad moral luck to be born into social groups
that cannot lay claim to category privilege. Membership of less privileged social
group(s) does not necessarily mean that the meanings one chooses to stand behind
are not recognised by others, but in many cases the meanings associated with the
identities and actions of the oppressed are negative; taking responsibility for them
thus involves both resisting dominant understandings and imposing new meanings on
relationships and practices that the oppressed are able to stand behind. Card's
example of taking responsibility for oneself, one's relationships and one's choices as
a lesbian shows how difficult it is for members of subordinate groups to claim
particular social identities as their own and to inscribe their own meanings on
identities and practices that have already been tagged negatively, often in
stereotypical ways, in hierarchical societies. There is a profound difference for
persons in these circumstances between claiming positive attributes for a social
identity within a group of similarly identified individuals and claiming the same
identity in the wider community.
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Although moral luck is not synonymous with being in a privileged group,
privilege ensures a certain amount of good luck, since one may be able to stand
behind non-normative values without social penalty.189 A man with the good luck to
be born white and middle-class may find it easier to claim a gay identity and
relationship, and to retain the advantages of sex, race and class than if he were
working-class or black. However, retaining race and class privilege does not
guarantee that the meanings he seeks to impose on his identity and his relationships
are taken up by others. For example, his partner may not be invited to social events
by his employer. It could be said that privilege is a kind of moral luck, since there is
luck in being born into the group that benefits from what is considered normative.
Simply put, having the good moral luck to be born into a privileged group makes it
easier to live a life which accords with social expectations about one's behaviour
since there are fewer restrictions on one's behaviour in the first place. One meaning
of privilege is exemption from the law so that having privilege means one has
immunity from specific constraints (Tirrell 1993, 17). For example, Tirrell points out
that in most Western countries boys and men are exempt from the general prohibition
against nudity, being able, in certain situations, to appear in public without upper-
body covering.
Where a social norm has changed over time, the meanings attached to the
behaviour it controls undergo a corresponding change; an example of this is
changing attitudes toward violence against women. Where violence towards women
was once considered normative and morally defensible, it is now considered socially
aberrant and unethical behaviour, and has lost its meaning as a permissible part of
189 Conversely, sometimes the aspirations of the oppressed can appear to be facilitated by belonging to
a social group that is discriminated against; for Indigenous Australians aspiring to be an elite
sportsperson is an attainable goal and channelling their ambitions into sport will be treated as
appropriate by white and black alike. However, I would argue that this is not good luck but,
perversely, a positive outcome of having the bad moral luck to be born an Indigenous Australian in
the twenty-first century.
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marriage, for example. It is probably more accurate to describe the meaning attached
to the behaviour as changing rather than being lost since what was once normative
and defensible on these grounds is now considered unethical, as well as criminal.
What changed to make the meaning of the practice change were the values that were
associated with the practice. Therefore, in some cases, the values we ascribe to might
need to change before meanings can change.
Sonny in Dog Day Afternoon is a good example of someone who has the
moral bad luck to try to make meaningful his choices, his relationship and his
identity in light of a value system which either makes his choices meaningless or
ascribes negative meanings to them. Given the non-normativity of his choices,
insofar as he is in a relationship with a transgendered person, he takes a moral risk
that the meanings he attaches to his practices will not be taken up others. If the
meanings he attaches to the relationship are not taken up, Sonny runs the risk that he
will not see himself as someone with self-worth and, as Babbitt suggests, he may
lack the kind of expectations possessed by someone with appropriate self-esteem.
One explanation for Sonny's behaviour is that he has internalised the normative view
of his relationship as socially transgressive and, lacking appropriate self-worth, is
prevented from developing his own positive meanings. His behaviour suggests he
doubts whether he is doing the right thing, and this goes some way towards
explaining his inability to stand behind the relationship and his own actions in a
manner that is convincing, since it is not possible to convey a practice or relationship
as meaningful if one does not see appropriate value in it.
In the absence of appropriate social institutions and structures to provide
rules which make sense of his actions, Sonny may be unable to make moral choices
that are meaningful, because it is not clear what the right thing to do is in the
situation. As I mentioned in Chapter Four in discussing the Heinz dilemma, in some
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situations doing what is right may depend upon one's responsiveness to others and
concern for the relationship rather than following institutional rules, such as the one
that says stealing is wrong. I suggest the film Dog Day Afternoon does not attempt to
address the main difficulty for Sonny, which is how he can convey the motivations
that lie behind his actions. His apparent dilemma involves robbing a bank, but his
real problem lies in explaining why he acts as he does when his choices are all but
incomprehensible to others in a society in which there is no social uptake of his
relationship with his transgendered partner.
The example of Sonny suggests that standing behind relationships and
practices that do not have established social structures and rules risks moral failure
because the moral accounts given are potentially unintelligible to others. In order to
take responsibility for choices, the oppressed may have to attach new meanings to
identities, relationships and practices that may not be taken up by others, thereby
potentially placing them in situations of moral risk. Attempting to make oneself
intelligible in these circumstances may, therefore, involve an inherent moral risk that
one's actions and choices will be meaningless to others, thereby undermining one's
own sense of oneself as having moral worth.
Standard social expectations make certain kinds of agency improbable
Both Card (1996) and Calhoun (1999a) discuss the kind of moral risk I have
explained above, but Babbitt identifies a further way in which moral risk can arise,
that is, where the expectations generated by social rules render the agency of the
individual dubious with regard to some specific action. The first kind of moral risk,
standing behind relationships or behaviours for which there are no socially
established and approved institutions, makes an individual vulnerable to being
misunderstood. Sonny in Dog Day Afternoon has difficulty explaining his
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commitment to a relationship with a transgendered man, since both the transgender
identity and being in a relationship with a transgendered person are normatively
transgressive at the time the movie was made. The second kind of moral risk is
different, in that the social expectations generated by norms in hierarchical societies
are frequently a means of constraining or disempowering certain individuals from
certain actions.
In inequitable or unjust societies, members of some groups, or more
specifically, individuals with some social identities, are not expected to demonstrate
certain kinds of moral agency because they are believed to be incapable of doing so.
An example of this can be seen in Morrissey's (2003) research on women who kill.
Morrissey discovered that legal and media narratives of the murders and court cases
placed the blame for the women's actions with anyone but the women themselves. It
seems that the normative expectations that women nurture and care for others made
it difficult, if not impossible, to accept that women are capable of reasoning and
acting in a manner to bring about another's death intentionally. Even where
individual women admitted to planning and carrying out their actions, the police,
legal representatives and media insisted on following narratives which constructed
the women's stories in ways that denied them agency. Rather than acting violently of
their own choice—whether it was as self-defence in response to provocation, as
Aileen Wuornos claimed,190 or as willing accomplices or instigators of violence—the
women were portrayed as either mad, as victims, as under the control of men, or,
where there was an element of sexual abuse, as "fulfilling the needs of their men"
(Morrissey 2003, 154). It seems that crediting women with the moral agency
190Aileen Wuornos killed seven men in Florida from 1989–1990 during the time she worked as a
prostitute. Although she did not deny the killings, she claimed they were done in self-defence
when the men raped or attempted to rape her (Muraskin 2004, vii). See Shipley and Arrigo (2004,
Chapter 8) for a more detailed biography.
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involved in reasoning through the choice and then killing another human being
conflicted too radically with established expectations about female behaviour, and
hence someone else had to be credited or blamed.
So ingrained is the connection between group identity and social expectations
and moral agency that when the actions of a member of a group do not accord with
normative expectations, these actions will be interpreted in ways that do not conflict
with normative expectations. Certain social identities, it becomes clear, are
associated with normative expectations that, when flouted, result not in a
reconsideration of those expectations but a re-evaluation of the person's social
identity. If the social identity, that is, 'woman', is perceived as nurturing and non-
violent, then individuals who exhibit violent behaviour are either acting in
accordance with someone else's will or else they are no longer women but, like
Aileen Wuornos, monsters. This suggests that an important barrier to women being
seen as full persons is that women are frequently denied credit for the ability to
reason morally or to take any action on their own that does not coincide with what is
considered normative, a denial that is maintained even in the face of individual
women demonstrating these capacities.
Sethe in Beloved is suggested by Babbitt as another example of the way
normative expectations can make certain kinds of moral agency implausible. Sethe
shows love for her children in the only way she can, by killing them so that they do
not have to suffer a life of slavery. As both she and her children are considered
property not people, objects not subjects, she is not supposed to have maternal
feelings for her children. Not only are such feelings undesirable from the point of
view of the slave owners, they are also a possible source of pain for Sethe herself. As
a piece of property she is not expected to show any agency at all, much less to
determine a way for herself and her children to escape slavery. As a slave there are
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no expectations that Sethe will act for herself, much less see herself as a person. Any
action as a subject, as a person, is in Sethe's case at odds with social expectations.
Her actions are unintelligible to anyone who cannot understand why she feels
impelled to act in accordance with her own moral conviction that she and her
children are entitled to live as subjects.
The expectation that persons will not perform any acts of their own volition
or that persons will not perform certain acts because of who they are makes it
morally risky (in addition to any other risk the agent incurs) to perform these acts.
Action which is at odds with social expectations of the kind of agency persons are
supposed to show may make the action incomprehensible to others because it
conflicts with a priori assumptions held by others. The person's actions will either be
misunderstood (as in Sethe's case), or considered evidence of insanity, or the impetus
to act will be credited to others (as in the case of some women killers); in any case,
any attempt at explanation will encounter difficulties because such actions confound
social expectations. This occurs even within oppressed groups. For example, when
Sethe explains that she killed her children to save them from slavery because she
loved them and wanted to protect them, her explanation is rejected by her own
community because she does not accept slavery's presumption that she is not a
person and therefore should reduce her own expectations, as her friend Paul D has
done.191
Explanations and the explanatory burden
I mentioned above that social expectations might be such that group members
191 I take the distinction between their expectations from Babbitt (1994, 5; 2001, xi). Sethe says to her
friend Paul D., “I did it. I got us all out ... Up till then it was the only thing I ever did on my own”;
in contrast Paul D. has learnt as a slave that "you protected yourself and loved small. Picked the
tiniest stars out of the sky to own" (Morrison 2006, 188–89).
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occupy particularly rigid stereotypes of identity and social role, or some roles and
identities might have excessively negative attributes and characterisations, making it
difficult for the oppressed to see themselves as having the necessary capacities to live
full moral lives. I have also described how social expectations might also exist such
that some members are unable to achieve any significant social goal. As a result,
claiming anything other than stereotypical roles and identities requires these group
members to make explanations about their identities and choices, which for others
are unnecessary. It could be said that a conflict exists between the way some group
members construct themselves to resist stereotypical identities and roles, and the
expectations held about them by others. If no conflict existed between community
expectations and the roles and identities assumed by some group members then there
would be no demand for explanation.192 Where a conflict exists it generates the
expectation that there will be some explanation, for example, as mentioned earlier,
when a woman intentionally kills another human being it is expected there will be
some reason for her behaviour that is not dependent on the woman's own agency.
Where a story produces surprise as a result of expectations held about
particular group members then it creates what Babbitt (2001, 6–8) calls an
"explanatory burden" on the individual involved. The burden is generated, Babbitt
suggests, because not only does the individual have to explain their own actions; in
addition, they have to explain why they have not met the expectations of others.
Babbitt (2001, 7) gives the example of a fellow female graduate student whose
professor was surprised by the quality of her work; the surprise he felt arose out of
his expectations for her. The significance, Babbitt suggests, lies in the burden placed
on the graduate student by the professor's expectations. To answer his surprise the
192 This does not mean that one dispenses altogether with the need for explanations, just that we would
no longer need these kinds of explanations.
221
student would have to explain to him that his surprise at her work arose from his low
expectations of black students. Notice that although the professor is the one whose
covert racist sensibilities have resulted in his low expectations and subsequent
surprise, it is up to the student herself to counter his surprise.
The demand for explanation is created in these situations because social
expectations are such that a particular expression of agency is deemed implausible
(Babbitt 2001). The woman who kills, the slave who claims subjectivity, the black
female student who excels academically, all three act in ways surprising to others
because they are not considered to have the capacities to undertake these actions,
and, consequently, the choices they have made may not be understood by others.
Normative values drive social expectations about individual subjectivity, moral
capability and agency, and to act in a way contrary to these expectations creates an
anomalous situation which requires explanation. In these circumstances neither
giving an explanation nor refusing to do so is sufficient to lift the burden of
explanation from the individual, because only the transformation of social
expectations, making that particular expression of agency more plausible, would lift
the burden of explanation.
Epistemological issues
Another facet of the explanatory burden helps reveal the way in which the
unintelligibility of others is built in to explanatory frameworks facilitating the
intelligibility of the privileged. In previous chapters I discussed the way in which
privilege constructs itself by deliberate omissions and exclusions (of the lives of and
injustices towards others). Consequently, in order for the meaning of their actions to
become clear, it falls on those who belong to less privileged group(s) to uncover the
interpretative context within which both the explanation (and the requirement for the
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explanation) becomes intelligible, for example, to reveal the presence of racism. This
kind of burden arises because the person is denied both a certain content to their kind
of moral agency, and, when the established explanatory frameworks available do not
allow a person to make sense of their actions, because they hold values that are at
odds with the normative expectations of the society. The explanatory burden arises
here because to make sense of what an agent does requires access to ways of viewing
the world which may be inaccessible to others due to the explanatory framework.193
To clarify this, consider the example Babbitt (2001, 6–8) gives from Miriam
Tlali's novel, Between Two Worlds, of a black woman called Muriel working in an
otherwise all-white office in Apartheid South Africa. In South Africa at this time
Muriel could be considered fortunate in having employment and being treated well
by her employer; however, because this is occurring during the Apartheid years
Muriel is constantly reminded that her black skin sets her apart from her co-workers,
from the separate washroom for her use, to the special mug set aside for her so it will
not be accidentally used by any of the white employees. Part of Muriel's role is to
make the morning coffee, but on one occasion one of her white co-workers makes
the coffee for her and brings it to her at her desk. A white woman bringing a black
woman coffee, that is, performing a menial task, is unusual enough that it would
seem to warrant Muriel's extraordinary gratitude. But this expectation, that Muriel
should show extraordinary gratitude to her white co-worker for a courtesy that would
be unremarkable if it was directed towards any of her white colleagues, is itself
onerous. In order to understand why this is so requires Muriel to unpack the context
for her co-workers; Muriel has to uncover the racism inherent in the expectation that
193 Remembering that the slave's actions to escape slavery, which appeared inexplicable to someone of
that time who agreed with slavery, now appear reasonable and require no explanation because
racism and slavery are currently considered morally wrong.
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she should be grateful for the white woman's kindness, and this places a burden of
explanation on Muriel. If she does not express excessive gratitude, she has to explain
why she does not: that the simple courtesy of bringing coffee is something people do
for one another that should not merit additional thanks but requires additional thanks
in this context because it is a white woman doing it for a black woman in a racist
society. Muriel is burdened by the expectation of gratitude and burdened by having
to explain why this is so; the onus is on Muriel to uncover the context of racism just
as it was on Toni Morrison to uncover the context in the interview mentioned in the
previous chapter. To make the onus rest on those less privileged to uncover contexts
of discrimination is to leave them doubly mistreated.
Moral resisters and unintelligibility that is not moral failure
Babbitt has argued against the notion that unintelligibility automatically
represents an instance of moral failure, particularly in the case of moral resisters.
Earlier in the chapter I suggested that a certain kind of unintelligibility ensues when a
person's response to a situation demonstrates the capacity for a certain kind of moral
understanding, an epistemic awareness of a situation which is not accessible to others
because social expectations generate different kinds of narratives which do not
cohere with how that person understands themselves. For example, there is no
socially sanctioned narrative of motherhood that understands killing one's children as
an act of love, so that Sethe's claim to having the capacity for moral deliberation and
the ability to choose what is best for her children is impenetrable to those who read
her behaviour in the light of a cultural, historical narrative of how motherly love
should be demonstrated. In fact there is no mainstream narrative of a black slave
possessing the capacity for moral deliberation let alone exhibiting motherly love, so
Sethe's actions and explanation also conflict with cultural narratives of how slaves
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should act. It could be said that Sethe cannot tell her story because the norms and
values relied upon to make sense of the story are those Sethe is most concerned to
resist (Babbitt 2001, 137). In order to understand Sethe's story in a different way, the
conceptual framework within which the story is given meaning has to undergo
change. In order to understand Sethe's story as one of motherhood and love, others
have to see Sethe as a person not an object, and moreover a person who has a certain
moral capacity and whose actions have meaning commensurate with being the
actions of a moral equal (Babbitt 1994, 13).
It follows that what Sethe and others are doing in making claims to
knowledge that conflict with accepted expectations is making claims to a kind of
power. Making oneself intelligible to others constitutes an act of resistance not
simply because to be heard one must have power—the power to ensure one's
credibility—but also because for the oppressed to express access to non-privileged
knowledges is to reject the norms and values which systematically devalue them as
human beings and to lay claim to a personhood equal to that of the privileged.
Established norms and values do not just determine expectations about what we can
do; they also dictate how much credibility is given by others to the stories we tell.
The result is that some persons' accounts are less likely to be heard and considered
meaningful in the way the person giving the account intended. As the examples of
Sethe and Aileen Wuornos suggest, actual outcomes for persons may be highly
negative when the behaviour cannot be accommodated within the normative
interpretive framework. Being unintelligible within the moral explanatory framework
may result in ostracism, prison or death.
However, it appears that we sometimes recognise behaviour in others as
principled and praiseworthy even when the behaviour is at odds with normative
values and social expectations, and therefore would normally constitute moral failure
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in its unintelligibility. When persons act to instantiate a view of themselves that they
do not yet see acknowledged by others, they make claims to qualities not normally
associated with members of that social group. In some cases, like Sethe, where
persons strive to act in ways that they are not seen as capable of, it suggests these
persons have developed evaluative self-respect sufficient to see themselves as
competent moral agents even without external acknowledgement of their moral
agency. While it is difficult to say whether it is the claims they make or their right to
make such claims that is accepted, by acting in ways which defy expectations for
members of their social group they generate expectations for themselves and other
members of their group about what kinds of behaviour are possible. It is these kinds
of situations, where agents exercise certain kinds of moral agency that are not seen as
accessible to them, or demonstrate an awareness of themselves as being equal
members of the moral community in defiance of the devaluation of their social
identities, that any unintelligibility generated by their stories is countered by an
understanding that these lives are morally significant. Indeed, unintelligibility arising
in these situations may reveal that the accounts given are morally significant. What is
important about the kind of moral accounts given is that those attending recognise
the integrity and authenticity of the person providing an account of themselves, even
if those attending cannot fully understand the reasons given nor are able to explain
why the person has shown integrity in their behaviour and choices. Consequently,
being a moral resister may entail a certain amount of unintelligibility, since the
person's actions are contrary to normative practices and social expectations.
Conclusion
Given the conditions necessary for a person to act in a way that is meaningful
to others, it is unsurprising that where comprehension is not facilitated by
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membership of privileged social group(s) persons may struggle to make themselves,
their choices and actions, intelligible to others. To be intelligible to others one must
be able to justify one's actions within a shared moral framework, but social
institutions which are exclusionary and unjust do not produce moral communities in
which everyone can have a say. The social expectations generated by normative
values create both a major barrier to the exercise of moral agency as well as an
impediment to understanding, and if taking responsibility for one's identity and
actions involves making oneself intelligible to others, then members of oppressed
social group(s) may be significantly disadvantaged by living lives frequently at odds
with settled expectations. If the social expectations and norms of the community
function to exclude some group members and deny them full moral agency, then
making themselves intelligible becomes a difficult task. When the given community
only allows for some voices to be heard, it is difficult to see how those who are
excluded can see themselves as persons whose viewpoint matters. Acting in ways
that are non-standard and engaging in non-normative practices may make it
impossible to convey the meaning of one's actions to others successfully, but this
does not make these actions meaningless; choosing to act in ways that challenge
social norms or values is meaningful in itself, independent of social uptake. Acting in
accordance with non-normative values defies others to be open to alternative
understandings, rather than simply dismissing one's behaviour as meaningless,
immoral, or crazy. These kinds of moral choices still demonstrate integrity since they
represent authentically held desires, but they may be difficult to explain to others
without a shared explanatory framework. In the final chapter I will look at some
examples of these kinds of moral choices by examining a number of moral accounts
in which the protagonist is portrayed as a moral resister and explain why I believe
these demonstrate steps towards the goal of being intelligible to others. In doing so I
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will revisit Babbitt's argument that failure to be understood does not necessarily
indicate moral failure, since it is sometimes necessary to first act in ways appropriate
to the kind of person one wants to be in order to become that person, and hence
partial intelligibility may be all that is achievable.
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6. Transformations
Introduction
In previous chapters, I suggested that both the categorisation and description
of membership of social groups may be implicated in undermining a person's ability
to develop competencies necessary for moral agency and, consequently, in their
reduced capacity for acting. Further, I argued that there are resistance possibilities
involved in persons taking responsibility for their identities, relationships and
practices by making these intelligible to others, particularly where the person's
actions are subject to stereotyping by mainstream understandings. In this chapter, I
will suggest that insisting on the meaningfulness of non-normative social identities
and practices can be understood as a means of resistance, particularly when this
involves reinventing stereotypical depictions of non-normative social identities. A
major difficulty in societies that treat some members unfairly is for those persons to
explain themselves in the absence of an explanatory framework within which their
actions are meaningful and intelligible to others. The reason this is so, I have
suggested, is because these persons value identities, relationships and practices that
are often contrary to what is considered normative. Insisting on the significance of
non-normative behaviours and values requires taking a moral risk and investing them
with a meaningfulness that may not always be recognised by others, hence the
potential for unintelligibility. However, before persons can challenge constraining
normative behaviour and social identities, they have to be seen as equal members of
the moral community. If they are not respected as equals they may suffer from
epistemic prejudice in the credibility economy as a result of their social identities, as
Fricker (2007) contends.
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If some persons lack credibility in the eyes of others because the content of
their lives is not meaningful in the same way as the content of other persons' lives, as
Gaita (1991) suggests, then what is needed is a space in which the content of their
lives, even if it is not fully understood, is recognised by others as meaningful. To
resist the demoralising expectations of others, including other group members,
persons belonging to subordinated groups need to develop feelings of self-worth, and
they can only do this when their moral lives are accorded the same respect as those
of members of privileged social groups. I argue that this self-valuing is only possible
when they cross over the boundaries between the fixed social categories of
oppression and inhabit the spaces in-between. I suggest that such an activity,
undertaken by the individual at the level of self-transformation by re-imagining
themselves as other than what they currently are, is only effective if it seeks to
change negative and stereotypical social identities.
Meaningfulness and explanatory frameworks
We derive meaning from events around us by interpreting those events in the
light of particular values, and what is considered salient is a matter of perspective
insofar as it depends upon "how the world appears from, to the narrator now, in the
light of her, his, or its own particular interests, needs, desires, and capacities"
(Scheman 2011, 196). In this way we make connections between events and
personages to bring sense to what is represented (Nelson 2001a, 14), and the
connections we make and the events and personages we consider salient reflect our
explanatory frameworks. This does not mean that whatever meaning we individually
impart to an identity, event or experience will be understood or accepted by others,
since discourse and meaning are subject to the same entrenched power relationships
as our other social interactions and institutions. Indeed, Naomi Scheman (2011, 196)
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contends that the subordinated and marginalised have to bring their perspective into
line with the privileged view from nowhere in order for their accounts to be taken
seriously.
That the meaning we instantiate is dependent on the paradigm through which
we interpret the world is evident in an example given by Laub (1992, 59–60) of the
testimony of a prisoner from a concentration camp where the inmates resisted and
blew up a crematorium.194According to historical sources only one chimney was
blown up, but the female survivor testified to seeing four chimneys in flames. From
the viewpoint of the prevailing historical paradigm the woman's account seems either
exaggerated, false or, at best, inaccurate; however, it may be possible to reinterpret
the woman's account by challenging the validity of the interpretive framework of
Nazi omnipotence and indestructibility. As Laub points out (1992, 60) if, instead, we
consider the woman's testimony as accurate then we can understand that by testifying
to armed revolt in Auschwitz she is testifying to the "breakage of a framework", one
in which the Nazi's are unassailable and the camp inmates are without agency or
choice. In Oliver's words, "she bears witness to something that in itself cannot be
seen, the conditions of possibility of Jewish resistance and survival" (2001, 16).
One way in which the credibility of the prevailing explanatory framework
may be challenged is to re-tell the narrative of the events in such a way as to make
visible the morally relevant details master narratives have suppressed, a process
Nelson terms telling a counterstory. A counterstory, as Nelson defines it, is one that
"resists an oppressive identity and attempts to replace it with one that commands
respect" (2001b, 50), where identity refers to the interaction between "a person's self-
conception" and how others conceive them (2001a, 6). As already discussed in
Chapter Two, in inequitable societies, the social identities created by identity power
194 This example is used by Oliver (2001, 1).
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tend to be constrictive and one-dimensional, and counterstories seek to replace these
stereotypical depictions by uncovering the prejudiced and misleading assumptions in
which they are grounded. It will be seen that counterstories necessarily involve
"counter-language", as defined by hooks (1991, 150), and which I mentioned in
Chapter Three, since they involve ways of speaking that may originate in the
oppressor's tongue but that are changed by the experience of oppression.
Pratt's (1984) autobiographical story, by uncovering the oppression of African
Americans which made her own white middle-class privilege possible, can be
thought of as a literal counterstory to the (master) narrative of family history told her
by her father. Pratt's story operates on several levels, since it is also sensitive to the
kind of subjective complexity described by the notion of the multiple self and to the
ways in which the construction of social institutions and practices privilege some
social identities at the expense of others. Pratt's account reflects her changing sense
of self over the course of her life and how her different selves experience the world
in terms of both privilege and/or oppression. As a woman, a lesbian and an adherent
of the Jewish faith she is formed by experiences of oppression, whereas as a middle-
class white woman she is constructed by class and race privilege. However, this
description of her various selves as separate unities simplifies the way in which
multiple identities function, as well as presenting an overly simplistic description of
the interplay between oppressed and privileged identities. For example, it seems
wrong to say she is oppressed as a Jewish lesbian when she experiences class and
race privilege. However, the privileging and oppression of some identities does not
cancel out others: it is not a zero sum game; the interaction of social identities is,
rather, a complex relationship that depends upon both the time and place in which
those identities are manifested. It is the process of identifying these intersections of
privilege and oppression at different times and places that makes Pratt's
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autobiographical story more than simply one woman's story.
The complex interplay between the various privileged and oppressed social
identities that Pratt possesses brings depth and texture to her analysis of how
exclusions are not only productive of privilege; they also contribute to defining her
as a person. Scheman (2011, 196) has described this ability to "recognise, articulate
and effectively communicate how the world appears from one's particular location"
as a kind of "perceptual autonomy", and she argues that having the capacity to give
one's own situated point of view is part of developing autonomy skills as well as
being central to autonomous narration. Consequently, the ability to make their
situated standpoint intelligible to others through the moral accounts they give
becomes a way for members of subjugated groups to demonstrate their competency
as moral agents, and hence may be useful in establishing their moral equivalence
with persons belonging to privileged groups.195
As de Lauretis has argued, and as I discussed in Chapter Three, there are
social and discursive spaces that are empirical and metaphysical borderlands, where
normative and non-normative are potentially juxtaposed and where contiguous and
dominant paradigms can be challenged and, therefore, where new meaning may
emerge. These spaces exist between self and other, and between the subject and the
addressable other. In these places it may be possible to question underlying
expectations and assumptions about identity, relationships, actions and values that
accompany inequitable power distributions, as Pratt is able to do, and, therefore, it
may be possible to declare the significance of non-normative choices, such as Pratt
coming out as a lesbian. It may also be possible to make claims about the moral
standing of members of subjugated groups so that the choices and practices
195 I discussed situated standpoints in more detail in Chapter Two.
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associated with them can acquire the meaningfulness of those practices associated
with persons considered equals in the moral community.
Interpretations of social identities that do not support the allocations of
privilege and authority determined by the forces of domination reveal another way of
seeing the world, one that may be antagonistic to assumptions about power and truth
contained in master narratives. These kinds of reinterpretations, like the testimony of
the witness to revolt in Auschwitz, present a challenge to normative understandings
by rejecting the totalising power of the dominant interpretative framework. Whether
these new understandings are completely intelligible to others is less important than
the recognition that there are other kinds of understanding than standard
interpretations.
Re-envisaging social identities
Laying claim to affirmative social identities is perhaps the most difficult
aspect of resistance, given that discrimination often functions by targeting members
of particular social groups precisely for being members of those groups. How can
one create a positive image that resists repressive conditioning if one's social identity
is inexorably linked to negative and/or stereotypical conceptualisations? More
fundamentally, how do the oppressed conceive of positive imagery for social
identities tarnished by the stereotyping imposed by dominant groups, given that the
oppressed may have internalised these stereotypes of attribute and behaviour and
social forces such as identity power may operate to reinforce these negative images?
It is not enough to claim that controlling images are stereotypes or deceptive as the
persistence of these perceptions demonstrates they can withstand a lot more than
mere contradiction; rather, the complexity of these identities needs to be made
explicit in order for the stereotyping to be revealed. I suggest later in this section that
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one way in which alternative representations can achieve this is to depict the multiple
selves that are obscured by dominant categorisations of social identities.
In redefining their identities, members of subjugated groups are faced with
the difficulties associated with either re-imagining existing identities or creating new
identities: if identities are re-imagined then such depictions have to interrogate
existing stereotypes perpetuated in master narratives, and if new identities are created
they face the problem of intelligibility, which I described in Chapter Five. In
addition, where new identities are created by individual group members they must
allow for difference within the group or risk duplicating the categorising effects of
oppression, and this is particularly the case where persons with multiple identities are
discriminated against within oppressed communities. Finally, since oppression tends
to either simplify or efface the complexity of multiple identities experienced by the
oppressed, some identities may need to be critically examined and either dismantled
or re-conceptualised. Consequently, redefinition of social identities by members of
oppressed groups has the difficult task of both counteracting the negative images
attached by dominant forms of categorisation as well as depicting persons who
belong to subjugated group(s) as unique individuals with multiple identities, in
addition to being members of a particular social group.
Such recreations of social identities by members of subordinate groups need
to be realistic, being honest about negative attributes and behaviours, and the reason
for their existence, while at the same time not portraying group members in the
stereotypical manner of mainstream depictions. Since morally reprehensible
behaviour, such as drug and alcohol abuse and accompanying violence and criminal
activities, may come out of lives lived under oppression and is frequently used by the
dominant as a reason to justify oppressive acts, the revelation of these behaviours
needs to be accompanied with insight into the power relationships that form the
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political and economic framework in which these behaviours are present.
Redefinitions of subordinate identities are complicated by the fact that negative
oppressive depictions may be internalised by group members, and even if these
aspects have been identified and recognised as alien by members of the group—as
artefacts of oppression—and, therefore, not necessarily inherent, they may be
difficult to differentiate from other characteristics. This is more likely to be the case
when individual group members have not positioned themselves critically with
regard to the social identities they are assigned by dominant categorisation schemes.
For example, a gay man who practices promiscuous behaviour and does not position
himself critically in regard to his social identity as a gay man, may be unable to
separate his own authentic desires from the stereotype of gay promiscuity.
A major problem for members of subjugated groups in re-imagining their
social identities is that other members of the social group may dispute the way in
which they are depicted, particularly where such descriptions ignore underlying
complex power relationships. For example, bell hooks has contested the liberating
potential of films such as Spike Lee's She's Gotta Have It, which "claim to tell
women's stories while privileging male narratives" (hooks 1989, 137).196 There is a
temptation on the part of group members to regard any depiction of their subjugated
identities as empowering because of its rarity.197 However, for these depictions of
subjugated social identities to be transformative rather than simply descriptive they
have to demonstrate an awareness of the power relationships involved and to
challenge destructive mainstream values. This kind of awareness is exemplified by
Toni Morrison in The Bluest Eye where she shows how the aesthetic value accorded
196 See hooks (1991, 181–83) for a discussion of the sexist portrayal of black women in the film.
197 I saw a production of a play by Aboriginal playwright Jack Davis in Geraldton in Western Australia
in the 1980s which gave discounted or free access to Aboriginal people; in spite of the confronting
subject matter the predominately Aboriginal audience was both enthralled and invested in the
story.
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to white skin negatively impacts black lives.198
Transforming the self by reinventing social identities
In order to re-envisage social identities, and hence transform the oppressed
self, persons must possess what Kim Atkins (2008, 136–37) calls narrative
competency, the ability to construct a coherent integrated story of identity reflecting
self-understanding and self-evaluation. We can only become persons we can regard
as worthwhile when we can utilise self-understanding and agential continuity to
adequately "articulate relations of mutual implication and explanation between our
constitutive attributes, relationships, actions, and sufferings, over time" (Atkins 2008,
137). Narrative competency requires the same kind of skill in communication,
interpretation and evaluation as autonomous agency, and, as discussed in Chapter
Three, thus presupposes the development of competencies in self-discovery, self-
definition and self-direction as identified by Meyers (Atkins 2008, 136–37).
Likewise, Scheman (2011, 96–97) argues that the capacity to give moral accounts
from a situated viewpoint is vital to autonomous narration as well as being necessary
for the development of autonomy competencies. The link between autonomy and
narrative competencies is revealed in the way social oppression operates through
master narratives, which may undermine autonomy by immobilising or diminishing
the members of subjugated groups.
Personal transformation is theorised by Atkins (2008, 119–20) and Mackenzie
(2008, 126–7) to occur through empathetically imagining oneself as another, which
one does by assuming another's first-personal perspective—what Mackenzie also
calls the "external perspective" (2008, 126)—as one's own. Such imaginings,
although partial, since there are limits to our empathetic capabilities (Mackenzie
198Alcoff (2006, 279) mentions this example.
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2008, 126), are empowering when they stem from a sense of the self as potentially
worthy. I argue that this is a kind of world-travelling, in which another's viewpoint
becomes our own, not as a means of understanding the other as Lugones (1987) has
suggested, but as a means of understanding the position of our future self. This is
similar to what happens when we make a decision and think something along of the
lines of: 'can I live with this?' The person who lives with the decision is a different
person, a person who has been changed or had their circumstances changed by the
choice made. However, this changed first-person has to be able to look back upon the
choice made and be able to connect to the first-person who was before the change; in
other words, once a change has been made the person has to be able to own it. For
something to be owned by a person in this sense it has to be something of
importance, not in an abstract or ideal way such as the desire for freedom, but as
something which their authentic self earnestly desires. Self-transformation can only
come about as a result of an affective force, which impels persons to conceive of
themselves and others in different ways from how they are currently existent. In
Morrison's telling, the difference between Sethe and Paul D. in Beloved, for example,
seems to be that for Paul D. such re-imaginings of the self are abstract and
potentially unrealisable whereas for Sethe they are accompanied by major changes to
her life and conception of herself.
The idea of alternatives of oneself is articulated in the work of Jan Bransen
who describes an alternative self as "a continuation of the person one is, such that 1)
this person is wholeheartedly moved to make one of the available choices, and 2) this
alternative succeeds in reconciling from her perspective the reasons for this one
choice with the crucial characteristics of one's own motivational profile" (2006, 19).
Mackenzie (2008, 123) further suggests that the role of imaginatively projecting
oneself is inherently ambivalent and to be useful in terms of narrative self-conception
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it must be constrained by four factors: one's physical embodiment, one's biographical
history, one's cultural context and social interactions, and one's practical identity. In
other words, there are limits on one's ability to creatively imagine oneself otherwise,
such as the external constraints provided by other people. However, we have to be
wary of applying these constraints without reference to a person's own unique
situation since, as Mackenzie (2008, 134) herself points out, there is a problem with
external constraints on a person who is being victimised or discriminated against and
whom external constraints could potentially disempower. Another difficulty, also
highlighted by Mackenzie (2008, 138), is that the information we have about
ourselves necessarily limits the imaginative project so that to some extent we need to
be open to what is outside us to open up our capacity for imagining ourselves
otherwise. Hence, the external constraints should work to limit the project but not to
constrain it from the outset, as they would if we were limited by normative
expectations. Although these constraints are not insignificant, in my view they are
not the determining factor in personal self-transformation; rather what principally
limits one's capacity to transform oneself is the impossibility of either seeing oneself
as one truly is right now or fully embracing a potential future self.
As I stated earlier, imagining another's first-person perspective is necessarily
partial (Atkins 2008, 119; Mackenzie 2008, 126); however, I believe it is the partial
nature of such imaginings which gives them power. As Mackenzie (2008, 122) points
out, if our imaginings are limited to what we know about ourselves and the world,
then they are necessarily limiting in terms of their transformative power. Such
imaginings, while not falling into "self-deception, self-indulgence, wishful thinking,
and other failures of agency" (Mackenzie 2008, 123), have to be able to entertain
novel and unfamiliar experiences in conceiving alternatives to the self. However,
given that the self one envisages has to be capable of looking back and recognising
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the self one is now there is an element of uncertainty in this process. Lives that are
open to many possibilities and provide those who are heedful with hope for change
are not those with a definitive end point. Lives that deal with ambiguities and
crossroads suggest potentialities that specific imaginings of other lives do not,
especially where the life imagined is one that transgresses normative values. An
example of this difference might occur if a heterosexual woman were to imagine
what it would be like to commit to a relationship with a man versus what it would be
like to imagine herself in a relationship with a woman. She has a certain amount of
information about what the experience of a heterosexual relationship would entail
and can glean more from her cultural context. Conversely, her ability to imagine her
life in a lesbian relationship is simultaneously constrained and enriched by the dearth
of cultural context; she may not be able to imagine most, or all, of what it is to be in
a lesbian relationship, but this may make her more, not less, open to the experience.
Note that her ability to imagine being in a lesbian relationship is limited by the four
factors Mackenzie suggests: being a woman, her remembered past as a heterosexual,
how transgressive being a lesbian is in her culture and whether she knows any
lesbians, and whether she can see a lesbian relationship as meaningful; however,
such imaginings are not limited by her ability to imagine being a lesbian according to
standard meanings. That is, if she can see being a lesbian as desirable for herself
even without knowing exactly what the experience involves, the partiality of this
imagining does not prevent her from embracing this alternative self and connecting
back with the heterosexual self that made this valuation.
It seems to me that what happens in personal transformation is closer to
Babbitt's (2001) understanding of such change than that theorised by Mackenzie
(2008). Mackenzie's understanding seems to suggest there is no difficulty in
imagining or articulating a future self; in contrast, Babbitt's approach suggests that
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although one may be able to imagine oneself other than what one is now what this
entails may be difficult to articulate to oneself, much less to others. Consider the case
when I am trying to decide whether or not to have a child; although I can read
literature, watch films and ask women who have given birth about the experience, I
am still limited in what I can imagine about what childbirth and motherhood
involves. In some ways what I can find out from the world limits my view of what
such an experience entails, and I might choose not to have a child based on the
negative reports of others, rather than making the decision with openness to all the
possible outcomes.
This may be an appropriate place to suggest a caveat on the use of the
imagination to effect self-transformation, and that is that such usage does not come
without a cost to the person. Babbitt (2001, 127) investigates this issue in detail and
concludes that sometimes this cost involves being less responsive in certain ways in
one's relationships in order to give precedence to moral and theoretical priorities.
While the cost may vary, the examples given in this chapter suggest that as well as
being transformative, reconceptualising the self as an imaginative exercise has the
potential to be damaging to whoever is involved and to those around them. For
example, when Pratt (1984, 26–27) came out as a lesbian her husband "threatened
and did violence, threatened ugly court proceedings" and not only took custody of
their children but moved them hundreds of miles away to restrict contact. Therefore,
standing behind non-normative social identities by re-envisaging them in ways that
are empowering may not only require members of subordinate groups to rehabilitate
these identities from the stereotypical imagery and negative expectations generated
by dominant characterisations, it may also entail considerable personal sacrifice.
An example of an affirmative life narrative which utilises transformative
imagery of social group identities is the self-styled "biomythography", Zami: A New
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Spelling of My Name (1982), by Audre Lorde, a semi-autobiographical story, which
also draws on myth and poetic re-imaginings. Anzaldua calls this kind of
fictionalised memoir "autohistoria", and she defines it as "the genre of writing about
one's personal and collective history using fictive elements" (2002b, 578). Anzaldua
(2002b, 560) argues that creating a personal narrative involves co-creating the
group/cultural story and requires the person to re-examine the dominant knowledge
systems constructing reality. Anzaldua describes the bridge or boundary between one
world and another as both "a barrier and a point of transformation" and suggests that
before crossing it is important to do the work of facing up to the part of you "holding
your failures and inadequacies, the negativities you've internalized, and those aspects
of gender and class you want to disown" (2002, 557). In other words, before it is
possible to transform themselves by boundary crossing between their social identities
persons must undertake a critical self-examination to uncover those internalised
forces that may be impeding change.
One interpretation of Zami is that it is an attempt by Lorde to uncover the
social forces that have acted upon her, and to recognise and document the strength
that has allowed her to survive the various oppressions she was subjected to by
inventing a new, mythic self, one able to cross over the boundaries between multiple
social identities and intersectional oppressions. By imagining herself as a "Black
woman warrior poet" Lorde can take responsibility for who she is by standing behind
her multiple identities as an African American lesbian. As someone possessing
multiple identities Lorde inhabits what AnaLouise Keating calls a "threshold
position", since thresholds "mark crisis points, spaces where conflicting values,
ideas, and beliefs converge, unsettling fixed categories of meaning" (1996, 2). By
intentionally locating herself in this manner, Lorde challenges the negative normative
meanings attached to her African American and lesbian identities by dominant
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interpretive frameworks. By claiming multiple re-imagined subjugated social
identities, Lorde’s project of self-definition also confronts those who view
themselves as possessing unitary identities "to re-examine the exclusionary terms
used to define their own personal and social locations" (Keating 1996, 2). However,
given the distorting effect oppression has on non-normative identities, such a strategy
is not without cost, as I mentioned above and as I discussed in Chapter Five. Persons
standing behind non-normative identities, relationships, and practices take the moral
risk that they will be misunderstood by others in the moral community. For persons
seeking to reinvent stereotypical social identities and imbue them with positive
meanings for themselves, the possible negative outcomes and moral risk have to be
weighed against the ongoing harm inflicted by multiple intersecting oppressions on
their moral capacities.199
While Lorde did not suffer the same economic disadvantage as many other
African Americans, she was subject to white racism both in "the world outside—that
world that defined us as doubly nothing because we were Black and because we were
Woman" (1982, 225), as well as within the lesbian community. Lorde (1982, 68–71)
describes a family visit to Washington D.C. in 1947 in which the practices of racism,
from the whites-only dining car on the train to the ice-cream parlour that will serve
them but not allow them to eat on the premises, constantly assail them. However,
because her parents attempted to protect their children from racism without ever
naming or explaining it,200 Lorde does not recognise the systemic nature of racism,
believing instead that she is somehow responsible for outcomes over which she has
no control, and the anger that she experiences has no target unless it is herself.
199 Lorde says of the damage caused by intersecting oppressions, "many of us wound up dead or
demented, and many of us were distorted by the many fronts we had to fight upon" (1982, 225).
200 For example, her mother took food for the train trip, describing the dining car as too expensive and
unhygienic, and was thus able to disregard the fact that African Americans were not allowed in the
dining car in 1947.
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Keating (1996, 148) argues that by denying the existence of racism her parents make
it impossible for Lorde either to name the force working against her, to respond
appropriately to it, or to define herself as an African American.201 In order to be able
to take responsibility for her identity, relationships, and practices, and to exercise
moral agency, Lorde has first to recognise and remove the barriers oppressive forces
produce in her and in the world which prevent her from developing and expressing
herself. These barriers operate both socially and psychologically to undermine her
sense of self as a person having the kinds of moral capacities that allow her to
exercise full moral agency in each of her social identities. Therefore, part of her
journey to self-definition involves standing behind aspects of herself, such as her
African American identity, that may invite negative expectations from others, and,
most importantly, re-envisaging these identities in ways which are empowering to
her. Reinventions of the self by reinventing social identities in this way are not
confined to the individual, but influence—and are, of course, influenced by—the
way these social identities are viewed by others.
By examining the way external and internal forces have distorted her sense
of self, Lorde's autohistoria, contrary to its self-proclaimed mythic status, becomes a
literal story of narrative self-constitution as strongly morally defining.202 Narrative
self-constitution, as I outlined in Chapter Three, entails persons being capable of
making sense of themselves by ensuring that their actions cohere with the narrative
of their beliefs, values and desires. Who we are at any point in time is dependent on
the way the different narrative strands come together. As we have seen, it is possible,
201 Lorde describes the way racism and sexism work against her as forces forming "a barrier to the
realization of my own powers ... which I had to examine and dismantle, piece by painful piece, in
order to use my energies fully and creatively" (1984, 147).
202 Both the article "Poetry is not a luxury" and her discussion with Adrienne Rich in Sister/Outsider
(1984) suggest Lorde considers her identity as a poet to have the same moral and political
dimensions as her other identities. For someone less concerned with injustice her career as a poet
might be categorised by Nelson (2001a, 15) as a story of non-moral self-definition.
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though, for persons to imagine themselves as other than who they are, and such
creative re-imaginings of oneself are not necessarily problematic even if they are
inaccurate.203 Indeed Mackenzie and Jacqui Poltera (2010, 47) challenge
Schechtman's (1996, 120) notion of the reality constraint as being too inflexible,
arguing that a certain amount of incoherence and self-contradiction within self-
constituting narratives is permissible, since to assume otherwise is to assume an
overly unified view of the self which does not reflect complexities such as internal
conflict and self-estrangement. Crucially, how significant such imaginative self-
narratives are depends upon their ability to persuade persons to commit to a
particular action, identity or relationship.
Like some other forms of self-transformation, re-imagining the self may also
involve a process of renaming, and in Lorde's case this renaming actively engages
with the reinvention of some of her multiple social identities, revealing how
entwined social identities are with a person's sense of self, so that actively seeking to
change one necessarily impacts on the other.204 I touched briefly on the connection
between recreating the self and renaming in my discussion on trauma survivors in
Chapter Three, and would argue that, when renaming involves the rejection of false
or demeaning labels, this activity is important to the development of moral capacities
which have been constrained by oppression. Self-definition, or renaming, is the
ability of the protagonist "to translate this experience into words she can share with
others, thus making possible collective transformations" (Keating 1996, 162), and
when undertaken by a member of a subjugated group it potentially challenges the
203 Whether inaccurate self-narratives are problematic may depend upon whether they are delusional
fantasies and therefore cannot be identity-constituting, as Schechtman (1996, 119–120) suggests,
or whether they are damaging to the person's self-actualisation and therefore represent a retrograde
step, as Mackenzie (2008) suggests.
204 Since slavery involves an effective de-naming, insofar as African American slaves were literally
deprived of their African names as well as their cultural identities, renaming for African Americans
also involves re-claiming this lost African identity (Keating 1996, 162).
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status quo. Keating also argues that Lorde's self-transformation "occurs only in the
context of others" implying an "intersubjective construction of personal identity and
an interactional self-naming process" (1996, 146). In this way Keating's analysis of
Lorde's journey to self-understanding and potential transformation suggests that self-
definition requires a relational understanding of autonomy and agency, which I
argued was the case in Chapter Three.
Although there is a fantastical element to Lorde's re-imagining of herself, it is
consistent with Mackenzie's criteria in being constrained by Lorde's physical
embodiment, biographical history, cultural context and social interactions, and any
fantastical elements can be attributed to her practical identity as a poet. The
transformation Lorde undergoes involves recognition and naming of herself as a
black woman, but she does this by interrogating and destabilising traditional identity
categories and re-imagining them as empowering for herself. By situating herself on
the borderlands of social categories Lorde is able to tell her story with an awareness
of the social relationships and institutional forces that have acted upon the person she
has become without being wholly determined by them. However, Lorde
acknowledges that the identities she claims might be distorted by stereotypes and
misunderstandings for others, so that standing behind the identities, relationships and
practices she finds meaningful also exposes her to the risk of unintelligibility and
moral failure.
Responsiveness to others
By acting in ways that are denied by oppressive expectations, individuals not
only re-envisage their own identities they also redefine their relationships and their
responsiveness to those persons who are significant in their lives. For example, in the
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film Samson and Delilah (2009),205 film-maker Warwick Thornton shows the
protagonists taking care of each other as a means of asserting moral competency. We
can read Samson and Delilah as embodying the addressable other to one another and
being reliant on one another for feelings of personhood and agency. Because they
value each other they affirm one another's sense of self and moral worth, and it is this
affirmation that allows them to be responsive to one another and act to rescue one
another at different moments in the story. For example, when Samson rescues
Delilah from the violence she suffers in the Aboriginal community as punishment for
her grandmother's death—effectively challenging the traditional view of Delilah's
responsibility and the expectations generated for her within the community—and
when Delilah, with his brother's help, rescues Samson from his dependency on
petrol-sniffing. In choosing to take responsibility for one another, they also take
responsibility, through the relationship, for themselves and their own choices.
However, these choices, like the choices made by Sethe for her children, and Sonny
for his transgendered partner, are also morally questionable. For instance, from the
point of view of her community Delilah shares the responsibility for her
grandmother's death, and it could be argued that as a member of that community she
should stay and make amends for failing her duty of care. Additionally, because
Samson steals his brother's truck to take Delilah away from the community this
causes his brother harm. It could be said that Samson puts his responsibility to
Delilah over that of his brother and she puts her responsibility to Samson over that of
205 Samson and Delilah (Thornton 2009) is a film written and directed by Aboriginal film-maker
Warwick Thornton, which portrays a young Aboriginal couple who leave their community in a
stolen truck after the death of Delilah's grandmother—whom Delilah helped make traditional
paintings—and Delilah is held responsible and beaten by the other women. They live under a
bridge on the outskirts of Alice Springs with an older Aboriginal man and where Samson continues
to sniff petrol as he did in the Aboriginal community. Delilah attempts to sell her own paintings
but is rejected by both a white art gallery and white tourists; she is later abducted and raped by
white youths, resorting to petrol sniffing herself until she is hit by a car and hospitalised. The film
ends with Samson's brother coming to town to take them back to the Aboriginal community and
from there Delilah takes Samson to her own country to break him of his dependency on petrol
sniffing.
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her community.
I described in Chapter Four how social arrangements create vulnerabilities
that, in turn, create moral obligations, and in this context taking care of her
grandmother is Delilah's socially-normed responsibility. In choosing to take care of
Samson, Delilah demonstrates what relationship is important to her, and this choice
differentiates and defines her as a moral person with a particular set of moral
obligations that do not accord with her community's expectations. In doing so she
shows moral integrity of the kind described by Walker (2007, 113) as reliable
accountability, and discussed in Chapters Four and Five, where integrity is not so
much a reflection of moral principles as it is an indicator of a person's dependable
responsiveness to others. It will be remembered that Walker suggested that we are
differently reliable, depending upon what relationships are important to us at a
particular time. Such responsiveness to others is a form of moral responsibility in the
care-taking sense proposed by Card (1996, 28), and which I discussed in Chapter
Four. In this sense, taking responsibility involves making a commitment to a project,
value or relationship, where taking responsibility is an active practice in which an
agent is prepared to stand behind certain practices, values or relationships, often
those that challenge the norms of the community. Accounts of commitments to a
particular relationship that may be denied or devalued in mainstream discourse, such
as Sonny's relationship with a transgendered person discussed in Chapter Four, allow
the oppressed to reinvent these relationships and practices, and the social identities of
the persons involved in terms of what the oppressed value or find meaningful in their
moral lives. However, in order to do so, they have to actively inhabit the
marginalised social and discursive space in which they are able to exercise some
moral agency by standing behind the practices, identities and relationships they
value.
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Social and discursive spaces in which to act
The history of rejections experienced by Lorde and Sethe, as well as by
Samson and Delilah, point to the difficulties persons have in discovering and
inhabiting a social space in which their practices, identities and relationships have
meaning. Finding space in which to act, to make claims to the value and
meaningfulness of marginalised identities and practices, is not easy and involves
actively seeking out spaces in the margins where such behaviour is possible.
However, realistically speaking, many of these attempts will be unsuccessful due to
the strength of opposing forces and historical differences in the interaction of these
forces in different times and places. For example, in spite of the many dislocations
caused by the white colonisation of Australia, Samson and Delilah are in their own
country and traditionally Australian Aboriginal persons link their sense of self with
an idea of place, or 'country'. As a result the experience of contemporary Aboriginal
Australians in traditional communities is one of potential empowerment and
transformation which is nevertheless simultaneously constrained and distorted by
external white racism and internal negative forces.
In Chapter Three I suggested that social spaces which are apparently safe and
empowering to a subordinate group are neither totally free from external influences
nor from internal struggle for recognition by some group members. Consequently,
although members of oppressed groups may feel safer in their own communities this
is not always the case, and they may need to leave the apparent safety of their own
group and move into boundary or threshold spaces. For example, in Samson and
Delilah, the negative events that occur in town may appear at first to be the result of
moving from a safe Aboriginal space into a racist white space, one in which they are
literally marginalised, but it is clear from the scenes of substance abuse and physical
violence that, as well as being partially constructed by colonialism and white racism,
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the Aboriginal community is anything but safe.
Re-imaginings of the self frequently involve travelling between places, and
recognising the differences between the self in one place and in another, much as
Lugones describes world-travelling, which I discussed in Chapter Two. For example,
in Samson and Delilah, how the two protagonists are situated in the world affects
both their sense of self, as well as playing a major role in determining when and how
they choose to act, particularly in terms of taking responsibility for one another.
Although the idea of country as it is understood by Indigenous Australians refers to a
physical space, the final scenes of the film where Delilah takes Samson back to her
country to care for him seem to be allegorical rather than real, so that the idea of
country may also represent another space in the film, perhaps a borderlands of sorts
between the two social spaces which undermine their moral agency, an imagined
space in which Delilah is empowered to act. In these scenes, which reveal both her
moral agency and her sense of moral responsibility towards Samson and their shared
relationship, Delilah is depicted as capable of rescuing Samson from both the white
racism that paralyses him in town and the powerlessness he experiences as an
Aboriginal man even when he is in Aboriginal community. The implication is that
Samson's relationship with Delilah is potentially empowering, in part because she is
empowered by finding, or perhaps imagining, her own space. Whether or not this is
an actual social space, the film hints at the possibility that there is somewhere they
can live free of harm. In earlier chapters I argued that space is productive of a
person's sense of self, and Delilah finds her capacity for moral agency in a space that
is neither white nor Aboriginal, somewhere neither real nor imaginary, but on the
boundary in-between. For Samson to be able to realise a positive sense of self rather
than experience himself objectified by racism he needs to move away from both the
apparent safety of the Aboriginal community, a space which I explained earlier is
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partially constructed by oppressive forces, as well as from the white spaces (the town
and the marginalised 'black' space under the bridge).
From the point of view of developing agency competencies, the scenes of
Delilah 'saving' Samson by taking him away from the powerlessness he experiences
in the black community are comparable to those in which Sethe 'saves' her children
by physically taking them away from Sweet Home, a place for ex-slaves. The idea
that the space represented by Delilah's country is a separate space, somewhere apart
from both white and black communities in the rest of the film, in which both
imaginative transformation and moral agency are possible, is also hinted at in the
creative space of her artworks which straddle both Aboriginal and white social
spaces. One way of interpreting the film is that Delilah's place of country is also a
physical representation of the space previously only hinted at in the artworks, the
space of self-transformation. In reality it is not clear to what extent self-
transformation is possible for Samson and Delilah, perhaps one reason Thornton, the
writer and director, chooses to be ambiguous about the reality of the final scenes. In
situating themselves between Aboriginal and white communities Samson and Delilah
also take the moral risk of being unintelligible to both groups, so that their world-
travelling positions them as other wherever they are. However, the final scenes of the
film, allegorical or not, elicit hope rather than despair, suggesting, as Babbitt (2001,
82) argues and I discussed in Chapter Five, that the possibility of moral failure is a
moral risk worth taking when pursuing a certain kind of moral agenda.
Limitations on re-imagining the self
Earlier I suggested that one way of creating new meaning is to interrogate the
assumptions and expectations contained in dominant explanatory frameworks, since
frequently persons who are oppressed have no model within the dominant paradigm
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of what constitutes the exercise of moral agency for someone with their social
identities. For example, earlier in this chapter I discussed a woman who challenged
the dominant paradigm of Nazi power as unassailable by testifying to armed revolt in
Auschwitz. In order to challenge the totalising effect of the dominant paradigm and
to resist the expectations of others, persons have to be able creatively to imagine the
world and themselves as other than what it is presently; a slave has to act in ways
which are not wholly determined by external, conventional conceptions of how a
slave should act. As Babbitt (1994, 10–11) suggests, in order for persons to see
themselves as someone with moral worth they may first have to make choices
commensurate with this self-evaluation; in other words, persons may have to act first
and become the person they hope to be through the choices they make. However, as I
have already discussed, such a choice involves the person taking a moral risk, since
where their choices conflict with normative expectations there is always the
possibility that they will be misunderstood, as Babbitt's example of Sethe in Beloved
reveals.
Sethe is someone who has been objectified by slavery and racism but whose
consciousness of how these forces have constrained her choices and threaten those of
her children are indicative, not only of her own sense of herself as a person who has
been treated unjustly but also of a strongly developed moral self. For Sethe to feel
that she and her children are treated unjustly she must believe that she and her
children have more worth than that of mere chattels; she must see herself first and
foremost as a person, not a slave. Being able to imagine oneself as other than what
one is involves not only imagining what other possibilities might exist, but also
involves questioning expectations and assumptions held about members of one’s
social group. In telling her story, Morrison has Sethe make claims about what is
important, which differ from the expectations of what a slave or ex-slave should
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value. Babbitt describes this as having a "certain sort of self-concept" where "it is
sometimes the case that one pursues an identity and community in order to make
appropriate judgments of importance, rather than taking specific ways of being to be
important because of one's community" (2001, 86). Hence, the value that Sethe
accords her daughter and her relationship with her daughter is based on a self-
concept which is aspirational rather than one Sethe has achieved. For example, Sethe
acts in ways that suggest she has become someone other than who she was, someone
other than an ex-slave, in fact someone who sees herself as having a value
commensurate with being an equal member of the moral community. Because she
acts in accordance with this self-concept, as if it was the case that she is an equal
member of the moral community, her actions are the actions of someone who values
herself as an equal to others, and this makes them largely unintelligible to others who
do not see her this way. In order to see her actions as she intends them, others would
have to see Sethe as she sees herself, and this is a problem for both whites and for
other ex-slaves.
Calhoun (1999a, 90) describes this as having a commitment to a moral
principle that is not intelligible to others. When a person's actions are unintelligible
for the reason that they do not have meaning within the explanatory framework
available, then the person will be unable to adequately explain to others why they
have made the choices they have. However, others may recognise such persons as
possessing the qualities necessary for equal membership of the moral community and
accord them evaluative worth, even if the content of their moral accounts is not fully
understood. This recognition may occur if others see persons who transform
themselves through redefining social identities and asserting non-normative values,
identities, relationships and practices as living meaningful lives, irrespective of
whether such lives are fully intelligible to others. Such transformations challenge the
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standard expectations held by others about persons with these social identities, since
they involve persons acting upon their own beliefs that they are morally competent
and capable of making decisions that are worthwhile regardless of dominant
understandings of their moral capabilities. For persons in these situations their
choices and actions have value because they become the person they aspire to be
through acting as they imagine this person would act, defying normative
expectations.
These points suggest that acting in accordance with a self-concept that is not
fully articulated, and/or in defiance of normative expectations, involves taking a
moral risk and leaves persons vulnerable to being misinterpreted or misunderstood.
There are also some other problems with the project of re-imagining the self which
may not be easily overcome, particularly by individuals on their own, as they arise
from the way power relationships work to enforce particular paradigms by denying
the validity of alternative voices. Fricker's analysis of prejudice in the credibility
economy suggests that persons may deny some persons' claims or testimony on the
basis of the latter's social identity. What is accepted as knowledge or factual is not
based on facts in the real world but on how those facts are interpreted in ways which
support entrenched power relationships and the social institutions. In other words,
the 'truth' often functions to maintain the status quo, so that counter claims, to the
positive value of subjugated social identities, for example, are seen as
questionable.206 For example, in To Kill a Mockingbird (Lee 2006), Tom Robinson
lives at a time and in a place in which African Americans lack moral equivalence and
are not expected to be capable of self-reflection and moral competency. Therefore,
206 Where stereotypical notions about a social group are used to justify unfair treatment of some
persons, members of privileged groups may act as if what they believe to be true corresponds with
facts about the world and therefore that their beliefs are true, making such beliefs and the facts
they enforce difficult to contest. Babbitt says where "the truth of a proposition is not expected ...
further understanding of such a proposition depends upon ... examining its implications for
background beliefs and practices, as well as for interpretation of other events" (2001, 168).
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Tom's explanation for his behaviour in regard to Mayella Ewell is incomprehensible
to his white audience, since a black man should not feel sorry for a white woman
because to do so is to suggest an equality, or perhaps even superiority of moral
behaviour, which the white racist paradigm denies. As hooks suggests, prejudice in
the credibility economy also exists within subjugated social groups. Although it
would appear more likely that members of a person's own social group would affirm
that person's experiences and claims, as Paul D.'s rejection of Sethe's claims
suggests, it may instead be the case that other members of a person's group have
internalised their subjugation and are unable to imagine any other way of living, or
they believe that it is impossible to act in ways other than in accord with normative
expectations. It is also possible that members of oppressed groups feel fearful when
one of their number claims a different experience, perhaps fearing retribution by
members of the dominant group. Frequently, fear of what might happen to
themselves encourages members of oppressed groups to enforce the subjugation of
other group members. Persons may be denied validation by others for all these
reasons; yet without validation, Laub (1992, 80) says, persons may not be an
authentic witness to themselves, undermining their sense of self. Mackenzie (2008,
133) suggests that one way we can check the plausibility of our narratives (about a
putative future self) is to seek advice from others; however, since it is possible to
imagine how this external other might respond then we can also regard ourselves as
this other imagined respondent, much as the internal other provides an addressable
other to validate our sense of self. This would seem to confirm Babbitt's analysis that
in some circumstances exercising moral agency requires persons to act in accordance
with a self-concept which may not be accepted by others.
There are indications, given that the viability of social practices and the
institutions they instantiate rely on collective agreement about what counts as a fact
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(Searle 1995, 117), and acceptance of what is a fact changes over time as institutions
change, that perhaps imaginative re-conceptualisation plays some role, albeit
indirectly, in the way social institutions evolve. However, it would be overly
optimistic to assume that such collective re-imaginings are always necessarily
positive for persons resisting oppressive forces. Given that identity power, which
creates understandings of social identities as a result of shared imaginative
conceptions, operates in conjunction with other kinds of social power, it may, in
practice, in inequitable societies, work to enforce stereotypical depictions and unfair
expectations of these group members.
In addition to the possibility of negative interpretations, there are also the
external and internal constraints on the project of self-reinvention, which I discussed
earlier in this chapter. The nature of self-knowledge is such that there are always
aspects of the self that are unknown and unknowable. As a result, such re-imaginings
of social identities are necessarily partial since they depend upon factors beyond the
control of the individual for social uptake to occur. Consequently, there is a sense in
which the work of re-conceptualisation of identities is ongoing rather than something
which can be readily achieved, and it would be simplistic to suggest that simply re-
imagining one's identity is sufficient for a person to resist oppressive forces. Rather, I
suggest that the project of self-definition plays an important, albeit small, part in
developing the autonomy competencies essential for moral agency, and that positive
ascriptions of characteristics give persons a sense of being persons whose moral
qualities engender the respect of others.
Conclusion
If, as I suggested in Chapter One, oppression is connected to a person's social
identities, both in the way persons are categorised and in the problematic dynamics
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of these identities, such as stereotyping, devaluing and objectification, then re-
imagining or reclaiming those identities may be an important initial step towards
resisting oppression. I have suggested that resisting stereotypes and other negative
depictions of social identities involves actively resisting the kinds of assumptions
and expectations attached to them in dominant discourses. Consequently, seeing
themselves in ways which reject dominant expectations may be important for
members of subordinate groups to live authentic lives. Such imaginings are
necessarily partial, as we have seen, since there are significant limitations on a
project of self-reinvention: internal constraints imposed by the distortion of identities
by oppressive forces and restrictions on narrative self-construction, and external
constraints, including normative expectations, difficulties gaining epistemic
credibility, and exclusion from social spaces. In addition, we have also seen that such
a use of moral imagination may not be without a cost, and persons who attempt such
a project may be seen as having unsuccessful and unintelligible moral lives. Given
that the alternative may be to endure lives distorted by oppressive forces, however,
persons who are members of subordinate groups may undertake the project of self-
transformation through the reinvention of social identities because doing so positions
them as persons who see themselves as worthy members of the broader moral
community.
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Conclusion
In this thesis I have suggested that persons whose moral competencies have
been compromised by inequitable social power relationships are disadvantaged as
moral agents because they have been unable to fully develop the skills necessary to
function as equal members of the broader moral community. I have argued that the
diminishing of effective moral agency is often closely connected to the categorisation
of persons into social groups based on sex, race, class, sexuality, age and ability, and
the characterisation of persons belonging to some of these groups as having reduced
capacities of moral reflection, choice and action. Perceived differences in moral
competency between the members of different social groups may justify the
presumption that some persons are less able members of the moral community on the
basis of their social identities. One outcome is that members of these subordinate
social groups suffer from prejudice in the credibility economy (Fricker 2007), so that
any claims to experience or knowledge are liable to be dismissed on the basis of their
social identity. The perception that some persons are less able members of the moral
community on the basis of their social identities is related to the presumption that
some lives are not meaningful in the same way others are because the identities,
relationships and values persons choose to stand behind are non-normative. I have
indicated that self-defined group standpoints may counter these perceptions by
allowing members of subordinate groups to make knowledge claims that are
considered credible by others both inside and outside their groups. Such claims may
also pose a challenge to established interpretive frameworks and undermine
dominant classification schemes by asserting the importance of alternative social
identities in the form of plural or multiple selves and the value of non-normative
practices and relationships.
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While the idea of self-definition of standpoint groups may be attractive to
members of subordinate groups it may also be problematic because of the way that
social categorisation functions as a form of control in hierarchical societies. In
inequitable societies social identities operate to limit and control the moral agency of
members of subordinate groups by derogating the moral capabilities of group
members and marginalising them in regard to the broader moral community. It may
also be self-defeating for oppressed persons to assert claims to social identities that
have been constructed as a means of their marginalisation, since such attempts at
self-definition may be co-opted and utilised to support the agenda of dominant social
groups and institutions (Collins 2002, 208).
In addition, since ways of knowing, including understandings of identity, are
mutual constructions which depend upon the affirmation of others, then claims to
new identities which are made unilaterally may not be intelligible to others. This is
especially the case where the framework for understanding has been displaced, since
understanding and uptake of moral choices requires an explanatory framework
arising from a shared moral system (Calhoun 1999a, 83). If persons also lack
epistemic credibility on the basis of their social identities (Fricker 2007) because the
content of their lives is not meaningful in the same way the content of other persons'
lives is meaningful (Gaita 1991), then this increases the likelihood that their
identities and choices will be incomprehensible to others.  At a minimum, epistemic
credibility requires that others acknowledge that a person's choices and actions are
indicative of a self-reflective person, that is, a person capable of moral agency.
I have suggested that some social identities are treated as morally inferior
because persons who belong to these social groups are not considered to be of equal
standing in the moral community, and this lack of valuing by others may make it
difficult for persons to have evaluative self-respect for themselves (Dillon 1995,
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294). Consequently, in order to respond to these circumstances positively, I have
contended that individuals may have to act as if they are persons whose moral
qualities and self-worth entitle them to be treated with respect, and hence deserving
of the respect of others, even if they are not accorded respect by those around them.
For persons who are devalued by society, seeing themselves as persons of moral
worth is a transformative process because it requires seeing both themselves and the
world as other than how they are normatively perceived.
The implication of this, I have proposed, is that resistance to being treated as
morally inferior may involve the transformation of the self through the reinvention of
negative social identities into positive ones that persons can stand behind. Since
categories of identity are rarely uncontested (Parmar 1990, 118), I have argued that
by claiming multiple identities members of subordinate groups may avoid some of
the problems associated with standard social categories. A pluralist approach also
addresses the issue that social identities are not fixed; rather they are both fluid and
complex, making assignment to a social group as a means of classification uncertain
at best. Additionally, self-defining through claiming multiple group identities may
redress the problem of the negative and stereotypical way aspects of the self appear
in "dominant systems of representation" (Parmar 1990, 116) for persons whose social
identities are considered 'other'.
Such a project means morally marginalised persons may have to imagine or
invent a self which is not yet instantiated and act in accordance with this self-image
(Babbitt 2001). I have contended that certain thoughts and actions represent
resistance because they arise from morally marginalised persons' consciousness of
the situation which leads to a re-imagining of their selves as situated identities. The
resistance potential of these thoughts and actions stems from the re-imagining
occurring within a conceptual space in which the person chooses to examine and
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question the normative expectations attached to their social identities rather than be
constrained or defined by them. This notion helps explain why acts of re-imagining
or reinvention of the self through the creation of alternative social identities have
resistance potential. I have suggested that, although non-normative identities,
relationships and practices may not receive social uptake because they are not
understood by members of the broader moral community, persons affirming these
practices and values may be recognised as living meaningful lives and possessing the
qualities necessary for equal membership of the moral community, and accorded
corresponding evaluative worth, even if the content of their lives is unintelligible.
Pluralist conceptions of the self are not only useful in understanding the effect
that multiple intersecting oppressions have on persons belonging to more than one
subjugated social group, they also provide viewpoints that may otherwise be lost in
systems that categorise persons in dualistic ways. The partial and critical nature of
the situated knowledges that arise from a pluralist re-positioning of the self provides
a counterpoint to the totalising viewpoint of dominant knowledge systems
(Haraway1988, 584). And since social identities are fluid, such situated partial
locations are also, necessarily, transitional. Thus, by constantly shifting the viewpoint
that is privileged, the critical positioning of a pluralist identity promotes the
interrogation of static interpretive frameworks. Such a project therefore unsettles the
dichotomy of privileged versus oppressed and margin versus the centre which
enables systematic forces of domination operating through processes of
categorisation to enforce control.
I have indicated that transformative notions of identity and space require
persons inhabiting the margins to adopt situated critical stances which reject
dichotomising interpretive frameworks, such as asserting the primacy of multiple
selves evident in plural social identities. What makes the idea of these acts of self-
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assertion and self-creation significant in terms of resistance is when persons position
themselves critically in regard to their social identities. This may involve inhabiting
interstitial or transitional social spaces, such as in the margins of discourses, in the
spaces between one identity and another, or on the threshold between realities, where
the possibility for resistance and transformation exists. Situational approaches to
resisting stereotypical identities therefore require persons to displace themselves and
cross the boundaries between different social identities or social groups. Positioning
themselves in social and discursive borderlands allows morally marginalised persons
to see alternative viewpoints and ways of being rather than being wholly defined, and
their choices and actions constrained, by dominant interpretive frameworks.
Normative expectations that accompany assignment of social identities can
be harmful and incapacitating, and social and psychological barriers to action may
reduce a person's ability to make claims to being of equal standing in the broader
moral community, both of which impact upon a person's moral agency. However, just
as no-one can be said to be wholly constrained by external forces, no-one can be said
to be wholly defined by them, since where persons are wholly constrained there
would be no resistance potential (Foucault 1983, 221). Therefore, although
constraints on the actions of members of subordinate social groups arising from
inequitable social practices and institutions may impede moral agency in these
persons, they do not wholly preclude the possibility of moral agency. Given that
autonomy is considered a necessary condition for moral agency, and self-definition is
a skill required for autonomy competency (Meyers 2004, xvii), then acts of self-
transformation through the reinvention of social identities reveal a person as a
functional moral agent, and I have argued, are crucial for resistance.
Normative expectations attached to social identities used to categorise
persons in terms of their sex, race, sexuality, age and ability are substantial
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contributory factors in determining individual choice and the limits of moral agency.
My principal interest in this thesis has been with the resistance possibilities available
to persons whose sense of self-worth and capacity to respond as moral agents has
been compromised by unfair social expectations in inequitable societies. I have
suggested that, in these circumstances, resistance requires the reinvention of the self
which depends upon a critical re-positioning obtained "through practices of political
and personal displacement" (de Lauretis 1990, 145) across the boundaries between
different social identities. The re-envisioning of the self as one that is constantly
changing from one situation to the next is best exemplified in the idea of the multiple
or plural self, an understanding that also unsettles fixed notions of social
categorisation. In addition to developing feelings of self-worth and the capacity for
self-reflection, the process of self-definition involves skills in both autonomy and
narrative competency and may also provide a means for persons with diminished
moral agency to act within the constraints imposed by inequitable social institutions
and practices.
I envisage that the strategies for resistance I have proposed here may be taken
up by persons who are struggling for positive recognition in Western societies, such
as persons who are marginalised by their sex, race, sexuality, age or ability. Rather
than directing self-defined group standpoints at members of their own group, such
persons may benefit from taking up the "excessive critical position" (de Lauretis
1990, 145) discussed in Chapter Three, which is attained by displacement across the
boundaries between social identities, and social and discursive spaces; such a
position allows the interrogation of both dominant perspectives and those generated
by other members of their subordinate group. For persons who are marginalised by
their sex, race, sexuality, age or ability, this may involve questioning and challenging
dominant assumptions and expectations about what it means to have moral worth and
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live a morally exemplary life in contemporary Western societies, such as Australia.
This thesis is proffered as a contribution to feminist ethics in the area of
identity politics, building on feminist epistemological projects in situated
knowledges and epistemic injustices, and feminist perspectives on the self,
particularly projects aimed at re-conceptualising the self as multiple. Many of the
ideas expressed here would benefit from further research and thought, particularly
the notion that a person's moral development and competency is closely connected to
their ability to redefine negative social identities through attaining a critical
positioning with regard to their own group standpoint. Given that moral accounts of
non-normative identities, relationships and practices given by members of
subordinate groups are often unintelligible, it would also be useful for future
researchers to consider whether the insights gained from situational awareness can be
made intelligible to others, as well as to what extent the moral accounts given by
members of subordinate groups have the ability to change dominant perceptions of
their credibility.
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